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Abstract
This study reconsiders the road to war narrative by focusing on cooperation rather than
conflict in Anglo-Italian relations. I link international and imperial historical methods in
order to examine British and Italian efforts to cooperate over their clashing interests in
empire between 1922 and 1940. By comparing six case studies drawn from British and
Italian archives, this thesis explains why the two governments pursued cooperation over
empire; how imperial methods facilitated or challenged cooperation; and what this tells us
about the global order and the norms that governed it during the interwar years. Three case
studies highlight imperial spaces where cooperation was relatively successful and three case
studies explore imperial crises which created great challenges for cooperation. British and
Italian attempts at cooperation reveal the hybrid nature of international relations during the
interwar years combining nineteenth century norms and practices with norms of
internationalization embodied by the League of Nations.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Many historians have painted the 1920s and 1930s as a steady decline into war as
Fascist ideology became increasingly revisionist while the European democracies attempted
to enforce the status quo. Anglo-Italian relations during this time have been characterized as
an inevitable clash between Fascism and democracy. My thesis project aims to reconsider
how we think about global order and the ‘road to war’ by focusing on cooperation instead of
conflict. Building on recent trends in international history and studies of empire, my thesis
bridges these two bodies of literature in order to explain what Anglo-Italian cooperation at
these imperial-international intersections reveals about the global order in the 1920s and
1930s. In this context, cooperation refers to rules, norms, and practices defined bilaterally for
the purpose of navigating, mediating, and limiting imperial competition and clashing
interests.
My thesis employs a comparative approach to analyze two categories of case studies
in British and Italian cooperation over empire: one category examines the Arabian Peninsula,
the Palestine Mandate and Malta where Italian imperial ambitions clashed against the
established imperial presence of Britain and the other category explores Fascist imperial
conquest in Corfu, Abyssinia and Albania, sovereign states which put these cases in the
League of Nations’ spotlight. British and Italian attempts at cooperation reveal the hybrid
nature of international relations during the interwar years combining nineteenth century
norms and practices with norms of internationalization embodied by the League of Nations.
These case studies suggest a new interpretation of this so-called interwar period: rather than
see it as an interlude between conflicts or a period when international order broke down, we
can see a commitment to that order and discern the rules, norms, possibilities and limits of a
Eurocentric global order.
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Introduction
Cooperation, Empire, and Global Order
In the winter of 1937, Ivy Chamberlain, the wife of former British Foreign
Secretary Austen Chamberlain, took one of her many vacations to Rome to escape the
dark and gloomy London weather. Upon her arrival in the cloudless city of Rome, Ivy
was charmed by an extravagant private dinner with Benito Mussolini and his closest
advisors.1 After entertaining Ivy for an evening, the Fascist dictator immediately got
down to business with the widow of his old family friend. The morning after her
elaborate reception, Ivy met with officials from the Italian Foreign Ministry for an
informal briefing on relations between the two countries. Later that week, Ivy sat down
with Mussolini to discuss the prospective Anglo-Italian Agreement. The Duce requested
that she tell him what “the feeling in England was for Italy” to which she replied “we
would like friendship and I’m sure that that is the wish of both Neville and Anthony.”2
The dictator expressed his sincere desire for friendship with England, referencing the
‘tradition’ of Anglo-Italian cooperation since Italian unification.3 Appealing to both the
long history of cooperation between the two countries and Austen Chamberlain’s friendly
predisposition toward the Fascist regime in the 1920s, Mussolini persuaded Ivy of his
‘genuine’ intentions to determine an understanding with her brother-in-law in London.
Combining sociability, established connections, and matters of state, the most
powerful members of the Fascist leadership discussed with Ivy the various areas that an
Anglo-Italian agreement would cover.4 As formal negotiations came to a close weeks
later, Neville Chamberlain thanked his sister-in-law for her role in “the creation of the

1

Ivy to Neville, 16 December 1937, Neville Chamberlain Papers, Cadbury Research
Library, UK [hereafter NC] 1/17/5.
2
3
4

Ivy to Neville, 16 December 1937, NC 1/17/5.
Ivy to Neville, 16 December 1937, NC 1/17/5.
Ivy to Neville, 22 February 1938, NC 1/17/8.
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atmosphere in Rome necessary for opening conversations.”5 While unorthodox in their
diplomacy, both the British and Italian leaderships demonstrated a desire to restore the
tradition of Anglo-Italian friendship and preserve cooperation between the two countries
despite their clashing interests and ideological incompatibility.
***
In accounts of the ideological polarization that has characterized the road to the
Second World War in Europe, we might expect reports of cooperation between
democratic Britain and Fascist Italy to be infrequent. The dominant narrative of this
period privileges national division, ideological tension, and stories of conflict with the
final declaration of war clearly in sight. A more nuanced analysis of the norms and
standards that guided the postwar order and the tensions that they created allows for a
deeper understanding of how states navigated and mediated the complex and multilayered global order between the two wars. My thesis links international and imperial
historical methods in order to examine British and Italian efforts to cooperate over their
clashing interests in empire. Recently, scholars have emphasized the need to explore the
role of international cooperation during the interwar years.6 The emergence of
international institutions and the rise of multilateralism provided an opportunity for
cooperation across borders at not only a political level, but also on social, cultural, and
technological projects. Likewise, recent histories of empire have highlighted imperial
cooperation, knowledge transfers, and the transnational networks that constitute empire.7
Imperial frontiers were porous. Empires and the people within them exchanged ideas,

5

Neville to Ivy, 3 March 1938, NC 1/17/9.

6

See Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order. (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1997); Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the
1920s, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Mark Mazower, Governing the
World: The History of an Idea. (New York: Penguin Press, 2012); Glenda Sluga,
Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2013); Daniel Gorman, International Cooperation in the Early Twentieth Century.
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017);
7

See Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski (eds.), Imperial Co-operation and Transfer,
1870-1930. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., 2015).
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information, and methods across fragile borders. My thesis bridges these two bodies of
literature in order to explain what Anglo-Italian cooperation at these imperialinternational intersections reveals about global order in the 1920s and 1930s.
Through an examination of Anglo-Italian cooperation over empire between 1922
and 1940, my thesis explores three over-arching questions: Why did the British and
Italian governments pursue cooperation in empire during the 1920s and 1930s? How did
imperial methods facilitate or challenge cooperation between the British and Italians?
And what does the course of Anglo-Italian cooperation over empire tell us about the
imperial system, the role of the League of Nations within it, and the norms that governed
the imperial project during the interwar years? The central argument of this thesis is that
Anglo-Italian cooperation over empire reflects an intersection, and in several instances, a
tension between different layers of the global order in the 1920s and 1930s, between
nineteenth century imperial norms and the ideals of the League of Nations system.
In my thesis, cooperation refers to rules, norms, and practices defined bilaterally
for the purpose of navigating, mediating, and limiting imperial competition and clashing
interests. The British and Italians clashed over empire throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
The Mediterranean and Red Sea basins emerged as sites of intense imperial rivalry as
both powers pursued a policy of expansion and consolidation of interests in the region. In
view of this escalating competition, the British and Italians opted to pursue a policy of
cooperation in which the two empires supported a set of norms and practices from which
they both benefited. To a certain degree, cooperation was necessary. Until 1940, neither
the British nor the Italians believed that they had the capacity to become regional
hegemons. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, it was in both empires’ interest to limit
competition and collaborate to safeguard their positions in the Mediterranean and the
Middle East.
Cooperation looked and functioned differently across imperial space. In some
spaces, cooperation was a system. These systems often emerged out of imperial
agreements or understandings that institutionalized common practices and behaviours
toward empire. More frequently, cooperation was used as a tool to navigate competition

4

and conflicting interests. The two empires used cooperation when it suited their own
interests and those of the imperial project more broadly. At times, the British and Italians
used cooperation as a tactic to circumvent international oversight, silence anticolonial
nationalism, and maintain empire embroiled in international crisis that demanded change.
Cooperation between the British and Italians was based on the assumption that
imperial competition needed limits.8 This did not mean, however, that competition ceased
to exist. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the British and Italians continued to compete
for space, resources, and influence in empire. To focus on cooperation is not to see the
world through rose-coloured glasses. Cooperation between the British and Italians was
not easily achieved. Often times, the systems of cooperation established in imperial
spaces were not ideal for either empire. The British and Italians frequently compromised
over their interests. On a number occasions, the mutual policy of cooperation endured
great strain as the Italians attempted to push its boundaries to the limits. The British and
Italian Empires nevertheless used cooperation as a tool to navigate between their
obligations to the League of Nations, their competing ambitions, and their own
vulnerabilities and limitations in empire.

Anglo-Italian Relations in the International System
While the British and Italians ended up on opposite sides of the war in 1940, only
twenty years earlier the two countries emerged from the First World War with a number
of common interests and concerns. The British ended the war as Europe’s strongest
power financially and the most stable politically. But within a year of the armistice, the
fragility of the British empire had become clear.9 In the years following the war, British
policymakers prioritized de-mobilization, disarmament, and economic recovery. Italy,
however, entered the 1920s deeply dissatisfied and internally divided. The Paris Peace

8

See Florian Wagner, “Private Colonialism and International Co-Operation in Europe,
1870-1914.” Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski (eds.), Imperial Co-operation and
Transfer, 1870-1930. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., 2015), 95.
9

See Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order,
1916-1931. (London: Allen Lane & Penguin Books, 2014), 374.
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Conferences had not transformed Italy into a world-class empire as the Treaty of London
(1915) had promised.10 After the March on Rome, consolidation of the Fascist regime,
economic recovery, and extension of empire became the most pressing matters for the
Italian government. While the British and Italians had different domestic issues to attend
to, they held parallel views toward the postwar balance of power and viewed the
international order of friends and foes through a similar lens: the Americans were a
source of money and morals; the Bolsheviks, a revisionist menace; the French,
economically weak, security-obsessed, and untrustworthy; the Germans, within limits,
had potential to be valued partners in Europe.
Policymakers in both Britain and Italy recognized the crucial role that the United
States would play in the postwar global order, feared the magnitude of its power as an
enemy, and desired its friendship. The First World War had transformed the role of
America in the global arena. America emerged from the war as an economic powerhouse
and the world’s new moral guide.11 At the centre of the war debts schemes, the United
States became the world’s greatest creditor.12 Forging, preserving, and preparing cordial
relations with the US for economic and strategic purposes remained a key interest of
British and Italian policymakers throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Their calculations
always included the US.13

10

See Marco Mondini, “Between Subversion and Coup D’Etat: Military power and
Politics after the Great War (1919-1922).” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 11, no. 4
(2006), 445-464; H. James Burgwyn, The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the
Great War and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915-1919. (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1993).
11

Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Allen
Lane/Pengiun Press, 1998), 108; Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: SelfDetermination and the international Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 3; Tooze, 255-270.
12

Patricia Clavin, The Great Depression in Europe, 1929-1939. (Houndmills: MacMillan
Press, LTD., 2000), 18-21; Mazower, Dark Continent, 108; Tooze, 211.
13

Tooze, 26; Patrick O. Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America,
Britain, and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919-1932. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
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The revelation that the Americans were not an ally that could be counted on drew
the British and Italians together. In the beginning of the 1920s, the British had two main
concerns with America’s growing power: the repayment of war debts and the question of
naval equality between the United States Navy and the Royal Navy.14 In both affairs, the
answer lay in conceding to American demands. For the Italians, the problem of war debt
was also central.15 During his first months in power, Mussolini worked to settle the war
debt issue, allowing him to establish a privileged relationship between the Italian
government and J.P. Morgan.16 While both the British and Italians viewed the United
States as essential to the economy, it was also a major obstacle to the empire-building
project. As the British government approached the tumultuous 1930s, the role of
American economic power and public opinion continued to limit, restrain, and selfcensor British decision-making on the global stage. These considerations often prompted
the British to adopt a stronger stance in the League of Nations than many policymakers
preferred. By the mid-1930s, the Italians were less concerned and pursued the violent
conquest of Abyssinia unintimidated by the consequences. American public opinion soon
came to revile Fascism and condemned Italian imperialism. Throughout the interwar
years, both the British and Italians recognized the profound economic value of
Washington, but confronted great difficulties when it came to American attitudes toward
empire.
The Soviet Union was a threat to both Britain and Italy. In the aftermath of the
Great War, Bolshevism had become public enemy number one in both countries.17 In

14

Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 186-189; BJC McKercher, Transition of
Power: Britain’s Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 11.
15

See Gian Giacomo Migone, The United States and Fascist Italy: The Rise of American
Finance in Europe. Preface and Translated by Molly Tambor. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015), 32-36.
16
17

Migone, 91.

John Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy,
1919-1926. (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), 154.
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1919 to 1920, Marxist-Leninist Italian socialists wreaked havoc across the Italian
countryside.18 The widespread fear of Bolshevism and internal subversion facilitated the
rise of Fascism in Italy.19 Keith Neilson highlights the role of the Bolshevik threat in
British foreign policy between the two World Wars.20 British decision-makers believed
that Bolshevism posed a powerful threat to the British empire, British trade agreements,
and the balance of power.21 During the early 1920s, the British government feared that
Bolshevik subversion would undermine Germany’s embryonic democracy providing the
Bolsheviks with the opportunity to overthrow the budding European order.22 During the
1920s and early 1930s, both British and Italian officials expressed concern over the
spread of Bolshevism not only in Europe, but in empire. But by the mid-1930s, the
British government had begun to reconsider the role of the Soviet Union in British
foreign policy in light of disturbing global developments.23 Mussolini’s anti-bolshevism,
however, escalated throughout the 1930s as he committed Italy to preventing the rise of a
Bolshevist government in Spain.24 The common suspicion of the Bolshevist menace that
the British and Italian leadership shared in the postwar order helped to facilitate
cooperation between the two governments throughout the 1920s. But the shifting
attitudes towards Russia during the 1930s also created challenges and barriers to
cooperation between the two governments.

18

MacGregor Knox, To The Threshold of Power, 1922/1933: Origins and Dynamics of
the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships, Volume 1. (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 247-249.
19

Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea. (New York: Penguin
Press, 2012), 14.
20

Keith Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia, and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 19191939. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
21

Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia, and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 28-30.

22

Paul Kennedy, Realties Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External
Policy, 1865-1980. (Syndey: Allen and Urwin, 1981), 245-246; Ferris, Men, Money, and
Diplomacy, 103.
23
24

See Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia, and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 88-254.

G. Bruce Strang, On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares for War. (Westport:
Praeger, 2003), 73-76.
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France is often seen as Britain’s eternal ally against the dictators and Fascist
Italy’s eternal enemy challenging its Mediterranean dreams. The 1920s, however, began
quite differently. It is true that throughout the interwar years, British officials worked
with the French government to preserve the general values of the postwar order and
maintain peace. But by the spring of 1921, the British government had begun to view
France as a strategic menace.25 During the early 1920s, British policymakers wanted to
replace the prewar balance of power in Europe with a new one. British policymakers
identified Britain’s two principal wartime allies as the major threats to this new order.
Beyond the Bolshevik threat, the British government feared that France would attempt to
establish hegemony in Europe. The French had thwarted British initiatives in European
reconstruction, blocked British aims in Turkey, and challenged British interests at the
Washington Naval Conference.26 In addition to the diplomatic strength of the French, the
Air Ministry highlighted the air menace that the French Air Force (FAF) posed to
Britain.27 This concern over the strength of the FAF, combined with recent theories of
strategic bombing, prompted the British government to develop schemes to expand the
Royal Air Force (RAF) in anticipation of a French offensive.28 By the 1930s, British
officials had begun to look upon the French with less suspicion, although not with much
confidence, but remained adamant that France should not receive privileged treatment as
the other European democracy in order to avoid dividing the continent into antagonistic
ideological blocs.29
The Italians were also mistrustful of French designs in Europe. After the March
on Rome, Poincaré welcomed the Fascist regime’s entry into international society in the
hope of gaining Mussolini’s support in the reparations questions with Germany.30 In his

25

Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 104.

26

Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 107.

27

Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 110.

28

Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 128.

29

RAC Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the
Second World War. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 17-19.
30

Alan Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
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study of Mussolini’s early diplomacy, Alan Cassels points out that Mussolini entertained
an association with the French only as a means to strengthen relations with the British.31
From the beginning, Mussolini regarded France as Italy’s natural rival. Events in the
1930s reinforced Mussolini’s enmity towards the French. The failed Mussolini-Laval
Accords left the Fascist dictator feeling that the French had extended the Italians a free
hand in Abyssinia only to sever it after the invasion and cry ‘bad’ imperialism on the
international stage.32 Within a year of the Abyssinia Crisis, the French and Italians ended
up on opposite sides of a proxy war in Spain.33 While the common suspicion of French
designs created space for Anglo-Italian cooperation throughout the 1920s, diverging
attitudes towards the role of France in the 1930s frustrated attempts to preserve
cooperation between the two countries.
After the Paris Peace Conference, both British and Italian officials favoured an
economically stable but limited Germany and looked upon the subsequent rise of Adolf
Hitler with hopeful caution. At the Paris Peace Conference, the British Prime Minister,
Lloyd George, and the Italian Prime Minister, Vittorio Orlando, replaced by Francesco
Nitti, desired retribution and ‘never again.’34 By the end of 1921, the reparations scheme
had proven unworkable. The British government believed that in light of the harsh peace
settlement and Germany’s imploding economy, the country was unable to pay
reparations.35 In the years following the war, the British government wanted to “get on
with business” by rebuilding the European economy and relieving itself of its wartime

1970), 16.
31

Cassels, 35.

32

G. Bruce Strang, “Imperial Dreams: The Mussolini-Laval Accords of January 1935.”
The Historical Journal 44, no. 3 (2001), 799-809.
33

See John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975).
34

Patrick O. Cohrs “The First ‘Real’ Peace Settlements after the First World War:
Britain, the United States, and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925.”
Contemporary European History 12, no. 1 (2003) 7.
35

Steiner, The Lights that Failed, 201-203.
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commitments to Europe.36 Because of the key role that Germany had played in Britain’s
export market prior to 1914, British policy became increasingly inclined towards the
reintegration of Germany into the world system as a vehicle for European recovery and
reconstruction.37 Prior to the March on Rome, the Fascist party had adopted a rather rigid
position towards the reparations question. But after assuming power, Mussolini gradually
moved closer to the British line on reparations.38 To maintain the European economy, the
British and Italians recognized that Germany needed to be weakened, but not crushed.39
It is well-known that Germany ended the 1930s as the enemy of one and the ally
of the other. But in the beginning of the decade, the British and Italians looked upon the
recovering country with a common set of concerns. As the 1930s began to unfold, the
British and Italians remained sympathetic to moderate German demands that appeared to
be in pursuit of a return to normalcy rather than boundless revisionism. While a number
of officials and diplomats emphasized the Nazi threat, most British policymakers looked
upon Hitler with both anxiety and a certain degree of understanding given their view of
the Versailles settlement as punitive.40 It was not until the latter-half of the 1930s, after
Hitler’s increasingly revisionist policies, that the British decision-making apparatus
reached a consensus on the formidable threat that Nazi Germany posed. In his recent
study on the relationship between the two dictators, Christian Goeschel points out that it
was Hitler who initially sought out Mussolini, rather than the other way around.41

36

British Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting held at Belcaire, Lympne, near Hythe, on
Sunday, April 24, 1921, at 11am, 24 April 1921. Documents on British Foreign Policy
[hereafter DBFP] S. I, Vol XV, (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948-1984).
37

At the Paris Peace Conferences, Lloyd George had initially been more concerned with
containing German aggression. This view changed in the early 1920s. Peter Jackson,
“French Security and a British ‘Continental Commitment’ after the First World War: A
Reassessment,” The English Historical Review 4, no. 1 (2011), 345-385.
38

Cassels, 47.

39

Tooze, 293; Cassels, 68.

40

Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War.
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 22.
41

Christian Goeschel, Mussolini and Hitler: The Forging of the fascist Alliance. (New

11

Mussolini was careful to avoid developing too cozy a relationship with his German
counterpart, worried that it would give the British cause for concern.42 While admiring
Hitler’s militarism, Mussolini held a deep suspicion of the German dictator that was only
finally abated in light of Hitler’s support for Mussolini’s adventure in East Africa in
1935.43 By the autumn of 1936, Mussolini publicly declared an ideological tie with the
Third Reich in his proclamation of the Rome-Berlin Axis.44 Despite the growing hysteria
around the German Menace and Mussolini’s deepening bond with Hitler, British
decision-makers remained adamant that the they must preserve relations with the Italians
in order to weaken the Rome-Berlin Axis and restrain Hitler’s revisionism.45 The role of
Germany in the international order became a key point of estrangement between the
British and Italians.
We cannot understand why the British and Italians cooperated over empire
without considering developments in the international system. Until the latter-half of the
1930s, the British and Italian governments held surprisingly similar attitudes towards
international politics. Particularly during the 1920s, this parallel view of the international
order facilitated cooperation between the British and Italians over empire. Common
concerns over Bolshevik penetration and French subversion encouraged cooperation
between the British and Italians in the Middle East. A shared suspicion of Hitler’s
intentions pressured the two governments to preserve friendly relations during the early
1930s. But as Mussolini became increasingly set on preparing for war while Neville
Chamberlain vowed to prevent it, cooperation became increasingly difficult to repair and
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preserve. My analysis of British and Italian perceptions of the postwar international order
demonstrates that common concerns or diverging interests in the international system
informed how the two countries approached relations in empire. Until the spring of 1939,
common interests outweighed clashing goals in both Europe and empire.

The Imperial System, Imperial Norms, and Repertoires
of Rule
Recent literature on empire has highlighted how perceptions of legitimate and
illegitimate imperial methods of rule have changed over time.46 During the nineteenth
century, great powers did not go to war over colonial matters. Instead, great powers met
at imperial conferences to carve up the world and negotiate clashing imperial interests in
private rooms hidden from the public eye. Acquisition of new territories or the extension
of imperial frontiers could be conducted through commercial infiltration or campaigns of
colonial conquest. Imperial administration included both direct and indirect forms of rule.
When feasible, imperial powers established systems of indirect rule through networks of
economic, financial, and political influence.47 British responses to the 1857 Indian
Revolt, however, demonstrates that when colonized populations attempted to challenge
the fragility of indirect rule, the imperial power responded with violence, repression, and
direct forms of imperial administration.48 These imperial norms persisted into the
beginning of the twentieth century, but encountered new scrutiny as international
attitudes toward empire began to shift in the wake of the First World War.
The postwar peace settlements redefined the rules of empire and launched a new
set of normative principles designed to govern imperial methods and interactions. The
values of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points trickled into the postwar imperial. While
Wilson’s principles were not intended to apply equally to all people, world leaders used
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notions of Genevan internationalism, the distant promise of self-determination, and the
guarantee of justice by imperial oversights to justify the new imperial system. Susan
Pedersen has argued that the League of Nations did not require empires to govern
differently, it required them to say they governed differently.49 While it is true that the
League introduced a new level of civilizing rhetoric into the imperial lexicon, it also did
more than that. This new standard was one of both empty rhetoric and sincere ideals. The
League of Nations attempted to enforce the boundary between the so-called civilized
world and the imperial world on the basis of League membership and set a new standard
over acceptable methods of rule. At many points throughout its existence, diplomats in
Geneva confronted tension between these ideals and practice. It was often the case that
political expediency received priority over the League’s desired new standards. But while
Geneva’s ideals often failed to come to fruition, these reformed imperial standards
remained a constant goal for League diplomats throughout the interwar years.
The League of Nations added new layers to the international hierarchy and
revised the boundaries of the imperial world. Not all states were equal. The postwar
international order was hierarchical and racialized. Independent states had an enhanced
legitimacy in the international order as sovereign entities.50 By recognizing their
independence, League members were off limits to imperial expansion and conquest. The
League of Nations also added a new category of empire: the mandate.51 The League
delegated the victorious empires with administrative oversight of the colonies and
territories seized from the German and Ottoman Empires with the task of assisting them
towards independent statehood in either the near or distant future. Mandates were
governed by one country and were off limits to other imperial powers. Territories outside
of the League of Nations system were vulnerable to imperial conquest and competition in
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ways in which League members and Mandates were not. These were primarily ‘new’
states that had emerged in Africa and the Middle East deemed not ‘civilized’ enough to
participate in the League apparatus. Geneva’s checks and balances did not extend to these
spaces. While spaces recognized by the League were off limits to new imperial
expansion, unrecognized states were fair game.
The League of Nations also limited the range of imperial methods available to
imperial powers. Martin Thomas has pointed out that after the First World War,
European public opinion became highly critical of “wholesale killings” in empire that
had characterized the methods of imperial acquisition in the previous century.52 The
League no longer considered colonial war, violent conquest, and brutal repression in
empire as legitimate methods of imperial rule. Instead, empire ought to be ruled by an
administration of imperial oversight assigned by the metropole or the Permanent
Mandates Commission (PMC). The League of Nations articulated a set of norms that held
empire to new standards and new scrutiny.53 When imperial powers violated the legalities
of the League, their imperial infractions became publicized around the world in an effort
to hold imperial powers accountable. Susan Pedersen argues that the Mandates system
functioned as a vehicle for the internationalization of political issues from the national or
imperial to the international realm.54 Within this framework, imperial powers and the
Permanent Mandates Commission were subject to both fellow League members in
Geneva and the attitude of public opinion internationally.55 The internationalization of
empire added a new layer of accountability and surveillance to the imperial project.56 The
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League of Nations internationalized and formalized empire and, in doing so, attempted to
make empire more humane in comparison to the imperial methods of the nineteenth
century.57
My work reveals a tension between two sets of imperial norms and standards: the
great power imperial system that emerged out of the nineteenth century and the
internationalized system inaugurated by the League of Nations. Despite the efforts of the
League of Nations to reform empire, nineteenth-century imperial norms persisted well
into the twentieth century. The nineteenth-century imperial system had been
characterized by imperial conquest and cooperation between great powers about how to
maintain empire. This was the form of cooperation that British and Italian governments
preferred during the interwar years. At a number of points throughout the 1920s and
1930s, the two governments sidelined the League and negotiated deals over empire.
While both the British and the Italians participated in the League’s system, the new
standards of the League of Nations clashed with British and Italian interests and the
norms of the older imperial system. When imperial methods overtly violated the League
of Nations’ Covenant, the international community worked to hold the transgressive
power to account. The new scrutiny and accountability mechanisms of the League of
Nations challenged British and Italian cooperation over empire at a number of moments
during the interwar years.
The chapters that follow compare the methods of empire employed by the British
and Italians to examine how these methods intersected and how they managed their
differences. Many scholars of Italian Fascism highlight the callous suppression, brutal
tactics, and the military mobilization that characterized Fascist colonialism in Libya,
Italian Somaliland, Eritrea, and Abyssinia.58 The methods of Fascist imperialism included
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the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of Italian troops to pacify colonial territories,
forced concentration of local populations, aerial bombardment, and chemical warfare. For
many historians, this level of violence shows that Fascist colonialism was unique in
comparison to other traditions of empire. There is a tendency in the literature to view
Fascist imperialism as purely violent in comparison to the British empire’s ‘humane’
imperialism reformed by the League of Nations. This view has established a false
dichotomy between violent and so-called humane imperialism.
Exploring the role of cooperation between the Fascist and the British empires
minimizes this apparent difference between them and demonstrates how they learned
from one another. Throughout the interwar years the British and Italians surveilled one
another’s activities, and learned from one another’s methods of rule across contact zones
in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Policymakers in Rome and London as well as
the ‘men on the spot’ in these imperial spaces, facilitated knowledge transfers about
colonial techniques of rule. The local conditions, the threat of competition, and the global
order all informed decision-makers’ choices to adopt a particular set of methods from
their imperial repertoires. The case studies that follow demonstrate that the British empire
was not only an accomplice to Fascist imperial violence, it was itself a perpetrator.
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As Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues in his comparative history of Nazi Germany, Fascist
Italy, and New Deal America in the 1930s, to identify commonality is not to claim
sameness — to compare is not to equate.59 Yet comparison does provide the opportunity
for critique; to identify similarity and acknowledge complicity. My thesis draws attention
to the continuities of mass violence in the twentieth century as urged by scholars such as
Hannah Ardent, Mark Mazower, Caroline Elkins, Satia Priya, and others.60 My analysis
of British and Italian imperial methods demonstrates the flexibility of imperial repertoires
of rule.61 The strategies that the two empires adopted shifted along a spectrum of imperial
repertoires that spanned from cooperation with local elites on one end to brutal repression
on the other depending on the various forces at play. By comparing these commonalities,
my thesis illuminates the continuum that exists between liberal and Fascist conceptions of
empire. I argue that while these campaigns differed in scale and scope, they were all part
of the logic of empire.62

Case Studies in Anglo-Italian Relations
My thesis employs a comparative approach to analyze two categories of case
studies of British and Italian cooperation over empire: one category examines the Arabian
Peninsula, the Palestine Mandate, and Malta where Italian imperial ambitions clashed
against the established imperial presence of Britain and the other category explores
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imperial conquest in Corfu, Abyssinia and Albania, sovereign states which put these
cases in the League of Nations’ spotlight. The first three case studies show how
cooperation and compromise over empire in these imperial spaces succeeded because the
two empires followed nineteenth-century imperial methods and remained outside of the
League of Nations’ purview. The second chapter reveals the challenges and limits of
cooperation between the two empires.
These case studies reveal the multi-layered, and often contradictory, nature of
global order in the 1920s and 1930s. The First World War and the rise of the League of
Nations did not produce a break with the ‘old diplomacy’ and new imperialism that
characterized the decades before 1914. Instead, it introduced a new layer to the global
order. The League attempted to reform imperialism and introduce a new standard over
methods and imperial space. Yet imperial conquest, indirect rule, and bilateral
cooperation that characterized the nineteenth century imperial project persisted well into
the twentieth century. British and Italian attempts at cooperation reveal the hybrid nature
of international relations during the interwar years that combined nineteenth century
norms and practices with norms of internationalization embodied by the League of
Nations. These case studies suggest a new interpretation of this so-called interwar period:
rather than see it as an interlude between conflicts or a period when international order
broke down, we can see a commitment to that order and discern the rules, norms,
possibilities and limits of a Eurocentric global order.
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Chapter 1

1

Cooperation in Empire

In the autumn of 1927, the Royal Air Force stationed in Aden received orders
from London to carry out a targeted aerial bombardment campaign against indigenous
populations in Yemen. Since 1923, Zeidi troops under the direction of Imam Yahya had
been encroaching upon the Aden hinterlands and carrying out periodic raids on
settlements within the British Protectorate. After several years of refusing British
demands to evacuate the territory, the British Resident at Aden warned Imam Yahya that
his “occupation of Aden renders him liable at any time to such measures of retaliation by
land, sea, or air, at such time and in such manner as [the British government] deem[s]
suitable.”63 In the autumn of 1927, the Committee of Imperial Defence recommended that
the British government deploy an additional air squadron to Aden to deal with the local
situation.64 The Cabinet viewed the use of airpower as an ideal instrument for
"controlling semi-civilized” peoples.65 In response to another encroachment on Aden
territory, the British government intermittently bombed settlements between 1927 and
1928 housing the Imam’s troops and cultural sites within the Kingdom of Yemen.66
To British officials, bombing Yemen was justified on both strategic and moral
terms. The Cabinet viewed the air arm as both a mechanism of imperial control and as a
means of reinforcing British imperial prestige. The Colonial Office supported the Aden
Resident’s view that drastic action was “essential if British prestige…. [was] to be
upheld” within the region.67 The Foreign Office viewed the “bombings as punishment”
for the Imam’s efforts to undermine Britain’s relations with the tribes of the Protectorate
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and for his expansionist tendencies.68 Some British officials, however, found this
response too lenient. One Foreign Office official wanted to “bomb [the Imam] to blues
until he evacuated all the territory belonging to us.”69 When discussing the matter with
the Italians, Dino Grandi expressed his confidence that the British would do so, “in the
most gentlemanly manner.”70 By the spring of 1928, one Foreign Office official
exclaimed that the “recent bombings had the desired effect.”71 The Imam was prepared to
negotiate the terms of his evacuation. Despite the existence of the League of Nations and
the existence of pacifist and human rights activists, imperial violence in the Arabian
Peninsula went unnoticed and unpunished.
***
For both contemporary observers and modern historians, it was Fascist aggression
that caused the imperial crises that preceded and provoked the Second World War. The
violence of Fascist expansionism in the 1920s and 1930s has been considered uniquely
Italian in comparison to Britain’s “moral” imperialism. Many narratives assume that
these two empires were guided by different conceptions of empire. Yet throughout the
1920s and 1930s, the two empires frequently collaborated to maintain the imperial
system. In imperial spaces deprived of international scrutiny, the British government
often welcomed cooperation with the Italians and employed methods similar to those that
Fascist imperialism would adopt later in the 1930s. Cooperation with the British provided
the Italians with an opportunity to learn and replicate British imperial tactics, including
the bombing of indigenous populations, martial law, identity construction, and forced
assimilation. In contrast to studies that juxtapose British and Italian imperialism in the
interwar years, this chapter examines how they cooperated over empire as a deliberate
effort to circumvent international scrutiny.
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The three imperial spaces at the centre of this analysis are: the Arabian Peninsula,
the Palestine Mandate, and Malta. While each was under the formal oversight of the
British empire, they were sites of serious imperial competition between Britain and Italy.
Each of these territories was a key location for both Britain’s imperial defence strategy
and Fascist ambitions for spazio vitale. Although Britain had acquired the Palestine
Mandate through the Permanent Mandates Commission, there was very little League
presence in any of these three spaces when it came to mediating competition between
empires. The British and Italians entrenched their imperial roles in Arabia, Palestine, and
Malta primarily by means of economic penetration and collaboration with local elites.
Yet when deemed necessary, expansion via bombs and airplanes were incorporated into
their imperial repertoire with the knowledge that instances of imperial violence would go
unchecked.
Many historians have pointed to imperial competition between the British and the
Italians as proof that escalating conflict characterized Anglo-Italian relations during the
interwar years. Manuela Williams has examined Italian propaganda campaigns and
intelligence collecting initiatives in Britain’s Middle Eastern Empire and Mandates.
Williams argues that Fascist propaganda campaigns in the region indicate Mussolini’s
intention to threaten the British empire.72 She points out that while Italy’s growing ties
with Arab nationalists generated serious concerns for the British, this effort to undermine
the British empire was not supported by a coherent imperial strategy.73 Similar to
Williams, Massimiliano Fiore examines the imperial conflicts that emerged between the
British and Italians in the Middle East in relation to Mussolini’s aggressive anti-British
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plans to expand from the early 1920s.74 He argues that the road to war begins much
earlier in empire than it does in Europe. Fiore’s research affirms the earlier work of
Lawrence Pratt and Reynolds Salerno which focus on the Mediterranean origins of the
Second World War.75 Most recently, Nir Arielli has provided nuance to the arguments
surrounding the role of Fascist ideology in empire by recognizing that while Fascist
policy in the region was influenced by ideological expansionism, Mussolini’s
policymaking was also informed by other forces at play.76
This chapter resituates sources of competition and growing tensions between the
British and Italians within a broader context of cooperation. As many historians have
pointed out, the Italians adopted subversive methods to challenge the British empire in
the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This focus on Italian attempts to extend the
Fascist empire at the expense of the British has a tendency to minimize persistent efforts
to preserve cooperation between the two empires alongside competition. In Arabia,
Palestine, and Malta, the British and Italians established normative expectations, through
formal agreements as well as a tradition of understanding, about the limits of competition
and how to maintain empire. In each of these imperial spaces, the British and Italian
governments followed a nineteenth-century style of imperial cooperation that existed
outside the League of Nations system. This chapter demonstrates that bilateral
cooperation over empire remained an essential feature of the imperial system well into
the twentieth century.
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By comparing tension and cooperation in Arabia, Palestine, and Malta with the
internationalized crises of Chapter 2, this chapter explores why some instances of
imperialism were subject to international scrutiny and the mechanisms of imperial
accountability while others were not. Susan Pedersen has emphasized that the League of
Nations and the Permanent Mandates Commission inadvertently held imperial rule to
new standards and new scrutiny through the advent of internationalization.77 My research
parallels the work of Susan Pedersen and explores the limits of imperial accountability as
a twentieth century standard inaugurated by the League of Nations. These mechanisms of
imperial accountability were by no means applied universally. I argue that the system of
imperial accountability was limited by the status of the territory in question, the imperial
methods used, and the legacy of nineteenth century imperial norms. As a result, Imperial
accountability was largely absent in Arabia, Palestine, and Malta during the 1920s and
1930s.
This chapter will explore three case studies in which the system of bilateral
cooperation over empire ranged from highly to thinly institutionalized. This chapter will
begin by exploring imperial tension and cooperation in the Arabian Peninsula where the
British and Italians established a system of cooperation over how to maintain empire that
informed and guided decision-making in the region. In Palestine, the second case study,
the British and Italians used bilateral cooperation as a tool to negotiate the limits of
competition culminating with the 1938 Easter Accords. Imperial cooperation in Malta,
the third case study, was informed by a tradition of coexistence rather than formal
agreements between the two empires. While the form of cooperation varied across
imperial space, it was always based on the assumption that imperial competition needed
limits.
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1.1 The Arabian Peninsula, 1926-1932: The Rome
Understanding & Spheres of Influence
On 10 February 1927, the British and Italians settled the terms of the Rome
Understanding which outlined the respective interests of each empire in the Red Sea and
determined the fate of the Arabian Peninsula under British and Italian imperialism.
Through the Rome Understanding, the British and Italians recognized one another’s vital
interest in the Red Sea region and agreed that there should be economic and commercial
freedom on the Arabian coast and Islands of the Red Sea. The British and Italians also
agreed that it was in their common interest to exert their influence in Arabia in the cause
of peace. Most importantly, the British and Italians vowed to “maintain close touch with
each other in all questions affecting the Red Sea and Southern Arabia in order to avoid
misunderstandings between them.”78
Many historians have brushed over the Rome Understanding as largely ineffectual
and having had little impact on the overall policy of the two empires. Early Fascist
historian Renzo de Felice and his followers have long denied that Mussolini intentionally
pursued an aggressive policy against the British empire and emphasize his desire for
peaceful coexistence with the British.79 Rosaria Quartararo, a student of de Felice, argues
that the British never truly respected Italian interests in Yemen and secretly aimed to
undermine Italy in the region.80 More recent scholarship has focused on Mussolini’s
ideological ambitions to expand the Fascist Empire at the expense of the British. 81
Manuela Williams and John Baldry largely disregard the Rome Understanding as a short-
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lived détente evocative of Italian deception.82 Fiore argues that the Fascist dictator’s
activities in Arabia demonstrate that the British and Italians had irreconcilable goals.83
Similarly, Arielli claims that despite the Rome Understanding, Fascist policy in Arabia
generated a greater threat to British interests than anywhere else in the Arab World.84
Historians have yet to explain why both British and Italian officials prioritized
cooperation in Arabia and how the Rome Understanding shaped empire in the region.
The British and Italians pursued the Rome Understanding because unchecked imperial
competition posed a greater risk than entering into a system of imperial cooperation in
Arabia. Prior to the Rome Understanding, imperial competition in Arabia was an
unregulated game. The terms of the Rome Understanding institutionalized a set of
normative standards over how to maintain empire in Arabia. This case study begins by
exploring the imperial tensions between the British and Italians and the perceived
advantages of entering into a system of cooperation. It subsequently explores the ways in
which the norms established by the Rome Understanding informed British and Italian
decision-making towards the region. Far from being inconsequential, I argue that the
Rome Understanding established a standard over the limits of empire in the Arabian
Peninsula.

1.1.1 Imperial Tensions in the Arabian Peninsula
Since the First World War, the majority of the Arabian Peninsula was nominally
independent with the exception of the Aden Protectorate. The region was made up of
three primary kingdoms: the Kingdom of Yemen ruled by Imam Yahya who was also the
leader of the Zeidi sect of Islam; the Kingdom of Hejaz, Nejd, and its Dependencies ruled
by Ibn Saud; and the small principality of Asir ruled by Imam Idrisi. The independence of
these kingdoms was self-declared and recognized by only a handful of European states.
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Existing outside of the League of Nations’ system, the Arabian Peninsula was vulnerable
to external influence and imperial infiltration in ways in which other independent states
were not. As neither an independent member, a mandate, nor an official part of a
European empire, the Arabian Peninsula was exempt from the new standard of imperial
morality and international surveillance that applied to other imperial spaces.
The British government’s key priority in the Arabian Peninsula was the security
of the Aden Protectorate in order to preserve vital imperial communications through the
Red Sea. Since the opening of the Suez Canal, the Aden Protectorate had been an
essential imperial outpost between London and India. In the 1880s, the British began to
form treaty relations with local leaders in the hinterland surrounding Aden mirroring
practices established in British India in order to ensure the port’s security.85After the
outbreak of war in 1914, the British concluded treaties with both Imam Idrisi and Ibn
Saud against foreign aggression.86 The British did not want the responsibility that would
go along with incorporating these territories into the official realm of the British empire.
Instead, the British used the treaty system to win the loyalty of ruling elites. British
imperial security relied on maintaining peaceful relations with local leaders.
After the Great War, the British government struggled to balance its treaty
obligations and strategic interests in the Arabian Peninsula with the Treasury
Department’s widely known effort to curb imperial defence spending during the 1920s.87
In light of these postwar financial priorities, the Cabinet remodelled British defence
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policy on the assumptions that peace reigned and empire was secure.88 In the Arabian
Peninsula, however, such was not the case. The treaties with tribes in the Aden hinterland
obliged the British government to provide them with protection when necessary.89 Imam
Yahya’s recent encroachments on the hinterland threatened both the tribes in the region
and Britain’s interests in the Aden Protectorate. Reports that the Italians were supporting
Imam Yahya with war materiel and training increased alarm over the situation. The
cessation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921 further emphasized the need to ensure
the security of the Red Sea in order to ensure fleet access to the Singapore base.90 To
make matters worse, the British government began to receive sporadic reports of Soviet
infiltration and subversion in the region. Many of the Departments emphasized that the
security of this region was a ‘vital interest’ of the British empire and argued that there
could be no cuts to defence spending until these threats were alleviated.91
Unlike the British, the Italians were newcomers to the Arabian Peninsula in the
1920s.92 In 1923, Benito Mussolini began to pursue a policy of peaceful penetration in
Yemen.93 The region had both a strategic and economic value within the Fascist empirebuilding project. Extending the Fascist sphere of influence into Yemen would contribute
toward Mussolini’s ultimate goal of breaking Italy out of its Mediterranean prison and
obtaining spazio vitale.94 With a position in Arabia, the Italians could secure an outlet for
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their colonies in Somaliland and Eritrea and establish a naval base in the Indian Ocean
with the potential to threaten British communication through the Red Sea. Apart from
Mussolini’s ideological guidance, Jacopo Gasparini, the Governor of Eritrea, was the
main personality behind Italy’s Arabian policy. Throughout the 1920s, Gasparini worked
to reinforce trading ties between Yemen and Eritrea.95 In early 1926, Gasparini, in
collaboration with the Colonial Ministry, established a company known as SCITAR
(Società Commercial Italo-Araba) for the purpose of developing economic relations
between Italy and Yemen. The company secured an oil monopoly in Yemen through a
special concession from Imam Yahya. Meanwhile, the Italian government created an
organization in Italy for the sale of products exported from Yemen, specifically coffee
and leather.96 On the surface, SCITAR appeared as Italian private enterprise. But owned
and operated by Fascist officials, the company had not only “commercial and industrial
intentions” but clear “political aims” in Yemen.97
In the summer of 1926, Gasparini visited Yemen to discuss the possibility of
concluding an economic agreement with the Imam Yahya, in the hope of formalizing
Italy’s position.98 On 2 September 1926, Italy became the first European country to
recognize Yemen’s independence when Gasparini signed a Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce with Imam Yahya opening up “new horizons” for Italy’s “political and
economic activity” in the Arab World. In a secret annex, Imam Yahya granted Italy “the
right of way” in economic enterprise in Yemen in exchange for annual instalments of
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Italian war materiel.99 After concluding the treaty, Pietro Lanza di Scalea, Minister of the
Colonies, boasted that the new accord marked Fascist Italy’s determination not to remain
imprisoned within its territorial limits.100 The Italians could now view the “Red Sea as an
area of our influence.”101
By the mid-1920s, British and Italian interests in Arabia clashed. The British
government viewed the Red Sea region as an essential imperial highway whose security
was vital to the Empire. By the summer of 1926, the security of Britain’s imperial
communications faced threats for which the government had neither the defences nor the
finances to address. Meanwhile, the Italians had gained a strong foothold in Yemen,
challenging Britain’s position in the region even further. The Italians aimed to extend the
Fascist sphere of influence by supporting Imam Yahya’s expansionist tendencies. While
imperial competition revved up into the mid-1920s, neither the British nor the Italians
were prepared for an imperial confrontation in the region. Both British and Italian
officials began to view cooperation, at least in the short term, as far more advantageous
than unrestrained competition and potential colonial war.

1.1.2 The Advantages of Cooperation over Empire
In an effort to prevent imperial competition from spiraling out of control, the
British and Italians negotiated an agreement over the limits of empire in Arabia. In
Whitehall, the Cabinet determined that unless the British cooperated, the only other
“solution to Italian activities” was to strengthen defences in the region in preparation for
a direct conflict with the Italians.102 The Colonial Office responded that “it was
inconceivable that Britain would engage in anything like a conflict with Italy over this
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corner of Arabia.”103 In the Foreign Office, Austen Chamberlain pointed out that all
reports “go to show that [the Italians] are working primarily to establish for themselves a
position in Arabia. This operation by no means requires the undermine of ours.”104 The
British had also received a number of intelligence reports that revealed that the Italians
were genuinely inclined to conclude an agreement over empire.105
In Rome, the Foreign Ministry held the view that while the Italians had interests
in Arabia, they need not conflict with the British. For nearly a year, Gasparini had been
encouraging the Colonial Ministry to conclude an imperial agreement with the British
that would divide the Peninsula into two spheres of influence.106 Gasparini recognized
Britain’s superiority in the region and believed that Italy’s best option for colonial
acquisition was through a forward policy in isolated areas rather than on a broad front.107
He reminded the Colonial Ministry that an open imperial clash would damage Italy’s
economic interests in Yemen and emphasized that the British were inclined to conclude
an agreement in Arabia. In support of this view, Dino Grandi suggested that the British
and Italians should confirm their “friendship” and “cooperation in this sphere as [they
have] in others.”108
Both the British and the Italians determined that limiting competition would be
beneficial to both empires. As the British and Italians prepared for negotiations, it
became clear that an imperial understanding in Arabia could serve as a platform for
addressing a number of outstanding tensions in the region. Through negotiations, the
British and Italians hoped to prevent the outbreak of a proxy war, settle the Farasan
Island dispute, and safeguard the region from Soviet subversion. Such an agreement
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could not only limit competition, it could inaugurate a collaborative imperial endeavour
in Arabia. Both the British and Italians had little to risk and much to gain from an
imperial understanding in Arabia.
Through discussions for an imperial understanding, the British and the Italians
first and foremost aimed to prevent the outbreak of a proxy war in the Arabian Peninsula.
Tensions between local leaders had been escalating throughout the 1920s. In 1925,
British intelligence reports revealed Imam Yahya’s intentions to invade Asir and expand
the Yemeni empire with the support of Italian men, money, and munitions. Considering
the threat that Yemen posed to Aden, the British wished to prevent Imam Yahya from
expanding his power in the region by absorbing Asir and gaining a foothold in the
Farasan Islands.109 In an effort to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, the British
government negotiated an agreement with France, Belgium and Italy in the spring of
1925 that aimed to prohibit the supply of arms to Arabian rulers.110 But due to Italy’s
blatant violations of the agreement, only one year later the Cabinet decided to lift the
arms embargo. By the end of the summer, both the British and Italians were sending war
materiel to opposing rulers in the Arabian Peninsula.
The looming confrontation between Asir and Yemen threatened to drag the
British and Italians into opposite sides of a proxy war.111 British Foreign Secretary,
Austen Chamberlain warned that “we are engaging in a covert war with Italy. She under
the Imam’s flag and we under the Idrisi’s.”112 The Foreign Office warned that the “clash”
of interests between Britain and Italy in southern Arabia was “likely to damage relations
between the two countries” beyond the Peninsula.113 Mussolini also expressed concern
over the impending conflict as he did not want this to lead to a dispute between Italy and
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Britain114 After a discussion with Austen Chamberlain in Leghorn, Mussolini became
convinced that an understanding over the Red Sea provided the Italians with the most
advantageous way forward. Both the British and the Italians expected that a system of
cooperation would prevent these imperial tensions from escalating to damage relations
between the two empires on the global stage.
The negotiations also addressed conflicting interests in the Farasan Islands. In the
summer of 1926, the Farasan Islands had become a site of intense competition as Imam
Idrisi opened up the Islands for commercial activity. A number of British and Italian oil
firms began vying for commercial dominance of the Islands. The British government
determined that the government itself should not be involved in an oil concession. But the
Foreign Office maintained that it must “ensure that if any concessions are granted, they
go to a British company” because of the important role of the Islands for British imperial
security in the region. 115 The Admiralty and the Air Ministry argued that if a foreign
power were to establish either an air base or naval base in the islands off the coast of
Asir, it would constitute a serious threat to British communications and require a
strengthening of British defences in the region.116 In exchange for accepting an offer from
a British oil company, the Idrisi demanded access to war materiel to be used against
Yemen. But as the prospect of a conflict with Italy drew closer, the British government
became increasingly hesitant about arming Asir.
The Italians viewed the Farasan Islands as an opportunity to both strengthen
Italy’s economic position and counter perceived British expansionism in the Arabian
Peninsula.117 Gasparini emphasized the importance of establishing a durable economic
position in the Arabian Peninsula by supplanting the trade monopoly that Aden held over
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the region.118 British intelligence reports suggested in 1926 that Imam Yahya promised
the Italians an oil concession in the Farasan Islands after Yemeni forces had conquered
Asir.119 The Italians, however, were not inclined to wait. The British began to receieve
evidence that the Italians were attempting to sway the loyalties of local elites in Asir in
order to gain consent for an oil concession in the Farasan Islands. Yet, oil was not the
only resource that the Italians were after. Gasparini argued that the SCITAR should
pursue a salt concession in the Farasan Islands. He believed that such an enterprise would
give Italy absolute dominance over the Yemeni economy and strengthen Italy’s political
position in the country.120
There were a number of matters on which the two empire-builders clashed, but
both the British and the Italians feared the infiltration of another power into the region —
the Soviets. Since the end of the First World War, both the British and Italians had been
highly skeptical of Soviet designs in Europe and empire.121 The British had learned of the
insurrectionist capabilities of Soviet influence from their experience in other parts of the
empire.122 The Italian Foreign Ministry kept close tabs on Soviet activities in the
Peninsula and began intercepting Soviet communications.123 These reports revealed that
Soviet agents were working in Saudi Arabia and Yemen to gain influence with local
elites. The British received numerous reports of Soviet propaganda in Arabia. One article
denounced British and Italian imperialism in the region and proclaimed that the “Arabian
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territories could be united only from below.” Soviet influence and support promised to
provide the “essential conditions for unification” and free the Arabs from imperialism.124
On a number of occasions, the Foreign Office expressed skepticism that the
Soviets posed a real threat in the region and questioned whether the Italians were using a
false threat of Soviet subversion to maintain close relations with the British.125 While a
number of Foreign Office officials believed that reports of Soviet subversion were just
another Italian ‘bluff,’ there was a widespread sense in the British government that on the
matter of Soviet influences in Arabia, it was better to be safe than sorry. For the British
and Italians, the Soviet Union was a common enemy against which mutual cooperation
could be beneficial. By consolidating their positions on the Peninsula, the British and
Italians aimed to exclude the Soviets from the region.

1.1.3 The Rome Understanding and Imperial Norms
As winter fell upon London, the British and Italians began exchanging notes to
delineate the purpose and scope of the negotiations to take place in Rome. The
negotiations themselves were largely conducted by lower level officials and ‘experts’ on
Arabia. On the British side sat the British Ambassador to Rome, Ronald Graham, and a
British colonial administrator and expert on the Arabian Peninsula, Sir Gilbert Clayton.
Governor of Eritrea Jacopo Gasprini and young Fascist zealot and Director General for
Europe and the Levant, Raffaele Guariglia, represented the Italian side. Their priorities
were different: while Whitehall’s priority concerned the empire’s strategic position in the
Red Sea, Rome’s was of a commercial and economic nature.126 After nearly a month of
negotiations, the group of experts and colonial officials had reached a common
understanding of empire in Arabia.
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The Rome Understanding has strong parallels to nineteenth century imperial
norms. The Understanding was based on the assumption that imperial competition needed
limits. The talks in Rome established spheres of influence, encouraged collaboration with
local elites, and created rules for economic competition. The Understanding was a
behind-closed-doors agreement that the British and Italians specifically decided did not
constitute an official treaty so that it would not need to be registered with the League of
Nations.127 Neither the British nor the Italians desired any form of League oversight in
Arabia. The scant press coverage of the agreement reflects the legacy of the widely
condemned ‘old diplomacy’ well into the 1920s.128 The League of Nations and
international public opinion were almost completely blind to this imperial understanding.
In practice, the Understanding established a new standard for a collaborative
imperial endeavour in which the British and Italians recognized the limits of their
respective influence and the methods by which it was maintained. The Rome
Understanding established de facto spheres of influence in Arabia. The Kingdom of
Hejaz, Njed and its Dependencies and the principality of Asir fell within the British
sphere while Yemen came under Italian influence. The British initially wanted to include
a term in which the two empires renounced their political ambition in the region and
agreed to limit empire purely to commercial endeavours. Gasparini demurred that the
term was too vague and pointed out that commercial enterprise in Arabia was frequently
wrapped up in local politics.129 Instead of sanctioning ‘political ambition’, the British and
Italians agreed to work with and through political elites within their spheres of influence.
The text of the agreement also committed the two governments to “exercise” their
respective “influences” on Ibn Saud, Imam Yahya, and Imam Idrisi towards eliminating
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causes of conflict between them.130 The British and Italians attempted to both influence
local elites and construct commercial monopolies in order to secure and reinforce the
frontiers of their respective spheres of influence.
For example, the British used the new spheres of influence arrangement in Arabia
to push Yemeni forces out of occupied portions of the Aden hinterland. When Tribes
under Imam Yahya occupied the outer limits of the Aden protectorate in 1923, the British
had done very little to expel Yemeni forces from the territory.131 But after the Rome
Understanding, the British government developed a higher expectation of the durability
and security of these imperial frontiers. British decision-makers anticipated that a secure
border would allow them to reduce the imperial defence requirements in Aden reflecting
the Treasury’s postwar defence policy.132 After the talks in Rome, the British government
became increasingly concerned with consolidating its formal empire according to the
letter of its treaty obligations. The Foreign Office believed that the Italians had a
responsibility to restrain Imam Yahya from his expansionist tendencies and requested
that Gasparini use his influence with the Imam to secure an evacuation of Aden or face
British Aerial bombardment.133
After several weeks of further encroachments on Aden territory, the Foreign
Office took unilateral action to preserve the boundaries of the imperial system in Arabia –
as described in the opening paragraph of this chapter. When the British issued warnings
to the Imam that he must evacuate the Aden Protectorate or face unrestrained aerial
bombardment without warning, the Italians objected because such a brutal act
undermined their joint obligations to preserve peace in the region as laid out in the Rome
Understanding. The two empires had agreed that safeguarding peace in Arabia was most
advantageous to their economic and strategic interests in the region. Therefore
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imperialism ought to be conducted through negotiation, mediation, and indirect rule
rather than through airplanes, bombs, and conquest. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry
feared that the real British objective was to expand their influence over Yemen, at Italy’s
expense.134
Anglo-Italian relations over the Yemeni-Aden border demonstrates the value of
the spheres of influence system in Arabia. The British used the imperial system in order
to secure and consolidate the Aden Protectorate. This would allow them to reduce their
imperial defence obligations in the region. While carrying out a bombing mission in
Yemen, the British pressed the Italians to use their influence in Yemen to put an end to
the border dispute.135 For the Italians, the belief that Britain’s ambitions were expanding
reinforced the need for cooperation under the Rome Understanding in order to preserve
their position in Yemen. Mussolini argued that an ongoing conflict between Britain and
Yemen “represents a serious danger for us” because it both provided the British with a
justification to extend their position in Arabia and it stirred Imam Yahya’s suspicions
over the direction of Italian loyalties.136 Mussolini explained that Italy’s influence in
Yemen was a result of limiting competition “that still very much exists between powers
in the Red Sea.”137 By mediating the conflict between Yemen and the British, the Italians
could protect Imam Yahya from British expansionism.138 These faulty interpretations of
British motives encouraged the Foreign Ministry to work to maintain the spheres of
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influence system rather than abandon it. As a result, with the help of Italian mediation,
the British entered into to “ticklish negotiations” with the Imam from the spring of 1928
until 1932.139
The Rome Understanding also imposed limits on economic competition in
Arabia. During discussions in Rome, the British and Italian delegations agreed that there
should be economic and commercial freedom for the citizens and subjects of the two
countries.140 This condition meant that as long as a company did not appear to be directly
owned or operated by a government, it was free to establish itself in the region. The two
empires were free to engage in commercial competition so long as they respected the
limits of political influence of one another’s sphere. The talks in Rome confirmed
economic penetration as a tool of empire in Arabia.
The recognition of commercial competition as a legitimate imperial activity reopened debate over the Farasan Island oil concession. After a number of bids and botched
deals, the British division of the Shell Company, Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, won the
Farasan Islands oil concession shortly before the talks in Rome. In Rome, the British
secured de facto oversight of the Islands under the British sphere of influence and
confirmed that no foreign power should establish a political position on the
islands.141After the Understanding, a debate began to emerge between Anglo-Saxon
Petroleum and Imam Idrisi over the terms of the contract. As a condition of the
concession, the Foreign Office authorized the Resident at Aden to provide the Shell
Company with arms and munitions to send to Imam Idrisi to defend Asir. But in the
summer of 1927, Imam Idrisi claimed that the Shell Company had not supplied the war
materiel promised and demanded that Shell Company cease operations until the
shipments arrived. 142
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The Foreign Office received countless reports that the Italians were behind the
Farasan Island controversy. After the Rome Understanding, the Italian Colonial Ministry
sent “archaeological missions” to Asir bearing gifts and donations for the tribal leaders of
the Farasan Islands in an effort to gain the indigenous population’s consent for an Italian
oil concession.143 The Italians established a close relationship with highly respected local
elites, such as Sayed Al-Mirghani and Abdullah Soheili, who traveled across Asir with
money, gifts, and promises of Italian goodwill in an attempt to secure a privileged
position for Italian firms in the Farasan Islands.144 Almost all reports carried a similar
message: Italian agents were violating the Rome Understanding and undermining the
British position in Arabia. Most Foreign Office officials, however, dismissed the reports
as inaccurate or unimportant. As several scholars have shown, colonial prejudices and
assumptions about race often tainted intelligence analysis and collection.145 These agents
were rarely British nationals. Within the British colonial mind, the reports of agents
indigenous to the Arabian Peninsula needed to be regarded with skepticism. In
interpreting the reports of Sayed Moustapha, an agent from Asir, the Resident at Aden
noted that the agent’s “love of power” no doubt “play[ed] a part in his actions.”146 The
Foreign Office often deemed these agents untrustworthy and self-interested and believed
that their reports were influenced by ulterior motives and the regional feud between Ibn
Saud and Imam Yahya.147 Orientalist views of colonial subjects as cunning and corrupt
prompted Colonial Office and Foreign Office officials to rely very little on intelligence
reports when it came to policymaking vis-a-vis Italy in Arabia.
Members of the Foreign Office overwhelmingly believed that the Italians were
not out to undermine Britain’s position in Arabia over the Farasan Island concession. The
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Air Ministry and Colonial Office argued that an Italian concession in the Islands would
lead the Italians to establish a political position on the Asiri Islands.148 But the Foreign
Office viewed commercial competition between the two empires in the Farasan Islands as
only a minor threat. In preparations for discussions in Rome, the Foreign Office had
pointed out that “economic competition is both [a] natural and beneficial” part of empire
and that it only becomes “dangerous when associated with political rivalry.”149 The
Foreign Office differentiated between political influence and commercial competition.
The Cabinet confirmed that as “long as the object of the Italians is commercial
penetration, we have no grounds for objection.”150 Because the Italians had pursued a
forward policy of commercial penetration and indirect rule, the British government
believed that the Italians had a right to establish a position in Arabia. From the British
perspective, the Italians were doing empire the right way. Their imperial rivalry was not a
threat and commercial competition, within reason, was part of the imperial game.

1.1.4 Conclusion
Britain and Italy had an imperial presence and ambitions in the Arabian
Peninsula. But common concerns about the internal stability of Arabia, zones of
competition, and external imperial challenges caused the British and Italians to pursue a
system of cooperation. From the British point of view, an agreement with the Italians
would provide the necessary conditions to cut defence spending in the region, prevent the
outbreak of a proxy war, and secure the Farasan Islands from Italian political influence.
For the Italians, an understanding would secure the British empire’s recognition of Italy’s
special position in Yemen. Foreign Minister Dino Grandi viewed the Understanding as
the “Magna Carta of our political situation in the Red Sea.”151 In the latter half of the
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1920s, it was in both Britain’s and Italy’s interest to limit competition and collaborate to
safeguard their positions against Soviet subversion.
Historians have been too quick to dismiss the Rome Understanding. Far from
being inconsequential, the Rome Understanding established a common understanding
over the limits of empire in the Arabian Peninsula. The talks in Rome established a
spheres of influence arrangement that delineated the limits of the British and Italians
empires in the region. It introduced collaboration with political elites, negotiation, and
economic penetration as the most legitimate methods of empire. The Rome
Understanding did not end imperial competition between the British and Italians in
Arabia, but it fundamentally altered how the rivalry was perceived and navigated.
Suspicions and faulty interpretations of one another’s ambitions reinforced the
assumptions on which the Rome Understanding had been based: competition needed
limits. The Rome Understanding institutionalized cooperation over empire and
introduced standards and expectations of imperial rule.
This case reconsiders the nature of British and Italian conceptions of empire.
Italian imperialism in the Arabian Peninsula complicates our understanding of Fascist
imperialism as always excessively violent. It demonstrates that Italian Fascism
incorporated spheres of influence, economic penetration, and collaboration with local
elites into its imperial repertoire. It also reveals that similar to the Italians less than a
decade later, the British also conducted empire via bombs, deaths, and brutality well into
the 1920s. Imperialism in Arabia complicates the neat dichotomy that many scholars
have established between Fascist imperialism and liberal imperialism reformed by the
League of Nations. The Rome Understanding inaugurated a new period of Anglo-Italian
imperial cooperation in the Red Sea with few accountability mechanisms in place.
Outside of the purview of League imperial oversight, the British and Italians established
an imperial system in the Arabian Peninsula created and maintained by two imperial
powers.
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1.2 The Palestine Mandate, 1922-1938: The Easter
Accords and Balancing Imperial Tensions
Nearly two decades of competition and cooperation in Palestine culminated with
the conclusion of Easter Accords in 1938 between Britain and Italy as the two empires
finally agreed upon the limits of the Italian empire in the Mandate.152 The goal of the
agreement was to settle all outstanding concerns between the British and Italian
governments in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. In exchange for Britain’s de jure
recognition of the Fascist Empire in Abyssinia as discussed in Chapter 2, Mussolini
agreed to curb Italy’s anti-British activities in Palestine and adopted a more peaceful
policy towards the British in the Arab world.153 The Italians vowed to cease anti-British
propaganda in Palestine and respect the limits of its position in the British Mandate.
Count Ciano assured the British government that “the Italian government will do nothing
to prejudice the position of [the British] in Palestine.”154 After years of Italian influence,
agents, and propaganda, in the region, Mussolini pulled out of Palestine.
Most historians agree that the Easter Accords were ineffectual and that the Italian
intention was always duplicitous – Italy’s goal was to supplant Britain as an imperial
power.155 Arielli concludes that one of the key aims of Italian policy in Palestine was to
destabilize London’s position in the Mandate.156 Similarly, Williams highlights the
balancing act that the Italians played between the Arabs and the Zionists in Palestine
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during the 1920s as indicative of Italian ambitions to replace the British as the
mandatory power.157 Fiore points out that while the Italians undertook a number of
systematic initiatives in Palestine in order to increase Fascist influence in the region with
the aim of achieving mare nostrum, it was not until the fallout of the Abyssinia Crisis
(1935) that the Italians adopted an explicit anti-British policy in Palestine in collaboration
with Arab leaders.158 The immediate cessation of Fascist activities in Palestine after the
Easter Accords has been almost entirely omitted from this narrative.
The Easter Accords belong to a longer tradition of competition and cooperation
over Palestine between the British and the Italians. Anglo-Italian cooperation in the
Palestine Mandate can be divided into three major phases: the cautious phase; the
aggressive phase; and the roll-back phase. Between 1922 and 1929, the Italians worked to
hold the British accountable to the terms of the Mandate as a means of pressuring the
British to concede to Italian aspirations behind closed doors. The years following the
1929 Disturbances challenged Anglo-Italian cooperation in empire as both imperial
powers attempted to use alternative imperial measures in an effort to shape the Mandate
for their own gain. Between 1937 and 1939, the British and Italians attempted to
reconcile their interests in Palestine. The Easter Accords emerged as an imperial bargain
that reinforced the need to pursue a policy of cooperation in Palestine.
Although Palestine was part of the Mandates system, imperial competition within
the Mandate slid under the League’s already preoccupied purview. The Permanent
Mandates Commission was overwhelmed with escalating Arab-Jewish tensions.159 In
Palestine, the two empires sidelined the League of Nations and used bilateral cooperation
as a tool to navigate episodes of competition. The limits of empire were consistently
renegotiated as the Italians pushed the boundaries of the imperial system. The cycle of
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tensions-negotiations-cooperation repeated throughout the interwar years culminating
with the Easter Accords.

1.2.1 The Cautious Phase: Forming, Enforcing, and Revising the
Mandate, 1922-1929
During the Mandate’s early phase, the British and Italians tried to resolve their
competing interests through negotiations. The British Government was drawn to
Palestine because of its paramount strategic position at the eastern flank of the Suez
Canal. The Great War had shattered nineteenth-century beliefs that the deserts of the
Sinai Peninsula would act as a natural defence for the Canal.160 The Colonial Office
argued that the occupation of Palestine during the War had been necessary in order to
preserve the security of Egypt. The Colonial Office noted that “to lose Palestine is to lose
Arabia” which would be a loss that the British could not afford.161 The Air Staff
supported this view and maintained that “prevention is better than cure.”162 If British
influence in Palestine decayed, it would be nearly impossible to operate any strategic air
route from Egypt to Iraq and India in the event of another war.163 In addition to its vital
location, the prospect of oil in Palestine also encouraged the British to seek control.164
After the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire, the Permanent Mandates Commission
allocated the Palestine Mandate to the British with the task of establishing a Jewish
national homeland and guiding the territory toward independent nationhood.
Even after the Permanent Mandates Commission conceded the Palestine Mandate
to the British, the Italians tried to get a toe in the Palestine door. Sects within the Italian
government had been pushing for an Italian position in Palestine for years. A vague
reference to an Italian sphere in Asia Minor was among the territorial acquisitions
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promised to Italy in the Treaty of London (1915) in exchange for its entry into war in
support of the Entente.165 While Liberal Italy’s dreams of a Mandate in Asia Minor were
foiled by the Wilsonian turn at the Paris Peace Conferences, Mussolini remained
determined to extend Italian influence into Palestine. Like Yemen, Palestine also lay in a
strategic location bordering the so-called prison bars of the Eastern Mediterranean. The
Fascist dictator planned to topple the Mandate by exploiting its internal contradictions
over the scheme for a Jewish homeland in the Permanent Mandates Commission.
Meanwhile, the Italians would develop a strong position in Palestine through commercial
and religious institutions. Once the British found themselves at an impasse, the Mandate
would need to be either internationalized or lifted to independence.166 Mussolini believed
that once Palestine was free from British domination, the Italians could take advantage of
the weak independent state and extend the Italian sphere of influence.167 In effect,
Mussolini intended to transform Palestine into another Yemen.
Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, Liberal Italy had positioned itself as
protector of the Holy Places in Palestine. The Mandate committed the British to
“establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine without prejudicing the rights of non-Jewish
communities.” 168 In formulating the Mandate, British experts recognized the “historic
rights and position of Italian religious institutions in Palestine.”169 On a number of
occasions, Fascist officials protested that the British government had broken its
obligations to protect the interests of Italian Catholic institutions in Palestine.170
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Mussolini complained that the “traditionally Italian” Christian rights in the Holy Land
were “continually being harmed by the incomprehensible and unjustified aspirations” of
Zionism.171 Il Duce stressed to the Italian Ambassador to London, Chiaramonte
Bordonaro that he must make Italian concerns clear to the Foreign Office.172 The Italian
Ambassador to London frequently reminded the British government of its obligations to
non-Jewish religious communities under the Mandate and made several claims that
Italian Catholic institutions had suffered under the Mandatory administration.173 The
British government assured the Italians that the programme in Palestine would not
prejudice Italy’s traditional Christian rights in the region.174 Beyond these assurances, the
British proposed that an international commission be established for the purpose of
settling all outstanding questions regarding the Holy Places. Such a commission,
however, never materialized.175
These tensions over religious interests in Palestine was a source of competition
between the Italians and the British throughout the 1920s, but it also provided a basis for
cooperation. The Fascist regime used the question of Catholic interests in Palestine to
negotiate the extension of Italian influence into the region. Il Duce hoped that Britain’s
recognition of Italy’s special interests would allow Italy to supplant the French as
protector of Christianity in the Middle East. Many Fascist officials argued that
Christianity “must prevail [in Palestine] for spiritual, political, and historical reasons.”176
Questions over religious rights in Palestine facilitated discussions between the two
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governments as the Italians attempted to hold the British accountable to the terms of the
Mandate and secure advantages for Italy’s Catholic influence. While these negotiations
frequently proved futile, the Italians largely respected the limits established by the
Mandate and through bilateral discussions.
The threat of America’s growing commercial interests in the Middle East
prompted the Italians to work with the British and conclude an economic understanding
in Palestine. The British had been “anxious to treat American institutions” in Palestine
“generously to avoid the slightest suspicion of discrimination against them.”177 In the
spring of 1924, the British accorded the United States most-favoured-nation treatment in
Palestine. After news broke about the Anglo-American Convention, the Italians rushed to
secure their own economic agreement with the British.178 In an exchange of notes in the
spring of 1926, the British confirmed that Italian commercial enterprise could participate
in the development of public works and promised to consider special arrangements for
admission of Italian labourers in Palestine. The British also reaffirmed their commitment
to give the Italians favourable consideration in the event of an Italian “economic zone in
Asia Minor materializing.”179 In practice the Agreement did little to advance Italy’s
position in Palestine as US financial circles established a strong position in Palestine
during the latter half of the 1920s.180 But after the 1926 agreement, Mussolini continued
to use the threat of American commercial dominance to secure greater economic
influence in Palestine. On several occasions, Mussolini emphasized the need to preserve
Anglo-Italian cooperation in view of growing American economic power. He confided in
Austen Chamberlin that American “wealth was becoming a danger” and that “they would
eat us all up” if the British and Italians did not work together.181
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Despite Italian challenges and demands, they were cautious in Palestine.
Mussolini negotiated with the British over the limits of Italian influence in the Mandate.
Despite their apparent imperial fragility, the British held a relatively strong line in
negotiations. In a formalized imperial space such as Palestine, the British were less
inclined to share the ‘burden’ of empire as they were in Arabia. During the 1920s the
Italians began to lay the groundwork for the network of local elites and loyal agents that
would join Italy in is subversive efforts in the 1930s. But, in the 1920s, these contacts
were primarily used to ensure Italy’s position in the region and to secure commercial
agreements. The Mandates internal issues largely distracted the League from growing
Italian influence in Palestine. The Permanent Mandates Commission was far more
concerned with maintaining order and control over the local population than it was with
broader imperial relations. This lack of imperial oversight created space for the two
empires to re-negotiate the limits of empire and for the Italians to push its boundaries.

1.2.2 The Aggressive Phase: Subversion and Propaganda, 19291937
Many historians argue that Italian policy in Palestine did not undergo a major
shift until after the Abyssinia Crisis.182 While the British were largely unaware of Italian
subversive activities in Palestine prior to the Abyssinia Crisis, the Italians had adopted an
increasingly aggressive policy from 1929 onward. The Palestine Mandate reached a point
of crisis in 1929 as demonstrations in Jerusalem spiraled into violent riots between Arab
and Jewish populations. The British imperial security apparatus was unprepared to handle
the situation.183 The Italians believed that the shortcomings of British rule— the
reduction of white troops, weak intelligence services, and lack of firm authority — had
been the cause of unrest.184 After the 1929 Disturbances, the Italians escalated their
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complaints over the treatment of Italian interests in Palestine.185 In light of Britain’s
growing imperial fragility, many Fascist officials recognized that the British
administration in Palestine was in no position to guarantee Italian rights in the region and
opted to pursue alternative methods. The anti-British policy that emerged after 1935 built
upon the forward policy that had unfolded after the 1929 riots.
The British were largely unaware of the extent of Fascist activities in Palestine
until Italian policy became overtly anti-British policy after the Abyssinia Crisis. A
number of intelligence reports suggested that while there was a fomenting fascist moment
among Arab nationalists, “the origin of the movement” was “difficult to trace.”186 On a
number of occasions, the Italian President of the Permanent Mandates Commission,
Alberto Theodoli facilitated talks between the British and the Italians over the unrest in
the Mandate. During the early 1930s, the Italians largely preserved the appearance of
cooperation in Palestine as Italian officials repeatedly expressed their desires to see the
“sources of the disturbances” removed.187 Secretly, Mussolini planned to exacerbate the
tensions between the populations in Palestine in order to “force England to ask for a
transformation of the Mandate” and secure for Italy a predominant position in an
independent Palestine.188After the 1929 Disturbances, the Italians brushed aside
negotiations with the British and began to foster relations with Jewish and Arab leaders in
Palestine to see which relationship would reap the greatest rewards.
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Italians toyed with the idea of
supporting the creation of a small independent Jewish state acceptable to the Arabs as a
means of opening the door to Italian influence in Palestine. The Italians had initially
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viewed Zionism as an instrument of British intervention in the Middle East.189 But in the
latter half of the 1920s, the Italian Consulate in Jerusalem emphasized the need to
develop cultural and economic relations with the Jewish community in Palestine. An
Italian agent known as de Angelis highlighted the benefits and the dangers that an
independent Jewish state could pose to Italy’s position in the Mediterranean. If oriented
towards the Italians, a Jewish state in Palestine would “break the great blockade of the
Arab states from the Red Sea to the Tigris” and weaken the Arab stronghold in the
Middle East.190 But if the Jewish state were not under Italian influence, it would pose a
grave threat to Italy’s expansionist objectives. De Angelis argued that the “Jews would
not fail to throw themselves into the race for political and economic influence” in the
Middle East and that the “Jewish state would not fail to cross the path of our policy of
expansion towards the east and stand in our way in management of Mediterranean
policy.”191
The Italian Consulate in Jerusalem reported that the Jews had become “the ruling
class” in Palestine and that it had become “necessary to get to work with the Jews.”192
Colonial Official Orazio Pedrazzi warned that “if we don’t do it, others will do it.”193 In
the spring of 1934, officials at the Italian Consulate in Jerusalem met with Chaim
Weizmann to discuss potential Italian support for Zionist aspirations in the region. When
asked what the “Jews [would] give Italy in exchange for support,” Weizmann replied that
the Zionist movement was “still too young” to offer anything substantial, but that he
could promise “his personal friendship” and to help the Italians achieve a more equal
footing vis-à-vis the British in Palestine.194 For the Italians, this was not enough. In return
for Italian support, Mussolini required an agreement that promised future political and
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economic influence in the region. In addition to Weizmann’s less than alluring offer,
Fascist officials recognized that Italy was playing a “dangerous game” and that support
for a “little Zionist solution” would almost certainly “provoke” the British.195 Even by
1934, the Italians tried to avoid harming relations with the British until they were sure
that an independent Palestine would serve Italian interests.
While the Italians developed relations with the Zionist community, they also
appealed to the Arab community in Palestine. Since the late 1920s, the Italian
government had been fostering relations with Arab nationalists by backing various
Palestinian rebels with arms and financial support to help lift them towards
independence.196 The Italians hoped that supporting the Arab cause in Palestine would
lead “the British [to] come to a similar end in Palestine as in Iraq.”197 Through these
contacts, Mussolini hoped that the Italians could secure a political influence and a
privileged economic position in Palestine upon its independence as Italy had done in Iraq
earlier in the decade.198 After several years of balancing between conflicting groups in the
Palestine Mandate, the Italians determined that it was the Arabs who had the most to
offer Fascist interests.
Securing positive relations with the Arabs would not only help the Italians to
extend Fascist influence in Palestine, but into the Muslim world as a whole. At some
point during the early 1930s, the Italian Consulate in Jerusalem befriended high profile
Arab leaders Amir Shakib Arslan, Ihsan Bey al-Jabari, and Hajj Amin Al-Husayni, the
Mufti of Jerusalem. From the beginning of the decade until the signature of the Easter
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Accords, the Italian government supplied these leaders with “aid” in the form of funding,
arms, and munitions.199 In meetings with Shakib Arslan and al-Jabari, Italian officials
supported violent action and terrorism against the Jewish community in Palestine and
encouraged pan-Arab agitation to awaken “the spirit of independence” across various
Arab countries.200 The Italians received information from agents in Palestine that a
number of leaders across the Middle East were collaborating in pursuit of an Arab
Federation.201 Italian support for independence for the Arab countries tapped into
growing resentment of British policy in the Middle East and painted Italy as an advocate
of the Arab cause, paving the way for Mussolini to declare himself the Protector of Islam
in the spring of 1937.
In addition to establishing direct ties with Arab leaders, the Italians also embarked
on a propaganda campaign in the Arab World that took a virulent anti-British turn after
the Abyssinia Crisis.202 In 1934, the Fascist leadership had launched a programme of
eastern music and news in Arabic languages that Radio Bari broadcast to Libya,
Abyssinia, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, and the Red Sea regions.203 Disillusioned
with British sanctions during the Abyssinian Crisis, Italian-sponsored broadcasts became
blatantly anti-British and Fascist appeals to Arab nationalism and dissemination of antiBritish sentiments became increasingly hostile.204 Italian-sponsored propaganda
highlighted the British government’s inability to prevent political interference of external
powers within the borders of the Palestine Mandate. In the spring of 1936, the crescendo
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of Italian activities in Palestine reached its peak with the outbreak of the Arab Revolt.205
With the support of Italy, the disturbances in Palestine had become a conflict of
international proportion as the pan-Arab movement gained momentum.

1.2.3 The Roll-Back Phase: Negotiating Empire, 1937-1939
Increasing instability in Palestine convinced the British that something must be
done about Italian activities in the Mandate. Italian influence in Palestine had far
exceeded acceptable limits of economic and religious influence under both the terms of
the Mandate and British conceptions of empire. As the Arab Revolt escalated and the
international situation deteriorated, the British became determined to mitigate Italian
influence in the Mandate. The Italian leadership believed that they were in a strong
bargaining position. Fascist officials subversive propaganda campaign could be used to
intimidate the British government and force it to offer the Italians coveted concessions on
the international stage.206 In the summer of 1937, both British and Italian decision-makers
decided to cooperate over Palestine in order to stabilize and consolidate their respective
empires.
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain believed that the British could roll
back Italian activities in Palestine through a negotiated agreement.207 The Foreign Office
had “little doubt” that the Italians were carrying out an “offensive and objectionable
campaign to undermine British influence in the Middle East area and in Palestine in
particular.”208 Anthony Eden, Robert Vansittart, and Miles Lampson, warned the British
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Prime Minister that Mussolini’s attempts to whip up anti-British sentiments
foreshadowed his expansionist ambitions to re-establish the old Roman Empire in the
Mediterranean at the expense of Britain’s position in the region.209 In negotiating an
agreement with the Italians, the British government had three principal aims concerning
Palestine. First, Italian propaganda in Palestine must end. Second, an Anglo-Italian
agreement ought to “re-establish a satisfactory basis” for Italian activities in Palestine.210
Finally, the British government intended “to do everything possible to secure in advance
Italian acquiescence in our future Palestine policy.”211 The Foreign Office proposed that
if the Italians refrained from “any attempt to create difficulties” in Palestine, the British
would respect the legitimate Italian interests existing in the region.
While the Italians rejected the proposal because it gave the British a blank cheque
in Palestine, Count Ciano assured Chamberlain that Italy would not undermine Britain’s
position in Palestine. But, there was a price: de jure recognition of Italy’s conquest of
Abyssinia.212 In a conversation with the British Ambassador to Rome, Count Ciano stated
that any basis for an Anglo-Italian agreement must begin “with recognition of the
[Italian] Empire in order to remove any possibility of misunderstanding and friction in
the future.”213 In negotiations for the Easter Accords, Palestine emerged as an imperial
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bargaining chip. By the late 1930s, the Italians prioritized formal empire over zones of
influence. For Mussolini, the prestige of the empire over Abyssinia took precedence over
covert Italian activities in Palestine. For the British, the sacrifice of Abyssinia was a small
price to pay for the security of the empire. Through the Easter Accords, the two empires
traded the British mandate over Palestine for de jure recognition of the Fascist empire in
Abyssinia.
After nearly two decades of oscillation between competition and cooperation, the
British and Italians finally came to an understanding of what constituted the reasonable
limits of imperial competition in Palestine. Immediately following the conclusion of the
Anglo-Italian Agreement, Italian-sponsored anti-British propaganda slowed to a halt
across the Mediterranean and Red Sea.214 As the British government continued to delay
the implementation of the Accords, the Italians began to curb their anti-British activities
in Palestine and adopted a more peaceful policy towards the British in the Arab world.215
Unlike the Rome Understanding, the Easter Accords did not establish a sphere of
influence system. Instead, Italian activities in Palestine were limited to reasonable
commercial competition and oversight of Christian institutions.
As 1938 came to a close, it was the British who emerged the winners of the
Palestine-Abyssinia imperial bargain. Despite efforts to assure leaders in the Middle East
that Italy had not abandoned its pro-Arab policy, strong criticisms and suspicions
emerged in both local press releases and official communications from Arab leaders to
the Italian government.216 The Fascist Grand Council received numerous letters from key
figures in the Arab revolt critical of Italy’s recent collaboration with the British. Many
leaders in the Arab revolt viewed the Easter Accords as a betrayal and a confirmation that
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the Italians had abandoned their pro-Arab policy.217 In response, Mussolini did little
beyond sending kindly worded letters of Fascist support to subdue suspicions. The
conclusion of the Anglo-Italian Agreement both directly and indirectly weakened
Mussolini’s position in the Middle East.

1.2.4 Conclusion
Historians have been correct to highlight the intense imperial competition
between the British and Italians in Palestine. But throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the
British and Italians used cooperation as a tool to limit competition and advance their own
imperial interests. The British and Italians continuously re-negotiated the boundaries of
competition in Palestine and pushed them to their limits. While the Palestine Mandate
existed within the twentieth-century imperial system governed by the League of Nations,
Anglo-Italian relations over Palestine were often characterized by nineteenth-century
imperial practices. The limits of Italian economic, religious, and political influence were
rarely negotiated at the Permanent Mandates Commission. They were primarily
negotiated with British officials in closed-door rooms.
The persistence of nineteenth century imperial norms well into the twentieth
century was possible because the Permanent Mandates Commission had little time to
hold the British and Italian governments accountable for their behaviour. The League of
Nations was preoccupied with the question of the Jewish homeland and growing tensions
between local populations. The international attention that the Arab-Israeli conflict
received distracted the PMC and international observers from Italian activities in the
region. The conditions in the Mandate created space for imperial competition. But neither
the British nor the Italians wanted an open imperial clash in the Palestine Mandate. The
British gave in to Italian demands for coexistence between religious institutions and
freely permitted Italian commercial activity in the region. During the 1930s, the Italians
took advantage of Britain’s imperial weakness in Palestine and established a strong
influence in Palestine. In many respects, the Palestine Mandate was a shared imperial
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space. Despite the usefulness of borders and spheres in regulating imperial competition,
the case of Palestine also shows the porousness and co-existence of empires.
While many historians dismiss the Easter Accords as ineffectual, this agreement
was a response to nearly two decades of imperial competition and cooperation in the
Palestine Mandate. The agreement also highlights the role of Realpolitik and pragmatism
in Mussolini’s policy making. While he ultimately desired Italian preeminence in
Palestine, cooperation with the British frequently served Italy’s immediate interests in
empire. Italy’s internal weakness and instability in the 1920s forced Mussolini to adopt a
cautious approach to competition in Palestine. While the Italians adopted a more
aggressive policy towards Palestine after the 1929 Disturbances, Mussolini decided to
roll back this policy in favour of cooperation with and recognition by the British. The
imperial bargain encapsulated within the Easter Accords confirms the legacy of
nineteenth-century imperial carve-ups and exchanges on the eve of the Second World
War.
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1.3 The Crown Colony of Malta, 1929-1934: A Collision of
Cultures in an (Italian) British Colony
Officially, Malta was a British Crown Colony. But for more than one hundred
years, Malta had been subject to both British and Italian imperial influences. The internal
political crisis of 1929-1930 gave rise to profound tension between the British and
Italians over the limits of imperial power in the small Mediterranean island. In an effort
to limit the increasing Fascist influence in the Crown Colony, the British government
suspended the constitution and introduced several Ordinances in the early 1930s that
banned the teaching of the Italian language in elementary schools, closed several Italian
secondary schools, and banned British subjects from participating in Fascist groups and
organizations. Most importantly, these Ordinances recognized any person born on the
Island as a British subject even if this person was born to Italian parents. Yet this antiItalian legislation did not entirely limit Italian influence on the Island. Instead, it renegotiated its place in Malta.
A handful of historians have examined the so-called Fascist culture war in Malta.
Henry Frendo’s exhaustive study of culture, politics, and identity in Malta during the
1920s and 1930s explores strains in Anglo-Italian relations in the years leading up to the
Abyssinia Crisis.218 The author depicts Maltese Prime Minister Lord Strickland as a
polarizing figure in local politics, but largely places the blame on Italian priests and local
organization for creating trouble in the British Empire.219 Claudio Baldoli focuses on the
Italian sponsored “cultural conflict” in Malta.220 Baldoli examines the role of Fascist
propaganda in Malta within the broader attempt to transform Italian communities abroad
into Fascist colonies and argues that this shows that Mussolini was driven above all by
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ideological ambitions. Both Frendo and Baldoli use the estrangement of Anglo-Italian
relations after 1935 as an endpoint from which to look back on the period.
It is true that Malta was a site of deep competition between the British and the
Italians. Unlike in Arabia and Palestine, competition between the two empires extended
far beyond the commercial realm as the British and Italians framed empire in cultural,
racial, and religious terms. But in many ways, Malta was a shared imperial space. While
the British held formal control over the island’s political and economic institutions, the
Italians dominated the legal, religious, and cultural establishments. Yet there were few
formal agreements between the two empires with respect to the extents and limits of
Italian influence in the British colony unlike the experiences in Arabia and Palestine. This
case study begins by outlining the tradition of peaceful coexistence that informed the
limits of competition in Malta before turning to examine the tensions that emerged at the
turn of the 1920s. But before long, the two empires adopted a cautious approach to
empire in Malta as the international situation became increasingly precarious. I argue that
a normative tradition of coexistence between British and Italian influences that had been
formulated in the nineteenth century served as a guide to navigate imperial competition
well into the 1930s.

1.3.1 Coexistence in Malta: British and Italian Interests
By the beginning of the 1920s, both the British and Italians had a well-established
position in Malta. The British government held formal political control over Malta and
held substantial influence in the island’s economy. But beyond British political and
economic institutions, Malta was home to Italian religious, cultural, and legal institutions.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the influences of these two empires in Malta existed
in relatively peaceful coexistence. As Malta began to move toward nationhood after the
First World War, the British and Italians attempted to imbue the Maltese with the cultural
characteristics of their respective empire to retain close affiliation between the Island and
the Empire upon independence. The nation-building project in the small Mediterranean
island began to mobilize competing conceptions of how a Maltese national identity ought
to look and threatened the system of coexistence that had prevailed on the island for more
than a century.
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The Italians established a deep and long-lasting position in the island. Malta had
been a part of the Kingdom of Sicily before it was a British colony.221 Even after the
island fell under British control, the Italian language, customs, and religious practices
remained entrenched among the cultural elite. During the nineteenth century, Malta
became a trilingual island in which children from an early age were educated in English,
Maltese, and Italian. English emerged as the language of politics and commerce in Malta,
but Italian became the language of professionals and the Church. The legal system in
Malta was strictly Italian.222 Law School requirements necessitated that all practicing and
prospective lawyers be fluent in the language.223 Beyond the legal system, Italian
influence persisted through the Catholic Church as the primary religious institution on the
island. The Archbishops of Malta and Gozo were independent diocesan Bishops who
reported directly to the Vatican.224 By the early twentieth century, Malta was home to a
population of settled and highly educated Italians.225 The rise of Fascism reinforced the
importance of the relationship between Malta and Italy. Shortly after the March on Rome,
Mussolini referred to Malta as an “Italian colony” and emphasized the “racial and
cultural ties between the Maltese and Italy.”226 For the Italians, the island was not simply
a strategic imperial outpost. Malta was an extension of Italy proper.
As the 1920s and 1930s unfolded, the British government became increasingly
determined to preserve its position in Malta for the purpose of imperial defence. Since the
mid-nineteenth century, the British had viewed Malta as a ‘fortress colony’ which housed
the headquarters for the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet.227 After the First World War,
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the Treasury implemented a demobilization and disarmament scheme to reduce defences
in the Mediterranean to a minimum based on the assumption of a friendly Italy. By the
early 1930s, however, the British had become increasingly concerned with the security of
its mercantile shipping routes and imperial communications through the Mediterranean.
British policymakers looked upon not only the growing strength and efficiency of French
and Italian air forces with uncertainty, but their anxious gaze extended into the Far East
in light of increasing Japanese aggression.228 After the Manchurian Crisis of 1931,
Britain’s position in the Mediterranean became indispensable in the event of
reinforcements needed at the Singapore base.229 Meanwhile, the British were still pushing
for world disarmament at the conference in Geneva rendering any substantial
strengthening of Britain’s position in Malta impractical. From the perspective of imperial
defence, Malta had become an essential but highly vulnerable imperial outpost.
Administration of the Crown Colony became increasingly complex in light of
surging Maltese nationalism.230 Since 1919, the Maltese indigenous population had been
vying for self-governance. Erez Manela has examined the emergence of anti-colonial
nationalism in the years surrounding the Paris Peace Conferences.231 While Manela
highlights widespread disillusionment in the colonial world in response to the collapse of
the Wilsonian moment, the Maltese experience appears as somewhat of an exception. As
Manela argues, the Wilsonian Moment presented nationalist elites in the imperial world
with an unprecedented opportunity to advance nation-building claims and expand
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legitimacy at home and abroad.232 Unlike many movements across the colonial world, the
nationalist aspirations of the Maltese were realized to a certain extent. In comparison to
Arabia and Palestine, for example, there was something different about the nationalist
ambitions of the Maltese. To a certain degree, nation-building in Malta made sense
within the European colonial imagination. The Maltese were white. From the British
Cabinet’s point of view, the Maltese deserved a true chance to “satisfy their aspirations”
and prove themselves at self-government.233

1.3.2 The ‘Language’ Question
After more than a century of “sheltered existence” as a Crown Colony, in 1921
the British government introduced an English parliamentary style of self-government and
established a constitution for the island with the goal of guiding it towards European
civility.234 Malta soon began to develop a bipolar party system tainted by competing
imperial interests. The Nationalist Party held the majority from Malta’s first
parliamentary elections in 1921 until 1927. The party platform was based on the Church
and the defence of the Italian influence in Maltese culture. The opposing Constitutional
Party built its platform on maintaining a special connection with the British and
highlighted Maltese nationalism as distinct from Italian influence.235 In an effort to
conjure a distinctly Anglicized Maltese identity, the Constitutional Party adopted an anticlerical position. The nation-building project in Malta brought to light the need to define
what it meant to be Maltese. After more than one hundred years of relatively peaceful
coexistence between British and Italian influence, the internal situation in Malta
exacerbated tensions between the two empires.
The Italians exploited the fragile state of Maltese politics. From Mussolini’s
perspective, a self-governing Malta provided the Italians with an opportunity to influence

232

Manela, 8.

233

Cunliffe-Lister Memorandum, 18 April 1934, CAB 24/248/46.

234

FO Memorandum, 28 April 1931, FO 371/15249, C 7329/3/22.

235

FO Memorandum, 28 April 1931, FO 371/15249, C 7329/3/22.

63

local politics and establish a privileged position in the island through pre-existing Italian
institutions. Similar to Fascist designs on Yemen and Palestine, Mussolini did not aim to
establish a formal Italian empire in Malta. Instead, the Fascist dictator intended to
infiltrate the island’s political system with loyal Fascists who would run the territory in
Italy’s interest. The Italians established numerous cultural institutions and Fascist
organizations designed to guide the Maltese towards realizing their “true” racial and
cultural heritage. Beyond the cultural sphere, the Italian government provided the
Nationalist Party in Malta with funding and advisors to advance the cause of the Italian
influence politically. By encouraging cultural ties between Malta and Italy, Il Duce
planned to awaken the “Italian national conscience in the Maltese people.”236 Fascist
Officials believed that the Maltese could be made Italian on the basis of the island’s
proximity to Europe and the perceived whiteness of its indigenous population. Italian
propaganda claimed that Malta was a long lost part of Italy that could be re-united with
the “mother country” through cultural ties and Italian institutions.237
Tensions between the Italian and British influences came to a critical crossroad in
1927 when the Constitutional Party under Lord Gerald Strickland won the national
election and began a program of anti-Italian propaganda. Strickland was a true product of
the imperial situation in Malta. He was the son of an aristocratic Maltese mother and an
English naval officer father who became fluently trilingual in Malta’s official languages
and was a practicing Roman Catholic.238 After assuming the premiership, Strickland
made it his mission to Anglicize and “civilize” Maltese culture.239 In Whitehall, the
Colonial Office viewed Strickland’s campaign as a “natural reaction” to the “under-
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current of Italianism in Malta.”240 The Cabinet was more critical. They complained that
the new Maltese Prime Minister was “by nature, quarrelsome, tactless, and shifty.”241
While the Colonial Office acknowledged that Strickland was “a hot-headed and
unbalanced person” and even “a fanatic” on the subject of Italianism, there was little that
could be done to modify the fundamental basis of the Constitutional Party’s platform.242
The Foreign Office pointed out that Strickland alone did not deserve all the blame for the
unrest as that Italian influences had far exceeded appropriate limits.243 But as long as
Maltese politics remained free from direct Fascist influences, the British government kept
its distance from the colony’s internal politics.
This cultural crossroad erupted into a full-blown crisis in 1929 when the Catholic
Church rushed to the defence of Italian culture in Malta. In the spring of 1929, Prime
Minister Strickland used the unfrocking of a British Catholic Priest by the Franciscan
Order to challenge Italian influence through the Catholic Church.244 In response, the
Vatican instructed the Archbishops in Malta to carry out a defamation campaign against
Strickland while Fascist organizations in Malta launched personal attacks on the Prime
Minister.245 The Palazzo Chigi believed that Strickland “wished for war against the
Italian language.”246 After a year of escalating tensions, the Vatican issued a Pastoral
declaring that those who voted for Strickland in the next election would be guilty of
“mortal sin” and subsequently excommunicated from the Catholic Church.247 In light of
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the Vatican’s threats, the Governor of Malta claimed that it would be impossible to hold
free elections and temporarily suspended the constitution.
In Malta, the Wilsonian Moment extended far beyond the months surrounding the
Paris Peace Conferences. But similar to its colonial comrades in other imperial spaces,
the idealism of the Wilsonian Moment in Malta collapsed just the same. The Cabinet
concluded that self-governance through a parliamentary institution granted to Malta in
1921 had “been given a fair trial and failed.”248 The Foreign Office reflected that the
Maltese people “had been able to develop an honest and progressive administration” and
established a “loyal, enlightened, and instructive” press. The Maltese demonstrated that
British and Maltese interests could “work together” in Malta for the “common good
under the British flag.”249 The island had achieved a “certain standard of culture and
civilization.”250 But in the aftermath of the election crisis, the Governor of Malta
explained to the Cabinet that while the “polite society [was] starting to become English”
the island “cannot yet be considered culturally English.”251 Malta as a whole was not as
“civilized” as the British had thought. The British government suspended the constitution
indefinitely and reinstated the imperial dictatorship that had ruled the island for a
century.252
The British believed that excessive Italian cultural influences were at fault for the
failure of the self-governance experiment. For more than a decade, British officials
emphasized the stark difference between the British Anglo-Saxon race and the Italian
Latin race. The interwar British gentleman was characterized as reticent, reserved, and
rational.253 The British were men of bourgeois democracy and believed that states shared
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a common interest in peaceful coexistence.254 British officials complained that the
Italians were a “sensitive and emotional race” suggesting their lack of “civility” in
comparison to the British gentleman.255 The language used to describe Italians indicated
that they were opportunistic, lacking loyalty, and could “be bought at a price.”256 British
officials claimed that the Italians were not, by nature, a people of democracy. The Italians
were a “warlike” Latin people inclined to dictatorship.257 Local elites in Malta stressed to
their British superiors that “British character” and “Anglo-Saxon morality” were radically
different from the “Latin morality” on the island.258 Regardless of the so-called
“progress” that the Anglo-Maltese people had made under British guidance, the pervasive
Italian elements led to political degeneration in Malta. The culture of the Nationalist
Party and “the old gang” of Italian bureaucrats did not jive with British democratic
traditions. Strickland’s premiership further exacerbated these tensions by antagonizing
the Italians. From the British perspective, it was the influence of these backward Latin
elements in Maltese culture that had caused the island’s parliamentary experiment to fail.
After the capitulation of Malta’s self-governance, the British government
implemented a scheme designed to limit Italian cultural elements in Malta. In the spring
of 1932, the British government introduced a Letters Patent that prohibited the teaching
of Italian in Maltese elementary schools and stipulated that all Italian schools must close
by 1934.259 The British also introduced new legislation to limit Italian cultural institutions
and ban British subjects from participation in Italian organizations. Under the British
government’s proposed laws, a British subject was defined as any person born in Malta,
whether to British, Maltese, or Italian parents.260 Because of the tradition of long-term
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Italian settlement in Malta, the new law would recognize many persons who identified as
Italian as British subjects and would ban them from participation in Italian cultural
activities. Finally, the British government attempted to develop a scheme that would
transform the legal system in Malta from an Italian-based to a British-based system.
British legislation after the 1929-1930 election crises sought to limit Italian cultural
influences in Malta in an effort to create the necessary cultural conditions to re-introduce
self-government to the Maltese.
Unsurprisingly, the British government’s proposed Italophobic legislation did not
sit well with the Fascist leadership. Mussolini believed that the new legislation was of a
“hateful and unfriendly character towards Italy.”261 The Italian Foreign Ministry
complained that Italy’s activity in Malta had never been political and that it, therefore,
could not have been the cause of political instability.262 Fascist officials argued that the
coexistence of Italian, Maltese, and British cultures in Malta had never been a problem
until Prime Minister Strickland made it one.263 In a conversation with Mussolini, the
British Ambassador to Rome, Ronald Graham, confessed that “Strickland’s policy was a
mistake, but there is no going back.”264 The Colonial Office also recognized that it was
“due primarily to Strickland’s own action,” that the situation in Malta had changed.265 In
a conversation with Robert Vansittart, Italian Ambassador Bordonaro seethed that the
recent British legislation “had been a mistake” from the “international point of view.”266
Dino Grandi warned that the current tensions over Malta would “create a cloud between
the cordial Italian-English relations” extending far beyond the imperial realm.267
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1.3.3 Caution in Empire
Despite escalating tensions over Malta, both the British and Italians proceeded
with relative caution and restraint in an effort to preserve cooperation between them.
Between the initial election crisis and the autumn of 1934, the international situation had
changed significantly. The Great Depression of 1929 reduced confidence in the global
economy and shook beliefs that it could be revived through global cooperative effort.268
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 alerted the British to the vulnerabilities of
the Eastern defences and highlighted the necessity of a peaceful Mediterranean in the
event of war in the Far East.269 The opening of the World Disarmament Conference in
Geneva and its prolonged collapse drew the British government’s attention towards the
need to establish a basis for cooperation between powers in Europe. The rise of Nazi
Germany in 1933 raised suspicions in both Rome and London over Adolf Hitler’s true
intentions. As the future of the global order became increasingly unstable and
unpredictable, the possible rupture of Anglo-Italian relations over a small colonial issue
in Malta did not appear to be worth the risk for either the British or the Italians.
Shortly after the announcement of Britain’s new language laws, the Italian
Foreign Ministry sent orders to the Consul in Malta explaining that while it must support
the local defence of the Italian language and culture on the island, it should also “exercise
moderation.”270 Fascist officials believed that the British government’s new language
legislation in Malta “may not be final” and that “much [would] depend on the reaction in
Malta.”271 The Italians continued to use the press and propaganda to elicit sympathy for
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the Italian cause in Malta. But beyond the press, Fascist circles in Malta did very little to
advance their cause or challenge the new British legislation. Foreign Ministry Official
Gino Buti recommended that “appropriate action should be taken by the consul as far as
possible outside of local politics.”272 After the new language legislation, Fascist activities
in Malta shifted from direct interference in the Nationalist Party program to limit its
activities within the cultural sphere. Mussolini believed that in the current situation an
“attitude of moderation” would serve Fascist interests most effectively.273
On several occasions, the Italians attempted to negotiate an understanding with
the British over Malta and put the Language Question to rest. The Foreign Ministry,
however, believed that a diplomatic appeal to the British would not have much effect.
Bordonaro lamented that he “did not believe that diplomatic action on our part [would]
have the effect it had three years ago in the time of Austen Chamberlain.”274 While
Mussolini’s attempts to convince the Colonial Office to permit the voluntary teaching of
Italian in Malta ultimately proved futile, the Italians received word that the Foreign
Office had decided to “suspend ‘for the moment’ any attitude or hostile measure to the
question of Italian language in Malta.” The British needed “the support of Italy in other
fields.”275 After receiving reports that the British planned to table the new legislation,
Italian appeals to the British plateaued.
British policy-makers believed that a friendly Italy could be a valuable ally to
Britain’s attempts to stabilize the European situation. While suspicious of French
intentions in the 1920s, the British began to realize the advantages of loose collaboration
with the French in maintaining the continental balance of power and hoped that the
Italians would do the same.276 During the early 1930s, the British and French
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spearheaded a number of initiatives designed to conclude a ‘Mediterranean Locarno’ and
confirm cooperation between the three major Mediterranean powers: Britain, France, and
Italy. After Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, the British government became increasingly
concerned with Italy’s commitment under the Treaty of Locarno (1925) to guarantee the
sovereignty of Austria. The British recognized that Italy might actually “gain advantages
form a German success in Austria.”277 The British also wanted to confirm Mussolini’s
leadership in the recently concluded Four Power Pact between the British, Italians,
French, and Germans intended to preserve international collaboration in light of the
collapsing World Disarmament Conference and the failed World Economic Conference.
The British government feared that the Four Power Pact could dissolve if Italy started
“secretly backing Germany.”278 The Cabinet concluded that whether in the League or in
the Four Power Pact, “everything depended on Italy.”279
Within a European geopolitical context, the British government hoped to move
forward with the Anglicization of Malta without jeopardizing cooperation with the
Italians on more pressing matters. The British intentionally delayed action on the Malta
questions until they had secured Italy’s commitment to the Four Power Pact.280 Even after
the conclusion of the Pact, the British proceeded with caution. In September 1933,
British Foreign Minister, John Simon, warned that “in view of the European situation…
matters could not be pushed to a quarrel with Italy.”281 The Foreign Minister explained to
the Cabinet that “on balancing respective risks, I feel bound to suggest that direct action
against Italian institutions in Malta should be suspended temporarily until the
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international situation is clearer.”282 British officials communicated the importance of
continued cooperation between the two countries despite the colonial issue in Malta. In a
conversation with Undersecretary of State Fulvio Suvich, Eric Drummond emphasized
that issues in Malta “must not disturb at all friendship between our two countries” and
that the British desired “joint action [between the British and Italians] in the important
international issues”283
By the autumn of 1934, questions concerning Malta began to fizzle out. After
considerable debate, the Cabinet decided to implement another Letters Patent introduced
on 16 August to transition the legal system from Italian to English. While the British had
effectively subdued Italian influence in the legal and education systems, Malta remained
devoutly Roman Catholic. The Cabinet also determined that Malta must remain in a
‘state of emergency’ for the foreseeable future allowing the Governor of Malta to retain
full control over Maltese politics.284 While the Governor of Malta implemented a number
of these new laws during 1932, the British government did not require that these laws
were followed or enforced. Increasing tensions in Europe caused the British government
to adopt a more conciliatory approach to empire. For the Italians, the Malta issue was
overshadowed by plans for the military invasion of Abyssinia set for the autumn of 1935.
By the mid-1930s, the question of the cultural and racial character of Malta had become
secondary or irrelevant.

1.3.4 Conclusion
Many historians cast a negative light on Italian activities in Malta as if the title of
Crown Colony extended the British a just right to the Island. Yet, in many ways Malta
was a shared imperial space. Unlike cooperation in the Arabian Peninsula and the
Palestine Mandate, Anglo-Italian cooperation in Malta was not institutionalized through
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formal agreements or understandings. Cooperation in Malta was guided by more than a
century of coexistence between British and Italian interests on the Island. The
coexistence between British and Italian institutions reveals the porousness of empire and
disrupts traditional views of imperial power. The most profound challenge to tradition of
cooperation in Malta was the nation-building project in the island itself. The extension of
self-governance to Malta in 1921 created space for these norms to be challenged. While
neither the British nor Italians desired a conflict over Malta, both empires tried to shift
the balance of power on the Island in favour of their respective cultural influences. The
most serious breach of imperial coexistence was sparked by a local elite with his own
political agenda: Lord Gerald Strickland. Yet even as tensions escalated, neither the
British nor the Italians secured a hegemonic position in Malta. While British legislation
did shift the balance of influence on the island, it did not totally eliminate the parallel
coexistence of British and Italian influences in different institutional spaces within the
island.
The narrative of the so-called cultural war that emerged between the British and
Italians overlooks the British government’s assimilatory cultural project in Malta. After
more than a century of coexistence between British and Italian imperial influences,
tensions emerged as each empire attempted to establish the cultural dominance of either
‘Englishness’ or Italianáta in Malta. Rather than differentiating between the colonizer and
the colonized, local politics explored the degrees to which the island’s population
reflected the cultures of these imperial actors. Unlike other parts of the empire, many
British officials recognized Malta as a part of Europe proper as the indigenous population
had a racial affinity with central Europeans. By imposing English cultural traditions on
the Maltese, the people could be guided towards European civility and nationhood. The
British cultural project in Malta was motivated by racial ideologies surrounding the
perceived whiteness of the Maltese and the disruptive force of hot-headed Latin morality.
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1.4 Conclusion: Cooperation and Accountability
Comparing Anglo-Italian relations in these three imperial spaces demonstrates
that there was intense imperial rivalry, but there was also cooperation. Many scholars
have argued that relations between the British and Italians over empire were
characterized by escalating conflict throughout the interwar years. This focus on Benito
Mussolini’s ideological ambition to expand the Fascist empire and achieve spazio vitale
in the Mediterranean and Middle East through violent conquest has obscured both our
understanding of Anglo-Italian relations and the imperial system in the 1920s and 1930s.
It is true that the two empires often had clashing goals in the Mediterranean and the
Middle East, but on a number of occasions the British and Italians opted to collaborate
and compromise over empire to prevent competition from going too far. In Arabia and
Malta, the two empires created systems of cooperation through formal agreements and
normative traditions that were informed by broader geopolitical priorities. In Palestine,
cooperation was a tool of empire used to mitigate competition and secure imperial gains.
Each of these case studies demonstrate that both the British and Italians shared the
common assumption that there were limits to imperial competition.
These case studies demonstrate that the British and Italians typically had more to
gain than they did to lose from cooperation over empire. In Arabia, cooperation over
empire provided the British with a greater sense of security over its imperial defences
while opening the door to the Italians for economic gains and a new sense of imperial
legitimacy. In Palestine, the precarious system of cooperation culminated in the Easter
Accords in which the Italians conceded political influence in the Mandate in exchange for
de jure recognition of the Italian Empire in Abyssinia. In this exchange, each empire
viewed the costs as relatively minor in exchange for the benefits. In Malta, the tradition
of coexistence proved stronger than imperial policy. The British and Italians had more to
gain from preserving the status quo than they did from continued imperial competition
that resulted in local instability.
Beyond considerations limited to the imperial realm, these cases demonstrate that
common concerns about the global order prompted the British and Italians to preserve
cooperation despite conflicting imperial ambitions and political ideals. Britain and Italy’s
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joint obligations under Locarno brought the two countries together as the two major
European powers committed to European security, apprehensive of central European
developments, and suspicious of French designs on the Mediterranean. Throughout the
1920s and early 1930s, British and Italian officials discussing imperial tensions would
emphasize their desire to extend cooperation and joint action from Europe to the imperial
realm. Furthermore, both the British and Italians feared the establishment of another
European empire in Arabia. Soviet propaganda across the Arabian Peninsula emerged as
a major threat to the imperial system established by the Rome Understanding and
provided a basis for continued cooperation. In Palestine, both the British and Italians
desired to prevent American economic interests from supplanting their own. In Malta, the
increasing instability of the global order in the 1930s caused both the British and Italians
to adopt more cautious approaches to empire. Officials in both countries recognized that
the British and Italians faced more substantial problems in Europe than they did in the
little colony of Malta.
The cases of imperial competition in Arabia, Palestine, and Malta demonstrate
that to a certain extent, imperial powers could sideline League oversight as they pleased.
Like the Italians, the British incorporated imperial violence into their imperial repertoire
when beyond the realm of international scrutiny. The use of imperial methods and the
organization of empire in Arabia was fair game because the region existed entirely
outside of the League system. Unlike international condemnation of Italian imperial
violence in Corfu, Abyssinia, and Albania examined in the second chapter, the
international community did not condemn British actions because the Arabian Peninsula
was not subject to international surveillance and was, therefore, exempt from the
privileges of imperial accountability mechanisms. Similarly, there was no League
presence in Malta. While Malta became self-governing in 1921, it remained a British
colony. The British and Italians both attempted to impose their cultural and racial
affinities onto the Island and the Maltese people. While the Maltese were not subject to
bombs and bullets, they were subject to the colonial erasure of their culture and
assimilatory programs at odds with League ideals of self-determination. Even in a
territory under the Permanent Mandates Commission’s oversight, as long as the British
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and Italians did not directly intervene with bombs and planes, they could negotiate new
limits of economic penetration and local collaboration.
These case studies demonstrate that the mechanisms of imperial accountability
encountered serious limits and restrictions long before the League’s final failure in the
Abyssinia Crisis. In these imperial spaces, the League of Nations played a minimal role,
if any role at all. Unlike the cases examined in Chapter 2, neither Arabia, Palestine, nor
Malta received the international attention necessary to hold imperialism accountable. In
Arabia, Palestine, and Malta, it was not an international body that established the main
imperial framework. Instead, it was secret agreements between two states over how to
maintain empire. While Susan Pedersen is right to emphasize the attempts to the League
of Nations to make empire accountable, there were limits to these accountability
mechanisms. Imperial accountability mechanisms were limited by the League’s terms of
recognition and the legacy of the imperial system of the nineteenth century. My analysis
of Anglo-Italian relations in Arabia, Palestine and Malta demonstrates that in spaces
excluded from the League of Nations imperial system, nineteenth-century imperial norms
prevailed in the absence of international oversights.
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Chapter 2

2

Imperial Crisis

On April 5, 1939, warnings fell from the sky. The Italian air force dropped
hundreds of thousands of pamphlets in Tirana, Durazzo, Valona, Santi Quaranta, and San
Giovanni di Medua alerting the Albanian cities of imminent invasion.285 The swirl of
leaflets dropped by warplanes urged Albanians to adopt a position of non-resistance
towards the occupying Italian forces. They warned Albanians “do not listen to the men of
your government.” The Albanian government aims to “lead [Albania] to an unnecessary
bloodshed.”286 The pamphlets claimed that the Italian troops were “of a people who have
been friends with [Albania] for centuries” and that they were coming to “restore order,
justice, and peace.”287
Terror struck at night. Italian bombs began to cascade over the country at 4:30am
on Good Friday, April 7, 1939. In a highly coordinated effort, the Italian navy and air
force attacked the four strategic port cities of Durazzo, Valona, Saranda, and Shingjin.288
Within a matter of hours Italian forces had more or less defeated Durazzo. After landing
in the freshly conquered city to revel in the Italian triumph, Count Ciano commented on
the stillness of the morning: “the sea was like a mirror” that reflected the destruction of
the night. The warships and motorboats all rested “motionless and solemn” in the bay of
Durazzo. Observing the total capitulation of the city against a backdrop of the towering
Skanderbeg mountain range, Count Ciano scribbled triumphantly in his Diary that it truly
was “a beautiful spectacle.”289
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The Foreign Office disapproved of the violent nature of the invasion, noting that
Mussolini’s methods “shocked the Christian conscience.”290 Nonetheless, the Foreign
Office accepted the outcome as “sad but inevitable.”291 According to one Foreign Office
official, “sticking to Christian ethics and honest dealings” would have put the Italians “in
precisely the same position as they are now.”292 For example, the Italians could have
simply replaced the Albanian King with an Italian sympathizer or even stationed a
garrison in Albania, in which case “there would have been no storm clouds over Easter”
and “no international complications.”293 For the British, the problem of the Italian
empire-building project in Albania was one of methods rather than purpose.
The Italians were surprised that the international reaction to the occupation of
Albania “was almost non-existent.”294 What remained of the Albanian government
appealed to the League of Nations and a number of friendly governments. Yet the
Albanian King’s story of “a million Albanians” who fought in the mountains and in the
streets and made the “utmost sacrifices to prevent the violent action of Italy” was ignored
by all. Unlike earlier crises, the Italian invasion was not the focus of castigatory public
opinion nor was it the target of lobbying initiatives. The flurry of international ‘talk’ that
characterized previous episodes of imperial violence was surprisingly quiet.
***
The Italian invasion of Albania is rarely the case that historians point to when
exploring Fascist imperial violence. The brutal nature of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia
in 1935 has by far overshadowed other instances of imperial violence during the interwar
years. Abyssinia, however, was neither the first nor the last place to fall victim to Fascist
imperial violence. Furthermore, many historians view the Abyssinia Crisis as proof of the
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ideological incompatibility of the British and Italian empires. This chapter focuses on
Anglo-Italian cooperation over empire in cases where Italian expansion became an
international issue, in particular crises involving independent states which fell under the
mandate of the League of Nations.
The three imperial crises in this chapter -- Corfu, Abyssinia, and Albania – all
challenged cooperation between the British and the Italians. The Italians had deep
imperial interests in each territory despite their League-recognized independence. These
territories had been ‘lost’ in Italy’s so-called mutilated victory after the First World War
and held a key role in Fascist ambitions for spazio vitale. The brutality of Fascist imperial
methods and the member-status of each country prompted the League of Nations to
respond and the British to rally in support of the international community’s moral
compass. It was widely recognized that by invading League members and using violent
methods, the Italians were doing empire the wrong way. But despite condemnations of
Fascist aggression, in the aftermath of each crisis the British and Italians worked together
to repair traditional cooperation.
This chapter reconsiders the role that the League of Nations played in the imperial
system by analyzing its part in mediating these three imperial crises. For too long,
scholars have dismissed the many contributions of the League of Nations and instead
focused on “why the League failed.”295 It is true that the League was founded on the
idealistic hopes and dreams of world peace. While it ultimately failed to achieve these
lofty objectives, the League nonetheless contributed to a number of innovative
developments in global governance. The League acted as a norm-setting international
body that established new expectations and monitored their realization. In her study of
the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), Susan Pedersen demonstrates that the
PMC unintentionally introduced a number of mechanisms that attempted to make empire
more accountable.296 Among these mechanisms, the most consequential was the new
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level of international ‘talk’ about empire. The Permanent Mandates Commission acted as
a vehicle for the internationalization of imperial issues and contributed to new levels of
diplomacy, scrutiny, and publicity over imperial matters.297 This chapter demonstrates
that the advent of international surveillance and ‘talk’ about empire was not limited to the
mandates system.
This chapter reveals both the extent and limits of the League’s imperial
accountability mechanisms on the international stage. While responses varied, the League
did attempt to hold violent Fascist imperialism accountable. Each crisis functioned as a
learning experience for the League of Nations in which Geneva confronted and attempted
to address the challenges and limitations inherent within both the League framework and
the shifting international system. Diplomats in Geneva encountered a great learning curve
when it came to questions of implementing the Covenant, imposing sanctions, and the
possibility of war. These imperial crises reveal the fundamental contradiction that
tormented the League for the duration of its existence: for a body designed to preserve
peace, its accountability mechanisms threatened to produce European war. Many
diplomats feared that to apply sanctions under the Covenant would result in war between
the League of Nations and the transgressor. In each case, the British and Italians
circumvented the League to preserve cooperation within the imperial system through
compromise rather than to rupture cooperation through imperial accountability.
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2.1 The Corfu Crisis: ‘Mad Dog’ Mussolini and a League
Success Story?
The murder of an Italian General in Greece on a joint boundary commission
sparked one of the first major international crises of the interwar period. On the morning
of August 27, 1923 the Italian delegation of the International Boundary Commission
appointed to delineate the boundary between Greece and Albania was murdered on Greek
soil.298 In response, Mussolini sent a seven-point ultimatum to the Greek government
demanding that Greece take responsibility for the murders, apologize, and compensate
Italy.299 When Greece rejected three points of the ultimatum, Benito Mussolini ordered
the Italian Naval Forces stationed in Gallipoli to occupy the independent Greek Island of
Corfu.300 On August 31, 1923 the Italian Navy carried out a bombing campaign against
the island causing fires in local schools and killing numerous Greek civilians.301 On
September 1, 1923, the Greek government addressed the matter of Italian aggression in
the League of Nations and claimed that the Italian occupation of Corfu was in violation
of Articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant.302 Within a few days, the two countries had come
to an agreement and on September 27, the Italians evacuated Corfu.303 It would appear
that when faced with its first major crisis, the League of Nations rolled back Italian
aggression and safeguarded the sovereignty of the Greek island of Corfu.
Historians have reached different conclusions about the significance of the Corfu
Crisis for the League of Nations. Alan Cassels argues that more than any other individual,
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Mussolini was responsible for the collapse of the League. In 1923, Mussolini began the
erosion of the international organization that he would later complete in 1935.304 James
Barros argues that the Corfu Crisis exposed the shortcomings of the League of Nations as
the crisis was mitigated largely by the Conference of Ambassadors rather than the League
Council.305 Similarly, Peter Yearwood argues that by the end of the crisis, peace had been
preserved, but despite the League rather than because of it. The crisis proved the
Covenant ineffective when faced with great power aggression against a smaller power.306
Adam Tooze stands alone in arguing that the Corfu Crisis was the League of Nations’
first major test and that it was ultimately successful in containing the crisis.307 Tooze
emphasizes that the Corfu Crisis was precisely the type of incident that the League of
Nations was designed to address and that the outcome of the Crisis marked the limit of
Fascist aggression until the collapse of the international order in the 1930s.
The literature’s focus on the Corfu Crisis as an early sign of the failures of the
new international system presents an overly deterministic view of the interwar years.
Rather than perpetuating the narrative of the League of Nations as a doomed institution, it
is important to examine what the League of Nations, its members, and its diplomats
learned from the Corfu Crisis. For the first time, diplomats in Geneva faced a number of
questions pertaining to the League’s authority, the implementation of the Covenant, and
the commitment to preserve peace. Rather than a foreshadowing of its failures, the Corfu
Crisis was both a learning and formative experience for the League of Nations, its
members, and its diplomats in Geneva in which the international community began to
engage with the questions that would plague the League for the remainder of its
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existence. During the Crisis, the League of Nations began to clarify its doctrines and
practices. Compromise emerged as a key tool to making the global order work.

2.1.1 Italy, Greece, and Imperial Crisis
Long before the March on Rome, Italian politicians had deep interests in the
Aegean and Adriatic Sea bordering the east and west coasts of Greece. Both Liberal Italy
and Fascist Italy tried to incorporate the ethnically Greek Dodecanese Islands into the
Italian empire. Italy had been in de facto occupation of the Dodecanese Islands since the
outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War in 1911.308 The Italians viewed the Dodecanese Islands
as an essential strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean and as a possible steppingstone for a military invasion of Turkey.309 In exchange for entering the First World War
on the side of the Entente, the Italian leadership worked to secure de jure recognition of
its position in the Dodecanese Islands among a number of other territorial acquisitions in
the Adriatic Sea and southern Europe.310 While the Entente Powers promised Italy a
number of territorial acquisitions including the Dodecanese Islands, the Wilsonian turn of
the Paris Peace Conferences frustrated Italy’s imperial dreams. It was not until the Treaty
of Lausanne (1923) that Italy finally secured recognition of its position in the Dodecanese
islands. The Italian acquisition of the Dodecanese Islands, however, exacerbated preexisting tensions between Greece and Italy .
The Corfu Crisis emerged out of the long-standing efforts of Italy to supplant
Greek regional power in the Mediterranean. Enraged by Greek anti-Italian press after the
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Treaty of Lausanne, the Fascist leadership began to consider the use of force in response
to Greek provocations.311 In an article published in Il Popolo d’Italia shortly after the
invasion entitled “The Reasons for Italian Actions” Mussolini explained that Corfu “had
been Venetian territory for four centuries” implying that Italy had a historic right to reunify with the lost Island of Corfu.312 In the Fascist official mind, the seizure of Corfu
was not simply a means of affirming Fascist prestige in response to the murder of the
Italian delegation in Greece. Instead, the murders provided Mussolini with an ideal
pretext for the conquest of Corfu and the acquisition of a new steppingstone towards the
eastern Mediterranean. The Italian invasion of Corfu was an imperial venture with the
goal of rebuilding the lost Roman Empire. In the early days of the crisis, there was little
doubt that Mussolini intended to seize Corfu permanently.313
The Italian invasion of Corfu produced a full-fledged international crisis. Both the
European press and various public figures across the continent berated the Italian
ultimatum as old diplomacy of the pre-war years designed to induce a war. Journalists
and politicians alike made comparisons between the Italian ultimatum to Greece and the
“peremptory and uncompromising” ultimatum that Austria delivered to Serbia in 1914.314
British officials suspected that Mussolini hoped that the Greeks would fail to satisfy
Italian demands, thereby providing the Italians with an opportunity “to show the world
that Italy is a strong Mediterranean Power.”315
In Geneva, League diplomats denounced imperial violence directed against not
only Greek civilians, but also defenceless refugees housed on the island. A mass
“population exchange” between Turkey and Greece had begun earlier that year. The
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Treaty of Lausanne stipulated that Muslims in Greece must ‘return’ to their homeland in
Turkey while Orthodox Christians in Asia Minor must repatriate back to Greece.316 This
treaty-mandated instance of ethnic cleansing resulted in a flood of refugees and displaced
peoples across the region.317 During this time, Corfu became home to approximately
7000 refugees and 350 orphans.318 The Chairman of the Commission for the Protection of
Women and Children in the Near East emphasized the harm that the Italian invasion had
done to refugees of the Greco-Turkish war. The Italian bombardment of Corfu was
carried out on short notice and it was directed against the barracks housing refugees,
many of which were women and children.319 Italy’s use of violence did not only violate
expectations of empire and international relations, it also harmed League efforts to
monitor the rights of refugees and minorities. The attack on a refugee centre breached the
League’s humanitarian values and reinforced calls to hold Fascist violence accountable.
A number of non-governmental organizations tried to sway both international
public opinion and the attitudes of politicians in support of the League of Nations. The
League of Nations Union (LNU) had one of the loudest voices when it came to
influencing public opinion and government decision-makers. The League of Nations
Union had formed in October 1918 as a non-governmental organization based in the
British Isles.320 The LNU had three main objectives: to confirm the British people’s
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support of the League of Nations as the instrument for removing injustices that may
threaten world peace; to foster mutual understanding, goodwill, and advance cooperation
between different countries; and to advocate for the League to maintain international
order and liberate people from war.321 In response to the Italian invasion of Corfu, the
League of Nations Union pressed for “full use of the League’s power under the covenant”
in order to achieve an “immediate settlement” between Italy and Greece.322 The
Executive Committee of the LNU believed that the British government’s response could
“establish or destroy the League” and concluded that it must pressure the British
government to “do all in its power to ensure that the League shall not hesitate to enforce
the covenant.”323 The LNU requested that local branches petition the government and
sent resolutions to Geneva and Paris in an effort to influence public opinion.324 Members
of the LNU also published pieces in the press in support of the League..325
The League of Nations Union quickly ran into challenges when it came to
exerting pressure on British decision-makers. In the summer of 1923, Westminster
paused for an exceedingly long summer break. From August 2 to November 13, the doors
to Parliament remained closed as British politicians took extra time to relax after the
Lausanne Conference. Even the British Cabinet took a recess from August 23 to
September 26. The Corfu Crisis erupted in the midst of this long summer break. The
LNU sent hundreds of letters to the British government, but the absence of many of
Britain’s key decision-makers limited the LNU’s ability to pressure the government. By
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September 19, many LNU members expressed great frustration with the way that the
British government, and as a result, the League of Nations, were handling the Corfu
Crisis. The LNU even considered direct press attacks on Geneva and Whitehall for their
failure to enact the Covenant appropriately.326 While the LNU had a profound influence
on public opinion during the Corfu Crisis, its ability to pressure the key decision-makers
was limited.

2.1.2 Cooperation in Crisis: Britain’s Shifting Position
The Foreign Office scrambled to respond. In the early days of the Crisis, the
Foreign Office had made it clear that it intended to support application of the League of
Nations Covenant in the Greco-Italian dispute. Robert Cecil, British delegate to the
League and leading member of the League of Nations Union emphasized that the “real
crisis” was the “existence of the League and that any failure to uphold the Covenant
would be followed by a general exodus of all the small states from the League.”327 In
support of this view, Foreign Secretary George Curzon believed that if the League failed
to deal with the crisis effectively, it could lead to a rupture within the League itself. He
staunchly opposed Italian calls to mediate the matter through the Conference of
Ambassadors in Paris, one of the only remaining wartime inter-allied bodies, rather than
the League of Nations.328 In a conversation with Italian Ambassador Della Torretta,
Curzon explained that the League “exists precisely to resolve conflicts such as that which
has arisen between Italy and Greece” and that “sidelining the League would constitute a
renunciation of its political principles.”329 Even after the Italian delegate threatened that
Italy might withdraw from the League, Curzon confirmed that the British government
would not declare itself “contrary to the competence of the League.”330
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The Foreign Office’s initial support for the League of Nations was fueled by the
pressure of public opinion, but also the interests of British imperial defence. The strategic
importance of Greece was well understood within British defence circles. It had long
been a tenet of British policy that Greece remain within the British sphere and not fall to
potentially hostile hands, whether internal or external.331 The Foreign Office believed that
Italy’s permanent occupation of Corfu would “constitute an intolerable disturbance of the
naval balance in the Mediterranean.”332 The Admiralty suspected that the Italian
occupation of islands in the Mediterranean was for “strategic reasons” rather than simply
a reaction to the murders of Italian officials in Greece.333 The Foreign Office argued that
the threat that the Italian occupation posed to British imperial defence interests in the
Mediterranean provided an “even stronger justification” to “support the League”.334
It soon became clear, however, that enforcing the Covenant might do more harm
than good to British interests. The Corfu Crisis ignited a debate within the Foreign Office
over the necessary price to be paid to preserve good relations with Italy. Only two months
before the Crisis, the Foreign Office believed that the British could “count on” the
“cooperation and support” of the Italians, important on a range of issues.335 Most
importantly, the British were trying to secure Italian cooperation over the French
occupation of the Ruhr and preserve Italian support for the postwar international order at
large. The Foreign Office’s experience in negotiations for the Treaty of Lausanne
inclined the British to believe that if Mussolini did not find “satisfactory results with [the
British]” the Fascist dictator would “turn elsewhere.”336 Enforcing the League of Nations
Covenant by imposing sanctions on the Italians would damage Anglo-Italian cooperation
and threatened to derail British interests in Europe. Negotiations at Lausanne had also
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taught the Foreign Office that “Italian friendship [could] be bought at a price.”337 British
officials unanimously agreed that the British must pursue a solution to the Corfu Crisis
that would maintain friendly cooperation with their ally.338 It appeared that sidelining the
League of Nations was the necessary price for preserving friendly relations with Italy.
The British valued Italy as an ally in part because France seemed bent on a
dangerous path that collided with British objectives and strategic outlooks. For more than
a year leading up to the Crisis, tensions had been escalating between the British and
French. In the autumn of 1922, a crisis had emerged between the British and the French
over the resurgence of the Greco-Turkish conflict in Asia Minor.339 While the British
supported the Greek effort, the French supported Turkish ambitions.340 Only a few
months later, the British and French fell out over the French occupation of the Ruhr.
Throughout 1923, rumours began to swirl about an impending “anti-British continental
bloc” between Italy and France.341
In championing the League of Nations, the British government risked
consolidating Franco-Italian solidarity and alienating itself in Europe. Immediately
following the murders in Greece, the French government expressed its willingness “to
join Italy in a step towards the Greek government”, possibly in the hope of winning
Italian support for the advance into the Ruhr.342 Even after the Italian invasion of Corfu,
Poincaré confirmed that “it was his intention to support Italy loyally and unconditionally”
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in the conflict with Greece.343 In a conversation with the Italian ambassador to Paris,
Romano Avenzzana, Poincaré explained that he was “keenly willing to render services”
in an effort to “eliminate any cause of fruition between France and Italy.”344 Poincaré
instructed the French delegate to the League of Nation to support the Italian line. The
British believed that the French government “had thrown itself on the side of the Italians”
leaving the British “no alternative but to defer to the Italian contention.”345
Mussolini welcomed French support during the Crisis, but he was ultimately after
closer cooperation with the British. This balancing act between the British and the French
was not pure opportunism as the de Felice school has argued with respect to Italian policy
in the 1930s. While he “practice[d] a double-end policy” that intended to “take advantage
of the disagreements” that existed between the British and French in order to “improve
Italy’s position,” Mussolini ultimately aimed to base Italian politics “on friendly
collaboration with the British.”346 Over both the Ruhr Question and the Lausanne
negotiations, Mussolini explained that he had “no doubt that intimate Anglo-Italian
collaboration” would be a “force of great value” in settling the Ruhr Crisis.347 In response
to Britain’s support for the League after the Italian invasion of Corfu, Mussolini claimed
that he had “always been willing” to support close collaboration with the British, but that
Great Britain’s recent policy had made his “task difficult.”348 Upon receiving Poincaré’s
support, Mussolini attempted to use the prospect of close collaboration with the French as
a means of pressuring the British to concede to his ambitions in the eastern
Mediterranean.
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Beyond the risks to Britain’s position vis-a-vis Italy and France, the Foreign
Office also began to doubt the League’s ability to implement effective sanctions to
uphold the Covenant, a question that would trouble British decision-makers for years to
come. A violation of Article 12 or 15 would require the League of Nations to implement
sanctions against Italy unless the Italians accepted arbitration through the League or the
Permanent Court of International Justice.349 The Treasury Department warned that the
implementation of sanctions would compel the British to cut off all diplomatic and
economic relations with the Italians.350 A Treasury report explained that sanctions would
involve the “imposition of the wartime system” in Britain as well as other League
members.351 Most importantly, the Treasury emphasized that “unless every state joined in
these measures, they would be ineffective.”352 British decision-makers worried not only
about the attitude of the League-outlier Americans, but also of the French who had
consistently supported the Italians at every chance they had.
While the Treasury Department raised concerns about the potential shortcomings
of sanctions, the Foreign Office also dreaded the possibility that they might be effective
and that “a check…of a humiliating kind” might push Italy closer to communism.353
While many British politicians disliked Fascism, they abhorred communism and sought
to prevent its spread at almost any cost. British officials also warned that damage to the
Duce’s prestige could provoke more not less expansionism and revisionism, for instance
in Yugoslavia. British officials believed that Mussolini was “in a dangerous mood” and
appeared “disposed to rush into wild adventures.”354 The Foreign Office warned that
application of the Covenant “[might] even end in war” between Italy and League
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members.355 The application of sanctions against Italy had the ability to not only damage
Anglo-Italian relations, but to alienate Italy from the League of Nations system and the
postwar order.
The Corfu Crisis presented the British with a difficult choice: whether to preserve
the legitimacy of the League of Nations with the possibility it might lead to the outbreak
of war or to look for an alternative solution beyond the League to ensure a peaceful
settlement. After a brief period of support for the League, the Foreign Office determined
that it must prioritize an expeditious solution to the Crisis and preserve peace in
Europe.356 Fundamentally, the British government did not believe that supporting the
League of Nations was worth the risk of the outbreak of another war between the
countries of Europe. Despite the tone of international public opinion, the pressure of the
League of Nations Union, and its obligations to uphold the legitimacy of the League of
Nations, the British government prioritized cooperation with the Italians over enforcing
the League of Nations Covenant.

2.1.3 The League of Nations and the Conference of Ambassadors
While the Foreign Office debated the value and risks of supporting the League,
the Italians attempted to circumvent League mediation altogether. After the invasion, the
Italians capitalized on Greece’s precarious membership in the League of Nations.
Greece’s international standing had been severely shaken during the Chanak Crisis
(1922). While the Turkish attack against Greek Smyrna prompted a crisis of international
proportion, Athens was dealing with a domestic crisis of its own. In the end of September
a revolution broke out prompting King Constantine to abdicate.357 The League refused to
recognize the new Greek government because of both the violent nature of the revolution
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and the absence of its traditional constitutional monarchy.358 By the summer 1923, none
of the League members with the exception of France had recognized the new
government.359 In the days leading up to the murder of the Italian delegation, the British
reaffirmed that it would maintain its “firm decision not to recognize the regime in
Greece.”360 Mussolini expected that he could convince the British not to support the
application of the Covenant to Greece because the Greek government was not recognized
itself.361
Mussolini insisted that the League should not be involved in the case of Corfu.
First of all, Mussolini claimed that the Italians had actually not violated the League of
Nations Covenant. The invasion of Corfu was not an act of war and, therefore, Articles
12 and 15 did not apply. Instead, the occupation of Corfu was both a “coercive” measure
and a means of “simple self-protection of [Italian] interests.”362 The Fascist dictator
instructed the Italian delegate to Geneva, Antonio Salandra, to emphasize that Italy’s
inability to obtain justice for the murders of the Italian delegation “amicably and with
peaceful means of satisfaction” entitled the Italians to “the use of violence.”363 He
declared that Italy would “remain indefinitely in possession of Corfu” unless the Greeks
provided the Italians with all reparations demanded.364 In an article in Il Popolo d’Italia,
the Duce claimed that “if there had been an English statesman in my place, he would
have acted like me and would been absolutely right to do so.”365 The article referenced a
number of precedents from the nineteenth century to demonstrate that Italy’s actions were
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“fully founded in the law of the nations.”366 Because the occupation was an act in pursuit
of “justice” rather than war, Mussolini claimed that the League had no grounds for
mediating the dispute.
Second, Mussolini protested that if the matter must be addressed, it was an issue
for the Conference of Ambassadors, not the League of Nations.367 Mussolini contended
that since the Conference of Ambassadors was the body that appointed the international
boundary commission, it should be the body to investigate and mediate the dispute. But
the real motivation was to prevent the British from supporting League oversight. Della
Torretta stressed that Robert Cecil very often acted independently in Geneva and
disregarded Foreign Office directives.368 The Italian ambassador warned Mussolini that
Cecil was a “fanatic” supporter of League internationalism.369 Il Duce feared that the
British would pressure other League delegates to take a hostile attitude to Italy in the
League.370 The Conference of Ambassadors in Paris would be shielded both from the
internationalist zeal and the glare of publicity that characterized diplomacy in Geneva.371
Furthermore, in Paris, Athens did not have a seat at the table. Both the Italians and the
French could ensure a judgement in favour of political expedience rather than Wilsonian
principles.372
In support of the Italian view, Poincare sent a resolution to Geneva on September
6 on behalf of the Conference of Ambassadors that emphasized Greece’s responsibility
for the Crisis and proposed the appointment of a commission of enquiry to thoroughly
investigate responsibility for the murders.373 By delaying firm action on the dispute, the
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League Council left space for another international body to propose a solution in its
place. In response to the Conference of Ambassadors’ resolution, the Spanish delegate to
the League proposed to send Poincare eight points for consideration at the Conference’s
next meeting on matters pertaining to a commission of inquiry, reparations, and justice.
With instructions from his government to “act in Geneva with moderation”, even Robert
Cecil supported the Council’s communication to Paris.374 The Council’s response
indicated the League “would be glad to receive information as to the deliberations of the
Conference of Ambassadors” transferring the decision-making authority from Geneva to
Paris in settling the dispute.375 By the end of the League Council meeting on September
6th, the League of Nations had effectively outsourced its authority and influence in
mediating the Corfu Crisis to the Conference of Ambassadors. Within a week of Italy’s
invasion, Mussolini succeeded in sidelining the League of Nations, silencing the
mechanisms of imperial accountability with it.
Once the Conference of Ambassadors convened to discuss the League’s
recommendations, the Italians set the terms upon which it would evacuate Corfu — terms
that closely mirrored the original Italian ultimatum. Before the Italian evacuation could
take place, Mussolini demanded that Greece deposit 50 million lire and punish the killers
of the Italian delegation. The British Ambassador, Robert Crewe, explained that the
perpetuators of the crime in Janina may not be found which would result in a failure to
meet Italian demands.376 Crewe argued that the Conference of Ambassadors’ guarantee to
investigate the murders had “removed all reason for the continuation of the
occupation.”377 In Paris, it became increasingly unclear what would constitute an Italian
evacuation of Corfu. Romano Avenzzana warned Mussolini that the Italo-Greek conflict
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was shifting to “give rise to an Italian-English contest” and suggested that the Italians
should neither “prolong the Italian-Greek dispute” nor “remain in Corfu” as damage to
Anglo-Italian relations appeared imminent.378 The prospect of harming relations with the
British, a result that maneuvering outside the League intended to avoid, pressured
Mussolini to reevaluate the longevity of Italy’s occupation of Corfu.
Mussolini ultimately compromised over Italy’s position in Corfu. On September
12, Mussolini sent orders to Romano Avezzana to inform the Conference of
Ambassadors that should the “investigation fail to identify the culprits or declare them
untraceable” such conditions would allow Italy’s “pledge [to remain in Corfu] to be
released” and “Greece would have to provide other repairs.”379 In Paris, Avenzzana
assured the ambassadors that Italy would “evacuate no later than September 27th” as the
deadline set by the Ambassadors for the conclusion of the investigation in Greece. In
exchange for the Italian evacuation of Corfu, the Greek government was required to
permit an investigation by an interdepartmental control commission between September
17th to 27th, make a number of public apologies, hold funerals for and honour the
victims, and pay the Italian government 50 million lire in damages.380 Upon receiving a
resolution by the Conference of Ambassadors outlining the terms of settlement, the
League Council took “note of the resolution and welcome[d] the fact that it put an end to
a situation which ha[d] aroused intense anxiety.”381 Avenzzana boasted to Mussolini that
the Conference of Ambassadors had “forced Greece to accept and execute virtually every
point” of the original Italian ultimatum.382 While the Conference of Ambassadors forced
Mussolini to abandon his imperial dreams of an Italian Corfu, the Fascist dictator secured
a number of advantages for Fascist prestige.
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2.1.4 Conclusion
The Corfu Crisis forced diplomats in Geneva to engage with the tension between
League principles and practical application that would challenge the League throughout
the interwar years. The Crisis raised questions over the limits of the League’s authority
and the League’s ability to implement sanctions. It revealed tensions between Geneva’s
internationalist values and members’ national interest as the British government struggled
to reconcile its international obligations with its foreign policy priorities. The Crisis
revealed an incompatibility between doctrines and principles and the practical need for
political expediency to mitigate crisis. Most importantly, the Crisis brought to light the
friction between the application of the Covenant and the League’s commitment to
preserve peace. The Corfu Crisis was also a lesson to the European empires that League
member states were off limits and that imperial violence was obsolete. It demonstrated
that empire was subject to a new level of public scrutiny, surveillance, and critique.
Moving forward, empires needed to use greater restraint, as imperial violence could no
longer go unchecked.
As the champion of League values, several scholars have highlighted the British
government’s outrage in reaction to the Italian occupation of Corfu.383 This outrage,
however, was not long lasting. It soon became clear that full-fledged support of the
League was impracticable and undesirable. Compromise was needed to make the League
survive: between principles and practices, internationalism and national interest, and
imperial ambitions and realities. Beyond securing the Italian evacuation of Corfu, the
League’s ability to hold imperial violence accountable was limited. On nearly every other
Italian demand, the League conceded. The key role of compromise established during the
Corfu Crisis informed League responses and practices in future imperial crises.
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2.2 The Abyssinia Crisis: The League’s Final Failure?
Twelve years after the Corfu Crisis, the Italians sparked another international
crisis that deeply shook faith in the international order. On October 3, 1935, Mussolini
ordered Italian troops to occupy independent League member Abyssinia in flagrant
violation of Article 12 of the League of Nations Covenant. The Abyssinian government
immediately communicated to the League that “Italian military aeroplanes bombarded
Adowa and Adrigat” resulting in numerous civilian victims including women and
children.384 Unlike in Corfu, the Italian invasion did not unfold under the guise of the socalled need for justice. The invasion of Abyssinia was a plain and simple imperial
conquest. The British government ultimately decided to support the League of Nations’
decision to implement limited economic sanctions against Italy in an effort to convince
Mussolini to abandon the invasion. But as a result of the decision to forgo an oil
embargo, the sanctions proved largely ineffective. After months of chemical warfare that
devastated the local populations, Mussolini claimed to have pacified the region. By the
summer of 1936, the League of Nations lifted the feeble sanctions effort and permitted
the Italians to remain in de facto occupation of the once independent country in the horn
of Africa.
The Abyssinia Crisis has received extensive scholarly attention. Many scholars
view the Abyssinia Crisis as the final great failure of the League of Nations because it
confirmed the double standards within the League and undermined the League’s
authority.385 Susan Pedersen argues that the Italian invasion of Abyssinia dealt a
particularly harsh blow to the ideological foundations of League imperialism as the
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Italians appropriated League rhetoric to justify the brutal conquest of Abyssinia.386
Alternatively, historians of Italian Fascism have explained the Abyssinia Crisis as the
critical turning point when Mussolini abandoned the status quo and opted for an
increasingly revisionist foreign policy.387 Historians such as MacGregor Knox and G.
Bruce Strang view the Italian invasion of Abyssinia as a manifestation of the social
Darwinist principles of Fascist ideology.388 Among these two schools of thought, there is
a general consensus that Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia and the British government’s
implementation of sanctions proved that ideological incompatibility was dividing Europe
in the 1930s.
This case study reconsiders the Abyssinia Crisis as the point of rupture in AngloItalian relations. It is true that the Abyssinia Crisis caused severe and relatively longlasting strain between them, but the British and Italians attempted to maintain
cooperation during the crisis and repair relations in its aftermath. Between the winter of
1935 and the spring and 1938, both the British and Italians used compromise as a tactic to
prevent the breakdown of the imperial system and as a bargaining chip to secure
advantages for their own respective positions in empire. By looking beyond 1935, I
challenge the traditional view that the Crisis itself marked the failure and collapse of the
League of Nations. The League’s immediate response to the Abyssinia Crisis does not
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mark a renunciation of its founding principles. Instead, the League’s final failure was the
moment when it revoked Abyssinia’s member status and recognized the Italian conquest.
This marked the abandonment of League principles and the admission of imperial
violence into the twentieth-century imperial repertoire.

2.2.1 The Pre-Abyssinia Days and the Hoare-Laval Pact
Diplomacy and compromise over competing interests in Abyssinia set the tone for
the ultimate solution of the Abyssinia Crisis long before the Italian invasion. The
Abyssinia Question was a dilemma that had plagued Anglo-Italian relations since the end
of the First World War. Italy’s desire to join Eritrea and Somaliland to increase the
security of the Italian empire in East Africa fueled Italian efforts to obtain a position in
Abyssinia. By the mid-1930s Mussolini believed that Italy was ready to carry out the
military conquest necessary to seize Abyssinia. In a memorandum written in December
of 1934, Mussolini declared that “as soon as our military preparations” can ensure the
“security of victory” the Italians must carry out “the destruction of the Abyssinia forces”
through “total conquest.”389 The Duce estimated that Italy would be ready to establish its
“direct dominion” over Abyssinia “through necessary military measures” by October.390
But Mussolini had learned a valuable lesson from his experience in the Corfu Crisis -Italy must avoid international crisis in order to limit League interference.
During the early months of 1935, Mussolini schemed to gain the consent of both
the British and French to ensure European stability during the colonial campaign.391
Fascist officials engaged in bilateral talks with the British and the French in an effort to
secure a ‘free hand’ in Abyssinia. Mussolini quickly concluded a secret agreement with
the French over Abyssinia, but attempts to extend this arrangement to the British proved
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much more taxing. 392 The WalWal incident that had erupted in December of 1934 alerted
British public opinion to Italy’s empire-building aims in Abyssinia. The incident did not
become a full-fledged crisis, but public opinion and party politics pressured the British
government to support a solution in Geneva.393 In response, the Foreign Ministry
attempted to fuse the solution of the Abyssinia Question with the security of Europe. The
Italians reminded the British that their “close policy of cooperation” extended “to all
problems — both in Europe and in Africa.”394 The Foreign Ministry instructed Grandi to
reaffirm that “the continuation of the intimate collaboration between the [two]
governments in European politics must be corroborated and reaffirmed with a sincere and
complete collaboration also in Ethiopia.”395
The Italians expected that the Stresa Conference scheduled for April would
provide the ideal opportunity to reinforce the link between the Abyssinia question and the
problems facing Europe.396 In April of 1935, British, Italian, and French officials met in
the Italian resort town of Stresa to discuss the growing German threat and the necessity of
maintaining peace in Europe. At the Conference, the three governments agreed to pursue
a common line of conduct in Geneva with respect to German violations of Versailles and
confirmed their determination to maintain the independence and integrity of Austria.
Most importantly, the British, Italian, and French governments declared their “earnest
desire to sustain peace by establishing a sense of security” and to oppose “any unilateral
repudiation” of treaties that “may endanger the peace of Europe” in support of the League
of Nations Covenant.397 While the Stresa Conference secured Mussolini his desired
scheme for European stability, it fell short of fulfilling his quest for an understanding
with the British over Abyssinia.
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In the months following the Stresa Conference, the Italians used Anglo-Italian
collaboration in Europe as leverage to secure British consent on the Abyssinia question.
The maintenance of the Stresa Front was essential in order to curb German aggression in
Europe. Following the Conference, Eric Drummond inquired whether “a situation like
that of Egypt would satisfy Italy” in Abyssinia suggesting that while the British would
not permit the formal extension of the Italian empire, they would be inclined to accept an
exploitive treaty system in Abyssinia.398 Mussolini demurred. Throughout the summer,
Mussolini continued his efforts to secure a “free hand in Ethiopia” from the British while
the British tried to mediate the dispute through the League. 399 As the Italians made their
final preparations for the invasion of Ethiopia, the Italian Foreign Ministry attempted to
persuade the French to convince the British “not to oppose our action” which would
cause a rupture in the Stresa system.400
The tone of international public opinion prompted the British government to
support the League in response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. In the days leading
up to the invasion, the LNU began to lobby the Foreign Office, the House of Commons,
the League Assembly, and French public opinion to generate support for the League
Covenant.401 In an interview with the Foreign Office, Robert Cecil emphasized the need
for “collective action for the restraint of Italy” through “economic pressure required
under Article 16.”402 Many historians have pointed out that the pacifist results of the
LNU’s Peace Ballot prompted the British government to support the application of
sanctions for domestic party politics purposes.403 But it is clear that LNU lobbying efforts
resonated far beyond General Election interests. The LNU declared that “the great mass
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of the people of this country” supported use of “the whole force of the League” to stop
the war and encouraged local branches to pressure the government.404 Through their
lobby efforts, the LNU internationalized Fascist imperial violence and persuaded the
British government to impose limited sanctions against its Stresa partner.
Similar to the Corfu Crisis, the British government attempted to circumvent proLeague pressures and devise a settlement outside of Geneva to preserve cooperation in
Europe and maintain the imperial system. Many historians have examined British policy
in formulating what has come to be reviled as the Hoare-Laval Pact. By December the
British government had become paralyzed over the same questions that it had considered
during the Corfu Crisis: the questions of the effectiveness of oil sanctions and the
prospect of war erupting in Europe. In view of the risks of applying the Covenant to its
fullest extent, British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre
Laval fabricated an imperial compromise. The terms of the Hoare-Laval Plan grew out of
the months of negotiations that had unfolded with the Italians over the limits of empire in
Abyssinia prior to the invasion. The Hoare-Laval Plan proposed to resolve the crisis by
according the Italians a “zone of economic expansion and colonization in Abyssinia”
while maintaining Abyssinia sovereignty and access to the sea.405 In an effort to preserve
cooperation and prevent a “mad dog act”, the Foreign Office finally agreed to concede
the free hand in Abyssinia that Mussolini had been attempting to secure for the past
year.406
The Abyssinia Crisis demonstrates both the power and limits of
internationalization. The League of Nations responded with more drastic action than ever
before. It is true that the Abyssinia Crisis proved League mechanisms ineffective, but this
does not yet represent an ultimate departure from League principles. When the terms of
the plan leaked, the Hoare-Laval Pact quickly became vilified in public opinion. The
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LNU expressed indignation towards the settlement and urged the British government “to
continue the policy of sanctions until they are effective and to support no settlement of
the Abyssinia dispute which failed to make it clear that aggression does not pay.”407 The
pressures of international public opinion and the LNU were strong enough to persuade
British decision-makers to abandon the Hoare-Laval Plan for the time being. While
internationalization effectively pressured Geneva to respond, the League remained
limited by its inherent faults and ultimately failed to roll-back Italian imperialism.

2.2.2 The Gentleman’s Agreement: A Détente?
As the Italian campaign in Abyssinia began to wind down in the spring of 1936,
the British government began to consider a scheme for repairing cooperation with the
Italians. Changes in the international situation which made war seem more likely
convinced the British that relations with Italy had to be fixed. Faith in the League of
Nations was dwindling while German strength on the continent was intensifying. The
German remilitarization of the Rhineland in the spring of 1936 raised concerns about
stability and peace in Europe and reinforced the need for the Stresa Front more than ever.
The Committee of Imperial Defence recommended repairing relations with the Italians in
order to redistribute defences from the Mediterranean to protect British interests in
Europe and the Far East.408 Italy also wanted to repair relations with Britain, as it was
unprepared for war. By the summer of 1936, both British and Italian officials began to
lay the groundwork for what would become a grand imperial bargain: British imperial
security for Italian imperial recognition.
The Foreign Office had become increasingly concerned with the prospect of a
brewing alliance between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany if Anglo-Italian cooperation
was not repaired. The Italians had made it clear that they “w[ould] not forget” that
Germany was the only major European power to abstain from sanctions against Italy.409
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After the fall of Addis Ababa in May 1936, Nazi Germany became the first state to
recognize the Italian Empire in Abyssinia.410 The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War later
that summer provided Mussolini with another opportunity to strengthen relations with
Hitler.411 Within a month of the outbreak of civil war, the Italians and Germans had
begun to send war materials to General Franco in support of a Nationalist victory in
Spain. In the beginning of October, Fascist and Nazi officials began discussions for a
political agreement between the two countries based upon “the principle of similarity of
the two regimes” and the “common obligation to establish an anti-Bolshevik Front” in
Spain.412 The agreement for the Rome-Berlin Axis only had one caveat — an
understanding over the future of Austria.413 In return, Hitler vowed to support and
recognize all of Italy’s rights in the Mediterranean.414
The British believed that restoring cooperation with the Italians over European
security and the limits of empire could drive a wedge between Hitler and Mussolini.
Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey argued that Britain “must do [its] utmost to get back
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to cordial relations with Italy” in order to prevent Mussolini from permanently turning to
Hitler.415 He emphasized in several Cabinet meetings that “Italy lives in dread of a
German menace through Austria and the Tyrol.”416 The Cabinet believed that repairing
relations would "solve at a stroke a number of problems of intense difficulty.”417 Through
negotiations for an understanding with the Italians, the Foreign Office hoped to secure an
understanding over the status quo in the Mediterranean, a renunciation of anti-British
intrigue in the region, and the Italian accession to the Montreux Convention.418 In the
autumn of 1936 Anthony Eden met with Dino Grandi to express the British government’s
“wish to establish the old relations of the past, before the Italian-Abyssinian conflict.”419
He explained that “despite the substantial differences” that “fatally exist” between
“Fascist doctrine and our traditions as a democratic country,” the British desired to repair
cooperation in pursuit of European peace.420
The Italians had one requirement for such a détente — recognition of the Italian
Empire in Abyssinia.421 The Foreign Ministry requested that the British government
withdraw its legation guard in Addis Ababa and transform its legation into a consulate as
an indication of its recognition of Abyssinia’s new colonial status.422 In the first week of
November, the British withdrew the Legation Guard as a demonstration of Britain’s
goodwill and turned the Legation into a Consulate shortly thereafter.423 The Foreign
Office explained that this transition would constitute a de facto recognition of the Italian
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Empire in Abyssinia, similar to what the British had proposed in the Hoare-Laval Plan.424
A symbol of recognition, however, was Britain’s limit. The Foreign Office maintained a
hard stance against including the question of formal recognition within negotiations for a
détente. Anthony Eden maintained that the question was outside the scope of discussions
for a détente as the Foreign Office expected that the question would be raised in Geneva
in the following year. 425 The British wanted to “keep liberty of spontaneous action over
Abyssinia” that might arise through the League.426
The negotiations for what has become known as the Gentlemen’s Agreement
focused almost exclusively on the Mediterranean status quo and brushed the Abyssinia
Question aside. The British aimed to reach an understanding in the Mediterranean in
order to reduce the empire’s naval commitments in the region.427 For the Italians, an
understanding in the Mediterranean could finally secure British recognition of Italy’s
vital interests in the sea. In a speech shortly before the opening of negotiations, Mussolini
declared that “this sea, for Great Britain is a road, one of many roads” or more accurately,
“a short cut” to the empire.428 Mussolini proclaimed that “for us Italians, it is life” and
demanded that “our vital rights be respected.”429 In negotiating an understanding with the
British, Mussolini envisaged either a sphere of influence arrangement or a non-aggression
pact between the two countries in the Mediterranean.430
Talks between the British and Italians culminated on January 2, 1937 with the
signature of the Gentleman’s Agreement. The Italian Ambassador to Rome proclaimed
that the Agreement marked a “definitive turning point in the history of recent relations”
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between the two governments.431 In the year that had passed since the height of the
Abyssinia Crisis, the British and Italians worked to negotiate a new basis for cooperation
between one another in the Mediterranean. In its final form, the agreement was a very
simple understanding over the Mediterranean. Both the British and Italians had
abandoned a number of questions pertaining to rights in Abyssinia and imperial interests
in the Middle East in order to establish a general détente. In the early days of 1937, the
Foreign Office had believed that Anglo-Italian relations had finally been restored.
Despite the good-will gesture of the Gentleman’s Agreement Italian volunteers
arrived in Spain less than two weeks later which the British perceived as a clear violation
of the status quo.432 Count Ciano explained that Italian action did not violate the new
agreement because the Italians had no intention of changing the territorial status quo and
that, at this point, the Italians were unable to abandon intervention and leave “the
Germans master of the situation.”433 It is clear, however, that the Italians had approached
negotiations for the Gentlemen’s agreement only half-heartedly. In the short term, the
Italians aimed to secure a victory for Fascist prestige, a blow to the League’s legitimacy,
and a reduction of British naval power in the Mediterranean. Mussolini also viewed an
agreement with the British as a means of blocking British approaches to Hitler for an
Anglo-German Accord.434 In the long-term, Grandi explained that repairing relations with
the British was “armistice, not peace” when it came to empire.435 In several telegrams to
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Count Ciano, Dino Grandi argued that “the less we give the British the impression of
wanting their friendship,” the more they will “be forced” to “pay for it.”436 While an
understanding in the Mediterranean was desirable for the time being, the failure to secure
a definitive recognition over the Italian Empire in Abyssinia nullified the perceived
advantages. The Gentlemen’s Agreement did not repair the cooperation of the preAbyssinia days nor did it resurrect the Stresa Front. The negotiations for the agreement
did, however, provide a basis for future discussions between the two governments.

2.2.3 The Easter Accords: An Imperial Bargain
After the Gentlemen’s Agreement proved unsuccessful in repairing collaboration
in empire, the British government began to reconsider how to restore relations with Italy
as the international situation became increasingly precarious. By July of 1937, Britain
confronted potential war in Europe, the Mediterranean, and now the Far East for which it
had neither the allies nor the resources to fight.437 The British government could count on
neither the enfeebled French nor the isolationist Americans to come to Britain’s aid if war
were to break out in either of the potential theatres as the French continued to be
embroiled in both political and economic crisis while public opinion across the Atlantic
disapproved of an American involvement in another European war.438 The internal
disarray of the Soviet Union caused the British government to strike the Soviets from
Britain’s list of potential allies.439 Even the governments in the Dominions voiced serious
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reservations about the possibility of involvement in another war in Europe.440 Britain had
few options for allies other than Italy.
In view of the British government’s fruitless attempts to reach an understanding
with either Germany or Japan, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made
reconciling Britain’s traditional friendship with the Italians a priority during the summer
of 1937. There were many advantages to a reconciliation, including securing
communications through the Mediterranean.441 In view of the constraints on Britain’s
defences, the Chiefs of Staff highlighted the “desirability, from the military point of view,
of the restoration of our former friendly relations with Italy” and recommended that
“[a]nything which can be done, without overriding disadvantages in other directions, to
dispel the clouds of mutual suspicion which at present darken Anglo-Italian relations,
would be of the greatest advantage from the military point of view.”442
Reconciling Britain’s strategic dilemma was not Neville Chamberlain’s only
concern. As the Foreign Office began to prepare a scheme for negotiations, it had soon
become clear that the British could also negotiate a grand bargain over empire. Since the
Abyssinia Crisis, Italian activities threatened to undermine British interests in the
Mediterranean, as discussed in Chapter 1. But if the two countries could get on better
terms, Chamberlain believed that Mussolini would reign in his defensive preparations and
revise his ambitions in the Mediterranean.443 Through talks with the Italians,
Chamberlain hoped to settle British concerns over Italian-sponsored anti-British
propaganda in the Middle East; Italy’s growing political influence in Palestine and
Arabia; Italian military power in the Mediterranean in the strength of the Libyan garrison
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and the recent air base developments; and Fascist involvement in the Spanish Civil
War.444
In exchange for limiting activities in Britain’s Middle Eastern and Mediterranean
empire, the Italians wanted to finally secure Britain’s de jure recognition of Italy’s
conquest of Abyssinia. By 1937, Mussolini was no longer willing to settle for de facto
recognition of the Italian empire. While Mussolini’s underlying rationale for recognition
is not clear in the records, British de jure recognition was the only significant concession
that Italy wanted.445 In a conversation with the British Ambassador to Rome, Count
Ciano stated that any basis for an Anglo-Italian agreement must begin “with recognition
of the [Italian] Empire in order to remove any possibility of misunderstanding and
friction in the future.”446 Throughout the summer, Ciano repeatedly emphasized that any
agreement between the British and Italians would need to contain clear recognition of the
empire, define the new colonial borders, and establish a new era of relations between two
equal empires.447
Chamberlain believed that de jure recognition was worth the price. Many British
officials referred to de jure recognition as “our most valuable weapon” in dealing with
the Italians. Several Foreign Office officials argued that the sooner the British
government could formally recognize the Italian empire, the better.448 A handful of states
had already moved toward recognition. Chamberlain’s close advisor, Cabinet Secretary
Maurice Hankey stressed that since the British government would eventually have to
grant de jure recognition, such a gesture should be put forward while it was still worth
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something.449 Chamberlain held the view that the British should promise de jure
recognition and work out the details in the League at the “earliest possible moment” in
the interests of “general peace.”450 Owen O’Malley, head of the Southern Department,
pointed out that unless the British government offered Italy de jure recognition over
Abyssinia, Mussolini would pursue closer relations with Hitler.451 If the British
government extended recognition of the Italian Empire as a part of a broader AngloItalian understanding, Mussolini could be lured away from the Axis. Chamberlain
believed that the British government had little to risk and much to gain from sacrificing
Abyssinia .452
Securing recognition of the Italian Empire was not Mussolini’s only motivation
for an understanding with the British. Both Mussolini and Count Ciano hoped that
negotiations for an Anglo-Italian agreement would drive a wedge between Britain and
France.453 The Duce would not forget the French betrayal during the Abyssinia Crisis.
Since then, the Italians and the French had ended up on opposite sides of a proxy war in
the Spanish conflict. Throughout the autumn of 1937, Mussolini and Ciano consistently
rebuked British efforts to bring the French in on a scheme for an understanding in the
Mediterranean.454 In a letter to the Italian ambassador in Berlin, Count Ciano confirmed
that “an agreement between Italy and Great Britain [was] destined to accentuate the
French isolation” and to weaken the collective system that France supports.455
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As 1937 came to a close, both the British and Italians had determined that they
had more to gain than lose from repairing cooperation. For Chamberlain, an agreement
with the Italians could alleviate the strategic dilemma, strengthen the empire, and make
progress towards preserving peace. For Mussolini, the Italians would make a huge step
towards strengthening Fascist prestige on the international stage, pacifying the new
Italian empire, and strengthening Italy’s position in Europe by isolating the French. Even
two years after the Abyssinia Crisis, the British and Italians were making continued
efforts to limit their conflicting interests and settle their differences over empire. An
imperial bargain — British imperial security for Italian imperial recognition — provided
the basis upon which the two governments would dispel mutual suspicion and resume
collaboration over empire.
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden staunchly opposed Chamberlain’s belief in the
Italian option. When Neville Chamberlain insisted on moving forward, Eden resigned in
February 1938. Within days of his resignation, the British government opened official
negotiations with the Italians. On Easter Sunday in 1938, the British and Italians finalized
the terms of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. In exchange for limiting Italian activities in
Palestine, Arabia, and Spain, the cessation of Italian-sponsored anti-British propaganda,
and an exchange of military information, the British government sacrificed Abyssinia and
allowed the lands and the people of the once independent country to be consumed by
Italian imperialism.
Shortly after the conclusion of the Easter Accords, the new British Foreign
Secretary Viscount Halifax raised the question of Abyssinian sovereignty at the May
Council meeting of the League of Nations. Halifax proposed that while “the League
should not condone the action” of the Italians the question of recognizing the Italian
empire in Abyssinia should be left to the individual member to decide.456 The British
Foreign Secretary framed the present tension over recognition as a question of either
idealistic devotion to League principles or a practical commitment to preserving peace.
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He claimed that such idealistic devotion had “increase[ed] international discord ….
contributing to those very evils that it was designed to prevent.”457 In defence of his
people, Haile Selassie asked the Council to refuse to take any steps toward recognition.
He argued that the League had been “appointed guardian of the principles of international
justice.”458 But by recognizing the Italian empire in Abyssinia, it was “about to sign its
own death warrant by tearing up [the Covenant] with its own hands.”459 Silencing Haile
Selassie’s protests, the President of the League Council resolved that it was “for the
individual members of the League to determine their attitude” towards recognition. The
question of Abyssinia’s sovereignty was closed.

2.2.4 Conclusion
The internationalization of the Abyssinia Crisis challenged Anglo-Italian
cooperation, but it did not cause a permanent rupture. Actions by both governments,
before, during and after the crisis, confirm their shared commitment to managing imperial
rivalry in a way that would be mutually beneficial. Before the Italian invasion of
Abyssinia, the Italians had worked to settle the Abyssinian question diplomatically and
secure British consent to the expansion of the Italian empire. Through the Hoare-Laval
Plan, the British government attempted to negotiate a compromise over empire in
Abyssinia. Through negotiations for both the Gentlemen’s Agreement and the Easter
Accords, the British and Italians attempted to reconcile and come to an understanding
over the limits of the Italian empire. In negotiating the Easter Accords, the British used
cooperation as a bargaining tactic to limit subversive Italian activities in the British
empire in exchange for formal recognition of the Italian empire in Abyssinia. While the
formula changed between 1935 and 1938, the idea of an imperial compromise over
Abyssinia remained at the heart of the proposed and concluded agreements between the
British and the Italians.
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Reconsidering the chronology of the Abyssinia Crisis challenges our
understanding of when and why the League of Nations failed. In 1935,
internationalization was still working. Fascist imperial violence prompted the
international community to apply pressure on Geneva and national governments to hold
Italy accountable. Though ultimately ineffectual, the League did impose sanctions. In
1935, the League of Nations stayed true to the moral principles upon which it was
founded. But by 1938, the League renounced its foundational values because the
international order had more to gain than it did to lose from sacrificing one of its own
members to another member’s imperial violence, or so it seemed. In his final speech to
the League Council, Haile Selassie was right: the international body that had been “raised
to make the triumph of peace” had become the “tomb of international morality.”460 The
League’s failure should not be placed on the ineffectiveness of its accountability
mechanisms in 1935 to 1936, but on its repudiation of its fundamental principles in the
spring of 1938.
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2.3 The Italian Invasion of Albania: International Crisis or ‘A
Perfect Solution’?
Less than a year after the implementation of the Easter Accords, another act of
Fascist aggression challenged Anglo-Italian relations. During the first week of April
1939, the Italian government delivered a provocative ultimatum to the Albanian
leadership which proclaimed that Albania must become an Italian protectorate and unite
with Italy under King Victor Emmanuel III.461 Mirroring the Corfu Crisis, Mussolini and
Count Ciano ordered the invasion of Albania upon rejection of the ultimatum’s
unreasonable terms. On April 7, Good Friday, Italian forces bombarded Albania. From
exile in Greece, members of the Albanian government appealed to the League of Nations
the following day. Albanian officials argued that the Italian invasion had violated Article
10, Article 11, and Article 17 of the Covenant and requested an immediate meeting of the
League Council to discuss the matter.462 Unlike the Corfu Crisis, there was no
meaningful discussion in the League Council about how to hold Italy accountable and
unlike the Abyssinia Crisis, there was no question of applying sanctions against Italy. By
April 12th the Italians had in effect conquered Albania and the international community
had done little to hinder the expansionist project.
Many historians view the invasion of Albania as one more act of aggression by
the revisionist powers on the road to war. Renzo de Felice argues that Mussolini decided
to invade Albania out of fear of the increasingly powerful Nazi presence on the
continent.463 Robert Mallett and Reynolds Salerno view the Italian invasion of Albania as
Mussolini’s retaliatory response to the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia with little
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forewarning by the Führer.464 In contrast, G. Bruce Strang argues that the invasion of
Albania represents the realization of Mussolini’s ideological ambitions articulated in the
‘March to the Sea’ speech earlier that year.465 Steven Morewood and Lawrence Pratt
emphasize the shifts in Italian and British policy.466 While Morewood claims that the
British never considered war over Albania, Pratt notes that invasion marked a turning
point in British policy from appeasement to containment.467 Dawn Miller condemns the
British for wishful thinking resulting in faulty intelligence interpretations in the weeks
leading up to the Italian invasion of Albania.468
While the Italian invasion of Albania is noted in many narratives of the road to
war, historians do not look closely at the crisis and instead focus on either the preceding
Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia or the ensuing conclusion of the Pact of Steel. This case
study examines the Italian invasion of Albania within the context of the Fascist imperial
crises that preceded it to demonstrate how imperial learning mitigated the international
response to the invasion. The Italian invasion of Albania demonstrates an expansion of
the Italian imperial repertoire in an effort to legitimize empire and circumvent crisis. The
first section examines Italian activities in Albania prior to the invasion and highlights the
continuities between the covert imperial methods examined in chapter one and those
employed in Albania. This merging of methods against the backdrop of a deeply unstable
Europe and fragile League of Nations prevented the invasion from becoming
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internationalized. The last section examines the efforts of the British and Italians to
preserve loose cooperation in the aftermath of the invasion as a tactic to delay the
outbreak of hostilities between them and buying them time to explore other options. But
really, by this point, their belief in cooperation as an imperial norm and a tactic to
strengthen their respective positions in Europe and in empire had been exhausted.

2.3.1 Italian Designs and Covert Action
The Italians had designs on Albania since the end of the First World War. The
Paris Peace Conference offered Italy full sovereignty over Valona and a substantial part
of the hinterland with a League Mandate over the remaining territory.469 The arrangement
soon proved unworkable as Italy faced increasing internal unrest within its own borders
in addition to chronic instability in its possession on the other side of the Adriatic. On 9
November 1921, the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris recognized the independence of
Albania but also conceded that the Italians had a special interest in the newly independent
country. The Conference passed a resolution that gave Italian forces the right to enter
Albania and restore its frontiers in the event of unrest.470 In the event of internal
instability, the Conference of Ambassadors “recommend that Italy be authorized to
intervene.”471 The Conference of Ambassadors recognized that “if it was necessary to
restore order in Albania, the duty rested on Italy.”472
On the basis of these special rights, the Italians viewed Albania as a territory
within the Fascist sphere of influence. Similar to cases examined in Chapter one, the
Italians established close relationships with local elites and a privileged economic
position in the country throughout the 1920s. The Italians invested billions in developing
Albania’s infrastructure and created a system of loans to the Albanian government from
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the mid-1920s.473 The Italian legation in Albania also forged close relations with a
number of major political figures creating a network of agents and informants. In
exchange for their loyalty, the Italian government paid these Albanian politicians a
generous sum.474 These Italian activities infringed upon Albania’s sovereignty. But there
was no League outcry in response to Italian economic penetration and funding of local
politicians. In Albania, the Italians adopted imperial methods that slid under the League’s
radar and circumvented the scope of the League’s surveillance and accountability
mechanisms. For now, the Italians were doing empire ‘the right way’ by using relatively
covert methods rather than imperial violence.
The Italians began ramping up their activities in the years following the Abyssinia
Crisis. The Fascist leadership established a system of Italian propaganda designed to
Italianize Albanians. By fabricating a cultural affinity between Albania and Italy, the
Fascist leadership believed they would be able to justify a permanent Italian presence in
the country after the initial intervention. The absorption of Albania would be framed as
the realization of self-determination, re-uniting Albanians with the Roman empire. Since
1933, the Italians had been transmitting news bulletins and translations of the Duce’s
speeches to Albania from the Radio station in Bari.475 After the Abyssinia Crisis, the
Ministry of Popular Culture began plans to build a radio station in Tirana which would
serve as a “particularly effective tool for propaganda and penetration.”476 The Ministry of
Popular Culture also planned to expand the broadcasts to include cultural conversations
to parallel other programs transmitted in the Arab World.477
The Fascist leadership also used the film industry to advance the Italian cultural
and commercial penetration of Albania. In early 1935, the Director General for
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Propaganda concluded several commercial agreements for the purpose of sending Italian
documentaries and films to Albania.478 The Ministry of Popular Culture soon secured a
monopoly over the Albanian film market to limit the number of films screened in other
languages.479 The Italian government founded a covert agency under the Italian-Oriental
Chamber of Commerce in Albania to manage film exports from Italy and imports into
Albania. The agency exported both Italian films and foreign films dubbed in Italian to
Albania.480 The Ministry of Popular Cultural also established ties with a pro-Italian
Albanian businessman, Media Bego, to act as a liaison between Italian-sponsored film
and Albanian film operators and began subsidizing Albanian importers of Italian
language films.481 Mussolini and Count Ciano expected that the influx of Italian films and
radio would strengthen cultural ties with Albania and support a so-called union with Italy.
Originally, the Italians masked their empire-building ambitions in Albania under
the guise of international law. Mussolini emphasized that the Italian absorption of
Albania must be planned carefully in order to avoid an international crisis. He planned to
use the pretext of internal unrest to establish itself in the country. The plan was that after
receiving the orders from Rome, the Legation in Albania would send instructions to
Italy’s network of agents to stir up internal unrest.482 The movement would appear as a
call for revolution to unite with Italy and relieve Albania from its oppressive rule under
the current king. In response to the instability, the Italians would deliver an agreement to
King Zog that would effectively render the country an Italian protectorate. The
agreement, however, would have the appearance of an international pact and would
therefore be considered legitimate on the international stage.483 Within this plan, Italian
military forces would have a very limited role as the impetus for the Italian annexation
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would appear as a call from within the country. By December of 1938, Italian plans to
annex Albania were nearly complete. Mussolini declared that the imperial venture would
take place in the coming spring.484
The German annexation of Czechoslovakia frustrated Mussolini’s plans.
Jacomoni, the Italian Ambassador in Tirana, had warned Count Ciano that he did not
believe “that an insurrectional movement [would] take place as previously foreseen,
solely by force of the Italian people.” Nazi aggression in central Europe further reduced
the confidence of local leaders who feared that the international community would
become involved if revolution were to break out. Jacomoni reported that “the intervention
of Italian troops” had now become “essential in the sense that, without the security of it,
the leaders could hardly move their gangs” to create unrest in Albania.485 After von
Ribbentrop extended the Italians a free hand in the Mediterranean, Mussolini and the
Italian Foreign Ministry subsequently prepared an ultimatum for Albania, the rejection of
which would justify an Italian invasion. The Italians delivered the ultimatum on April 2nd
and upon rejection on April 6th, Mussolini ordered the military invasion of Albania.

2.3.2 The Invasion of Albania: Averting International Crisis
The international response to the Italian invasion of Albania reveals the limits of
imperial accountability in the late 1930s. By 1939, the Italians had learned the
importance of justifying imperialism within the League’s civilizing lexicon. The Italians
prepared for the imperial endeavour in Albania differently than those in Corfu and
Abyssinia by using methods that the League would deem acceptable or, at the very least,
overlook. But they also used the instability of the international order to distract from
Italian aggression and prevent a total rupture of relations with the British empire. Despite
the full-fledged military invasion of Albania, the Italian leadership was relatively
successful in mitigating the imperial crisis.
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In the days leading up to the invasion, the Italians had attempted to use the
shadow of the Czech Crisis as a diversion from Fascist empire-building activities in
central Europe. Count Ciano framed Italian action as an effort to restrain German
aggression. The Italian Foreign Minister ordered Dino Grandi in London and Raffaele
Guariglia in Paris to “get the word out” in these cities “through third parties” that Italian
action would block “further German expansion in the Balkans.”486 He emphasized that
this rumour must be created with the utmost discretion to prevent the identification of its
origin.487 Upon hearing these rumours, one Foreign Office official minuted that “Count
Ciano is a liar, and a clumsy liar at that.”488 While the British were skeptical of Italian
designs on Albania, the Foreign Office had concluded that Italy would not occupy
Albania in the near future because of the political complications with Yugoslavia.489
The Italian invasion took the British by surprise. When news of the invasion
reached the Foreign Office, the most senior officials had already left London for the
Easter Break. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had left to Scotland a day earlier and
“hoped to stay [there] for about ten days.”490 To make matters worse, the Foreign Office
struggled to reconcile reports between Albanian representatives and the Italian
government with several officials noting that the situation was “extremely obscure.”491
The Foreign Office concluded that regardless of the details of the situation, preserving the
independence of Albania was not worth sparking a European war. The British had few
direct interests in Albania and recognized that Italy had a special position in the country
since the 1921 Conference of Ambassadors’ resolution. One Foreign Office official
commented that “however violently one may dislike Italy’s policy, it is true that Italy has
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a special position in Albania where her political and economic interests are naturally
predominant” and that it was “hardly worth risking a world war to try to prevent Italy
from control a country” largely within her hands already.492 In effect, the British
recognized that Albania was already within the Fascist sphere of influence.
The Italians also highlighted the similarities between the Italian position in
Albania and the British empire in an effort to legitimize the imperial arrangement. On a
number of occasions, Fascist officials claimed that Italy’s position in Albania paralleled
Britain’s position in Egypt and Iraq.493 Both countries were nominally independent states
that had concluded highly restrictive international treaties with the British upon gaining
independence. British troops were also stationed in both countries. In a meeting with the
British Ambassador to Rome, Lord Perth, Count Ciano remarked that Italy intended to
“observe the form” in Albania that the British had established in Egypt and Iraq.494 The
Italian press referred to such an arrangement as “a perfect solution” for the Italian
Empire.495 One Foreign Office official noted that while the Italians had wished for
Albania to be regarded in the same light as Egypt, the two cases were very different.
While Egypt was “in truth, an independent government” any future Albanian government
would simply be Italy’s “puppet”.496 The British Ambassador claimed that the
arrangement between Italy and Albania appeared to mirror the British model of
Dominion status.497 Even British officials made efforts to reconcile the Italian position in
Albania with imperial arrangements that they deemed legitimate. Italian mirroring of
British imperial arrangements demonstrates another element of Fascist imperial learning
in the Albanian case. Not only did the Italians incorporate covert methods used in other
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imperial spaces into their repertoire, they also imitated British imperial structures
recognized by international law.
The years of Italian propaganda in Albania appeared to pay off in the wake of the
invasion. The Ministry of Popular Culture shared the many letters that it received from
Muslim community leaders in Albania praising the ‘Protector of Islam’ for liberating the
Muslim community from the oppressive rule of King Zog. In a letter to the Ministry of
Popular Culture, Beshet Shapati, head of the Muslim Community of Albania, exclaimed
that “all Albanian Muslims welcomed with great enthusiasm the liberation of the
country” and that Muslims know that “where ever the Italian flag waves, Muslims live
freely and protected.”498 Another letter from the ex-Minister Mustafa Krufa Qazim
Koculi Sejfi Villamasi highlighted the joy and gratitude of the Muslim community in
response to the union with Italy.499 A letter from an unidentified group of Albanian
refugees rejoiced that King Zog’s government has finally “finished stealing from the
people and killing them” and welcomed the Duce as a great liberator of the Albanian
people.500
It is unclear whether these letters came from the network of pro-Italian leaders
whose generous Italian-sponsored salaries ensured their allegiance. These letters may
have been sent by Italian agents living in Albania or they may have been sent out of fear
in an effort to get on the good side of Albania’s new conqueror. It is safe to argue that not
all Albanians welcomed the Italian invasion – the Foreign Office received a number of
letters from Albanians condemning Italian aggression and requesting British assistance.
Yet regardless of the origin of, or motivation for, the letters that the Italians received,
these were the letters that were shared with the world. They created the perception that
Albanians were favourable to a union with Italy and that international public opinion
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need not condemn it. While it can be expected that many of these letters were sent for
ulterior motives, the Italians used them to justify the invasion of Albania on the
international stage.
In Europe, the press response to the Italian annexation of Albania remained
relatively muted. In the days leading up the invasion, the English press was
extraordinarily positive about the prospect of Italian action in Albania. A Daily Express
headline even hailed Italian action with “the Duce Protects Albania.”501 Following the
invasion the European press focused on what the invasion foreshadowed rather than the
invasion itself.502 The League of Nations Union also gave the invasion little attention. In
the first and only executive committee meeting at which the invasion was discussed, the
committee resolved that the British government should “have no further dealings or
agreements with Mussolini” and that the LNU should “denounce the invasion of
Albania.”503 Most of the conversation emphasized the need for collective defence and an
arrangement between Britain and Russia. Unlike the response to Corfu and Abyssinia, the
committee did not discuss tactics for the mobilization of public opinion or for lobbying
London and Geneva. By the spring of 1939, the LNU, like Whitehall, had become
preoccupied with preventing the outbreak of war and dismissed the notion of holding
Fascist aggression accountable.
In Geneva, the response was even more apathetic. The Secretary-General of the
League of Nations received a communication from the new head of the Albanian
government less than a week after the Italian invasion that the country wished to
withdraw from the League.504 With both Italy and Albania withdrawn from the League,
there was little basis upon which the Covenant could be applied. From exile, however,
King Zog and members of his former government petitioned the League to invoke
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Articles 11 and 17 of the Covenant. More than a month passed before the Council
addressed the issue. The Secretary-General noted that “reading the letter [from King Zog]
consisted the action he intended to take” on the matter indicating that there was very little
that the League of Nations could do.505 Viscount Halifax, however, was quick to raise a
point of order. He noted that discussion of the Albania issue would entail a revision of the
agenda which had already been adopted. The Council briskly passed a resolution to
forward the matter to the Assembly and never discussed Albania again.
The Italian invasion of Albania was not subject to the same level of international
‘talk’ or public scrutiny as the Italian invasions of Corfu or Abyssinia. By the spring of
1939, the scope of international discussion had been redirected and confidence in the
League’s institutional framework had been exhausted. The British press did express some
criticism towards the Italian imperial venture. But with little support from other realms, it
had very little impact. The LNU, preoccupied with encouraging its government to pursue
a collective defence arrangement, did not coordinate with its sister organizations on the
continent, did not mobilize public opinion, and did not lobby politicians to hold Fascist
imperialism accountable. In Geneva, there was no question that the League of Nations
would not employ sanctions against Italy. After sanctions proved ineffective in the
Abyssinia Crisis and following the League’s subsequent recognition of the Italian
Empire, the international community had very little faith in the League. Reflecting this
sentiment, A. N. Noble commented to his Foreign Office colleagues that “nothing we or
anyone else can do will stop the Italians [from] overrunning Albania if they decided to do
so.”506 By the spring of 1939, it was clear that internationalization had stopped working.

2.3.3 Ebbing Anglo-Italian Cooperation
For both the British and Italians, the invasion of Albania emerged as a movement
of clarity in which the two governments realize that the logic upon which their policy of
cooperation has been based, no longer holds up. The invasion prompted British and
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Italian decision-makers to re-evaluate the function of cooperation. Even after the
Albanian episode, the two governments specifically decided against denouncing the
Easter Accords in an effort to preserve loose cooperation between one another. But from
the April of 1939 onward, loose cooperation becomes a tool to buy time before war rather
than a device used to collaborate over the empire as it had been in the past. After nearly
twenty years of negotiating, modifying, and reinforcing the system of cooperation
between the two empires, the imperial system had begun to break down as Mussolini
became increasingly determined to expand the Italian empire. While working to preserve
the remains of the Easter Accords, both the British and Italians began to pursue other
options that risked damaging Anglo-Italian relations, but that had a stronger prospect of
maintaining and strengthening empire in the Mediterranean and Middle East.
For the British, the question of denouncing the Accords was a moral one. The
crux of the issue was that the British could not understand why the Italians “intervened
militarily instead of continuing to negotiate” because the British would have “no
difficulty with negotiating.”507 Once again, the Italians were doing empire the wrong way
-- through imperial violence rather than diplomacy. But in light of the relative absence of
public pressure, the Foreign Office determined that it would be more advantageous to
preserve the agreement than it would be to denounce it. From Rome, Perth recommended
to the Foreign Office that “we should lose much and gain nothing from any such
denunciation.”508 He pointed out that to denounce the treaty now would only relieve the
Italian government of any obligation to carry out assurances over Spain, the Balearic
Islands, and the Middle East.509 The Chiefs of Staff also supported preserving the
agreement. Even in the spring of 1939, the Chiefs of Staff remained optimistic that there
was still a possibility of “detaching Italy from the Rome-Berlin Axis” and believed that
preserving the Easter Accords might secure Italian neutrality in the event of war in
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Europe.510 After the Italian invasion of Albania, the British leadership concluded that to
denounce the Easter Accords would do more harm than good.
In the days after the invasion of Albania, the Italians went so far as to reinforce
the importance of the Easter Accords in international affairs. Less than a week after the
invasion, Crolla recommended to Ciano that “the best thing” the Italians could do to
mitigate the consequences of the invasion was to announce the withdrawal of troops from
Spain.511 Crolla anticipated that by making a show of the function of the Easter Accords,
the Italian violation of the Mediterranean status quo could be overlooked. Mussolini sent
orders to Crolla to confirm his intention to repatriate legionaries from Spain.512 The
withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain was the most important condition of the Easter
Accords for the British. While the Italian invasion of Albania had been a major blow for
the Easter Accords, both the British and Italians opted to preserve the remnants of
cooperation than abandon it altogether.
In the wake of the invasion, the British prioritized deterring further Italian
aggression and building alliances in the event of the outbreak of war. Viscount Halifax
swiftly concluded the day after the invasion that “we should not go to war about Albania
and instead the British should “endeavour to seek further time, which we should use to
improve our position.”513 Albania was not worth war, but if the Italians were to expand to
Turkey or Greece, it would dramatically impede British imperial defence strategy as a
whole. In view of the strategic importance of Turkey and Greece, the Chiefs of Staff
recommended that “everything possible should be done to maintain the most friendly
relations with Turkey and to avoid an unfriendly Greece in time of war.”514 The Foreign
Secretary proposed that the British should extend the guarantee arrangement that had
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begun with Poland in response to German aggression to the eastern Mediterranean.
Halifax proposed that the British should make it clear that if Turkey or Greece were
attacked, the British government would come to its defence.515 The decision to conclude
security agreements with Turkey and Greece marks a shift in British policy from
cooperation with Italy to an effort to deter further Italian aggression.
While the British hoped to prevent war against Italy, the Foreign Office became
increasingly concerned with building alliances in the event of war in Europe. Throughout
the 1920s and 1930s, the British government had avoided any firm agreement with the
French.516 While the central European dynamic of this wobbly friendship has received
great scholarly attention, the Mediterranean element has been largely overlooked. In the
Mediterranean, the British had consistently averted French appeals for an agreement over
empire and instead attempted to bring the French in on a number of agreements with the
Italians and multilateral pacts in an effort to avoid alienating Italy. After years of delay,
the British opened informal talks with the French in February of 1939. Discussions
initially progressed slowly but soon took on a new momentum as the events of March
began to unfold.517 When formal talks opened in London less than a week before the
Italian invasion, the British and French primarily focused on preparing for war in Europe.
These talks took on a new urgency after the invasion of Albania. In April, plans for the
Mediterranean and Middle East emerged as a priority. The COS proposed that in the
event of war in the Mediterranean the British and French should apply pressure on the
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Italian empire to cause Italy’s position in Libya and Ethiopia to fall.518 After the Italian
invasion of Albania, the British government prioritized Anglo-French cooperation in the
Mediterranean and building alliances in the event of war.
Following the Italian invasion of Albania, the British government also began to
feel out the Soviets on the possibility of a tripartite alliance with the British and
French.519 Since the Soviet Union’s return as a major player in European politics in the
1930s, the British had been hesitant to form close relations with the Bolshevik state.
British officials also believed that the Soviet Union would have very little value as an ally
because its already out-of-date military had been weakened by the purges.520 While the
military situation was weak, the COS recommended that an alliance with the Soviets
would have immense economic value. Soviet cooperation in withholding food and raw
materials from Germany would prove invaluable in the event of an economic blockade.521
The precarious discussions with the Soviets for an alliance began on the eve of the Italian
invasion of Albania. While negotiations with the Soviets touched on the Mediterranean
very little, they do represent a growing urgency in British foreign policy to secure allies
against Europe’s fascist powers. Next to France, the Soviet Union had been Mussolini’s
primary enemy largely for ideological reasons. The British government’s decision to
make a go of an understanding with the Soviets sent a clear message to the Italians that
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Whitehall was exploring options that would likely bring about the end to Anglo-Italian
cooperation.
For Mussolini and Ciano, the invasion of Albania proved that an alliance with
Nazi Germany would better suit Fascist Italy’s imperial ambitions. In a speech to the
Fascist Grand Council earlier that year, Mussolini had made clear his expansionist
ambitions in the Mediterranean. In his famous ‘March to the Sea’ speech, he announced
that the tasks of Italian policy must be to “first break the prison bars” of the
Mediterranean and to subsequently “march to the ocean” through French North Africa
and British Egypt. Mussolini also declared that the Rome-Berlin Axis responded to the
“fundamental historic need” of the Italian people in the Mediterranean.522 The March to
the Sea speech articulated the incompatibility between British and Italian imperial
ambitions and highlighted the value of an alliance with Nazi Germany.523 Talks about
formalizing the Axis into an alliance had begun to percolate at the turn of 1939, but the
Italians remained hesitant until it was clear that cooperation with the British was fading
away.524
Mussolini and Count Ciano were suspicious of Hitler’s ambitions in the Balkans
and the shock of the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia delivered a great blow to the
Axis partnership. The invasion had come as a surprise to the Italians, who only received a
night’s notice of the plans for Nazi action in central Europe. Count Ciano complained
that “the Axis functions only in favour of one of its parts” and that Hitler acts “entirely on
[his] own initiative, with little regard to us.”525 In the days following the Nazi invasion,
Mussolini became increasingly concerned that the Nazis would establish “Prussian
hegemony in Europe” at the expense of Italy.526 But von Ribbentrop was quick to assure
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the Italians that unlike the British, the Germans did not have any imperial interests in the
Mediterranean. Von Ribbentrop wrote a letter to Ciano confirming that “in all questions
affecting the Mediterranean, the policy of the Axis must be laid down by Rome, and that
therefore Germany will never pursue in the Mediterranean countries a policy independent
of Italy.”527 Ribbentrop’s reassurances confirmed that an alliance with Nazi Germany
would prove more advantageous than Italy’s tradition of imperial cooperation with the
British.
The British response to the Italian invasion of Albania proved Mussolini’s view
that an alliance with Nazi Germany would best suit Italy’s imperial ambitions. Viscount
Halifax’s reacted to the invasion of Albania by emphasizing the preeminence of British
imperial interests in the Mediterranean. He declared that the British “cannot ignore what
is happening in the Mediterranean area, even if this is an area in which we recognize the
special interests of Italy.”528 For Mussolini, the invasion affirmed that the British and the
Italians had incompatible imperial goals. The Fascist leadership viewed the British
government’s move to create alliances and announce guarantees as a move to “enlarge
the encirclement area” of the fascist powers.529 In the beginning of May, the Italians
began plans for an alliance with the Germans to expand the empire and counter Britain’s
new alliance-building project. On 22 May 1939, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany
concluded the infamous Pact of Steel in which the two powers recognized their solidarity
of interests and vowed to deepen their collaboration in preparation for war. Anglo-Italian
cooperation over empire had come to an end.

2.3.4 Conclusion
The Italian invasion of Albania should have been an international crisis. Like
Corfu and Abyssinia, Albania was an independent member of the League of Nations. It
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was a victim of unrestrained Italian military aggression. Its political leaders quickly
petitioned the League of Nations, invoked the Covenant, and requested that Geneva
protect the rights and sovereignty of Tirana. Albanians under Italian occupation even sent
letters to Geneva and Whitehall requesting NGOs and national governments to “protest
and arouse world public opinion” against the “violence to our country.”530 But European
public opinion was preoccupied with its own security. NGOs were busy petitioning their
governments to prevent war. Whitehall was distracted by increasing German aggression
in Europe. Geneva, what was left of it, avoided the question altogether. By 1939, no one
in Europe believed that the independence of Albania was worth the possible outbreak of
war.
The international situation deflected public scrutiny of Italy’s Albanian venture,
but so did Italy’s use of imperial methods. By 1939, the Italians had learned the norms of
the League of Nations imperial system and attempted to adjust accordingly. From the
Corfu and Abyssinia Crises, the Italians had learned that imperial violence would prompt
an imperial crisis. Italy’s adventures in Arabia, Palestine, and Malta, however, had
received minimal, if any, international attention. In these imperial spaces, the Italians
conducted empire through economic penetration, relationships with local elites, and
cultural affinity to create a guise of self-determination. In Albania, the Italians spent
years establishing a privileged economic position in the country and cultivating a cultural
affinity between Albania and Italy. Mussolini and Ciano even developed plans to spark
an internal insurrection that would prompt Italy to swoop in and heroically save the
‘uncivilized’ Albanians from themselves. When it became clear that the Italians would
have to use force to expand the empire, they attempted to justify their action with an
array of excuses. The Italians deliberately attempted to avoid an international crisis. By
incorporating covert imperial methods and ‘speaking’ the language of the League, they
did.

530

Field to Boyle, 11 April 1939, FO 371/23712, R 2533/1335/90.

133

The invasion of Albania prompted the British and Italians to re-evaluate the value
of cooperation and what it meant for Anglo-Italian relations. Prior to the invasion, the
two empires used cooperation as a tool to collaborate in maintaining the imperial system.
But after the invasion, cooperation became an instrument used to delay the outbreak of
war. The British and Italians decided to preserve what was left of the Easter Accords to
uphold the appearance of cooperation. But for all practical purposes, the period of AngloItalian cooperation over empire had come to a close. The invasion confirmed that the
Italian empire would expand at the expense of the British – limiting competition no
longer appeared feasible. In the spring of 1939, there was no question that an alliance
with Nazi Germany be more advantageous for the Fascist empire.
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2.4 Conclusion: Imperial Crisis and Its Limits
The course of Anglo-Italian relations during these imperial crises reveals that
there never was a break between League diplomacy and ‘old diplomacy’. While the
British, and to a certain extent the Italians, would play along in Geneva, behind closed
doors the two governments also came to alternative understandings. These case studies
demonstrate that normative systems of League diplomacy and ‘old diplomacy’ co-existed
and were invoked at different times when deemed most useful. When necessitated by
public opinion and LNU pressure, the British would take a stand in the League against
Fascist imperial violence. When it came to maintaining the imperial system and
preserving cooperation, the British opted to mitigate crisis outside of the public eye.
Whenever possible, the British and Italians settled imperial matters outside the League of
Nations. Despite the rise of global governance and the League’s new normative
standards, bilateral cooperation over empire remained an essential feature of the imperial
system well into the twentieth century. These case studies demonstrate that global order
is not a static and hegemonic normative system. Instead, these case studies reveal the coexisting, overlapping, and clashing nature of the global orders characterized by the prewar years and the League of Nations system.
The League of Nations imperial system was built around a set of contradictions
and double standards. As Susan Pedersen has argued, the Permanent Mandates
Commission did not require states to govern empire differently, it required states to say
they governed empire differently.531 But responses to the Italian invasions of independent
League members explored in this chapter tell a different story. When it came to sovereign
League members, Geneva did not only say that empire was governed differently, it did
attempt to enforce a new standard of empire. The League imperial system pressured
empires to adopt different methods to achieve similar results. Imperial violence was
outlawed and conquest became obsolete against League members of the “civilized
world”. But empire still could be legitimately expanded in these territories through
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collaboration with local elites, economic penetration, and the infiltration of political
agents if it were under the guise of the civilizing mission or self-determination. The
League of Nations imperial system did revise the nineteenth-century imperial repertoire.
But this revision did not make empire more humane. Whether through exploitive political
and economic arrangements or the outright bombing of cities, imperialism remained a
violent project.
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Italians attempted to learn the rules of this
new imperial system. From the Corfu Crisis, the Italians learned that the international
community was hesitant to apply the Covenant and implement sanctions. From the
Abyssinia Crisis, the Italians learned that unjustified imperial violence was unacceptable
in Geneva. In Albania, the Italians had finally learned the language of the League. The
Italians framed their venture into Albanian as a necessary step to save the uncivilized
Albanians from themselves. The Italian leadership frequently referred to King Zog of
Albania as a “vain" and “childish” man who was a “tribal chief who now call[ed] himself
King.”532 The Italians initially attempted to avoid the use of imperial violence by
establishing a system of Italian institutions in the country, securing the loyalties of local
elites, and implementing a propaganda campaign in favour of Italian influence. Upon
invading the country, the Italians proclaimed that their venture into Albania was a “high
civilizing mission” and emphasized the population’s desire for a union with Italy as a
realization of self-determination.533 Even after the invasion, the Italians left Albania with
its own government intact mirroring British imperial arrangements. In Albania, the
Italians merged imperial conquest with other methods more acceptable to Geneva. By
1939, the Italians had become fluent in the norms that underscored the League of
Nations imperial system and, in doing so, circumvented imperial crisis.
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These imperial crises reveal the extents and limits of the League’s imperial
accountability mechanisms. In each case, an independent member of the League of
Nations was subject to imperial violence in violation of the Covenant. Yet, in each case,
the League of Nations responded differently. In Corfu, the League outsourced the matter
to another international body, but it was ultimately successful in rolling-back Italian
aggression. In Abyssinia, diplomats in Geneva had countless hours of discussion and
applied sanctions under the Covenant against the Italians. In Albania, the League did
nothing. These case studies demonstrate that the implementation of the League’s
accountability mechanisms depended on the imperial adventure becoming an
international crisis. By 1939, the League’s legitimacy was declining and the international
community was preoccupied with the possibility of war in Europe. These case studies
show that imperial crisis could only be internationalized if there was not a more pressing
crisis in Europe. The Italian invasion of Albania did not become internationalized
because international public opinion and government decision-makers were preoccupied
with the crisis of Nazi aggression in Europe. This further reveals the logic of empire: the
international community could care less about the decorum of the civilizing mission
when European civilization itself was at risk.
These case studies highlight the problems of peacebuilding that afflicted the
1920s and 1930s. The peace-building process that immediately followed the Great War
had been highly territorialized on central Europe. Numerous historians have criticized the
interwar years for the failure to develop an Eastern Locarno. These case studies, however,
reveal the impact of the unfinished peace in the Mediterranean and in empire. As Patrick
Cohrs has argued with reference to the postwar financial settlement, the ultimate goal of
long-lasting peace and stability informed British approaches to empire in the region.534
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the British attempted to conclude an understanding
among Mediterranean powers over what constituted the status quo in the region. The
Foreign Office produced countless proposals for Mediterranean Pacts and schemes for a
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‘Mediterranean Locarno.’ The imperial crises explored in this chapter emerged out of
diverging conceptions of how a peaceful Mediterranean and Middle East ought to look.
In the aftermath of the Abyssinia Crisis, Austen Chamberlain reflected that the “Locarno
policy” had been based on a “definite guarantee of peace in the area where we are vitally
interested” and restricted “our obligations elsewhere.”535 The former Foreign Secretary
mused that it was precisely in what happened “elsewhere” that “the real difficulties
arise.”536
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Conclusion
Global Order, Continuities of Empire, and the Road to
War
On 16 October, 1939, the British Ambassador to Rome, Percy Loraine met with
Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano at the golf club which they both frequented. Both
men ducked out of the office early that Monday afternoon to escape the taxing work of
wartime diplomacy. As they played a round of golf, the two men exchanged views on the
international situation. Ciano confided in Loraine that he felt “depressed about the future”
as it appeared “dark and impenetrable.”537 Only a couple of weeks earlier the Nazis had
overrun Poland but the end of the war in Europe did not appear to be close. The British
Ambassador believed that the Italians were in a “difficult position” and that Count Ciano
was firmly in the “anti-German camp.”538 Loraine lamented that “if only Germany would
separate herself from Hitler … there was a good chance of all of us getting on our legs
again.”539 But Ciano was not so optimistic. He believed that “only some outside
influence” could bring about Hitler’s downfall.
As they finished up their last hole, Loraine emphasized that despite the
circumstances, he found himself feeling much happier recently. He rejoiced that the two
countries had “lifted their relations out of a deep rut” and stressed his hope that relations
would never again endure such strain. Count Ciano sympathized with this view and told
the British Ambassador “you can count on me right through to help about that.”540 Both
men left the golf course that afternoon to return to their offices and deal with the ongoing
war in Europe. But these friendly interactions between men served to reinforce a hope
that a total war between Great Britain and Fascist Italy could be avoided. For both the
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British and the Italians, ideological differences that existed between them did not render
conflict inevitable even after the outbreak of war in Central Europe.
***
The case studies in this thesis might seem carefully delineated by time, place and
scope. But their significance relates to many fundamental issues in European
international relations in the 1920s and 1930s and forces us to rethink the so-called road
to war; the role of ideology in determining state policies as well as the alliance system;
the persistence of imperial norms and practices; Anglo-Italian relations and the
inevitability of their breakdown; the ways in which empires learned from and replicated
one another; and the norms and purpose of the interwar global order. These case studies
also reconsider common assumptions about the British empire. They critique the British
empire, not in the classic ‘guilty men’ sense that has come before, but for being not only
complicit, but proactive in a collaborative imperial system founded on racial hierarchies
that took the lives, cultures, and histories of peoples across the globe and culminated in
total war.
When war broke out in Europe in the autumn of 1939, the Italians remained
neutral. On several occasions, Mussolini and Count Ciano had made clear to the Nazis
that Fascist Italy would not be prepared for a major European war until 1942. In
negotiations for the Pact of Steel, Mussolini indicated that the Axis powers needed “a
period of peace lasting no less than three years.”541 The Italians still needed time to
modernize the military and strengthen the economy before war. Until then, the Italians
desired relative peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Even after the war in Europe
began, the Italians engaged in negotiations with the British over trade and empire until
their own entry into the war in June 1940. Once the Nazis had over run France, Mussolini
and Ciano believed it was time to dispense with the remnants of compromise and embark
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on a war for empire. With the French defeated and the British overstretched between
Europe and the Far East, the Fascist leadership believed that there was little left to stand
in the way of securing mare nostrum.
Until the Fascist declaration of war in 1940, the British continued to pursue the
policy of cooperation towards the Italians in the hope that they could delay, and, if
possible, detach Italian support for its Axis ally. Nearly all reports received from the
British embassy in Rome indicated that the Italians were not inclined to declare war
against the British. Some British officials believed that “despite years of propaganda” the
Italian people “still like us and hate the Germans” and were not inclined to embark on a
war in support of a German issue.542 Others expected that the Italians would join the war
on whichever side appeared most likely to come out victorious.543 On a number of
occasions, the Foreign Office discussed the possibility of bribing the Italians with
imperial offerings in exchange for their support against Germany. They considered
offering the Italians concessions in Jibuti, Tunis, British Somaliland, and Tangier, as well
as participation in the Suez Canal. To a certain degree, the British were still sympathetic
to Italy’s imperial ambitions and were willing to work with the Italians according to
established norms and practices. But as the war dragged on, it became clear that an
alliance with the Nazis better suited Italian interests. On June 10, 1940, Fascist Italy
declared war on the British empire.
Many historians have explored the road to war between the British and the
Italians. Orthodox historian Renzo de Felice and his followers argue that Mussolini did
not actively play a role in the road to war. Instead, he played the role of the peso
determinante between Nazi Germany and Great Britain in an effort to secure the best deal
possible.544 In this view, Mussolini was simply an opportunist with no violent ambitions.
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The revisionist Anglo-Saxon school of thought largely discredits the orthodox view and
argues that ideological differences between Britain and Fascist Italy essentially rendered
war inevitable – Mussolini and Hitler were destined to form an alliance as a result of the
ideological affinity of their regimes. While these historians differ on the beginning of the
road to war, it is clear that from the March on Rome there was strong potential for
conflict.545 Historians such as Lawrence Pratt, Reynolds Salerno, Nir Arielli, and
Massimiliano Fiore highlight the Mediterranean origins of the Second World War and
argue that the road to war begins much earlier in empire than it does in Europe.546
My analysis of Anglo-Italian cooperation over empire reveals a more complex
story. It is clear from 1922 onward that the British and Italian empires had competing
interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. As historians such as MacGregor
Knox, G. Bruce Strang, and Massimiliano Fiore argue, Mussolini was ideologically
motivated to expand the Italian empire.547 But these case studies also reveal a strong
element of pragmatism and realism in Il Duce’s decision-making. The 1920s and 1930s
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were not characterized by endless and escalating competition between the British and
Italians empires. Instead, the two empires pursued a policy of cooperation to navigate
competing interests and to prevent competition from going too far. There is no denying
that Mussolini’s activities in empire challenged the British. But for the most part, these
challenges took place within limits during the interwar years. These case studies show
that while his empire-building objectives were guided by his long-term ideological goal,
Mussolini adjusted his short-term ambitions to suit global circumstances.
The imperial system, and the cooperation and compromise that it made possible,
deeply informed Anglo-Italian relations during the interwar years. Until 1939, the British
and Italians both believed that competition over empire should take place within limits.
Since the nineteenth century, there had been an understanding among great powers that
competition over empire should not lead to a conflict between them. This understanding
persisted well into the twentieth century, even as the League of Nations attempted to shift
imperial questions to the international realm. As the twentieth century unfolded, the
British and Italians continued to pursue a policy of bilateral cooperation to navigate
competition, silence anti-colonial nationalism, and sideline international oversight. In
many instances, cooperation was not easy and the two empires were forced to
compromise. Particularly in times of crisis, compromise between imperial ambitions and
the status quo emerged as a tool to navigate crisis.
Shifting the focus to examine how empires were mutually sustaining and
legitimizing within a broader competitive context allows us to reconsider the road to war
narrative that has characterized Anglo-Italian relations. Until 1939, cooperation with the
British was advantageous to the Fascist empire-building project. Through negotiation and
compromise, the Italians extended the Fascist empire both formally and informally. In the
latter half of the 1930s, Mussolini began to ramp up imperial expansion while the British
became increasingly insistent on preserving the status quo. Yet even in the late 1930s, the
Italian leadership was careful not to go too far. Italian imperial conquests in Abyssinia
and Albania were chosen strategically – the British had few interests in these spaces.
Even in 1938, the Italians agreed to respect the limits of empire and pulled out of
Palestine.
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The collapse of Anglo-Italian relations was not simply a result of ideological
incompatibility between democracy and Fascism. In fact, when it came to empire, the two
states were surprisingly compatible as they approached the imperial project with similar
methods, practices, and assumptions. Instead, the collapse of this friendship can be
understood as a re-evaluation of cooperation over their clashing imperial interests. For
nearly twenty years, the British and Italians compromised over zones of competition . By
1939, however, it had become clear that while the Italians had a whole host of conflicting
interests with the British, but they had very few with the Nazis. Hitler was preoccupied
with expansion in central and eastern Europe and had little interest in the Mediterranean.
With Hitler, Mussolini believed that there would be little need for compromise in empire.
By 1939, an alliance with the Germans would prove more fruitful for Italy’s empirebuilding goals.548 As Christian Goeschel has argued with respect to Fascist foreign-policy
in Europe, this study shows that the alignment between Mussolini and Hitler was one of
mutual interest rather than pure ideological affinity.
By looking beyond explanations about ideological incompatibility as the driving
force on the road-to-war, the continuities between British and Fascist conceptions of
empire become strikingly clear. Many historians have focused on how Fascist foreign
policy represents a rupture with the past. It is true that Fascist Italy deviated from the
policies of Liberal Italy. But the case studies in my thesis also show the many ways in
which the Italians learned from British imperial practices and methods of empire.
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Italians looked to the British empire for inspiration
and justification. After observing the British empire dropping bombs on indigenous
populations in Yemen, the Italians did the same in Abyssinia less than ten years later.
From their experience in Malta, the Italians learned the value of the British Empire’s
assimilatory practices. The importance of identity construction and cultural assimilation
became a key part of the Italian imperial project in Albania. Mimicking the British in
Malta, the Fascist leadership worked to Italianize Albania’s political and commercial
institutions long before annexation. The Italians even attempted to mirror British imperial
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arrangements to justify Italian expansionism. The British position in independent Iraq and
Egypt provided an ideal model for the Italians. The Italians hoped to replicate this model
in Yemen, the Palestine Mandate, Malta, and Albania. The Italians also learned from
their own experiences throughout the interwar years as they observed which methods and
practices would spark imperial crisis and which ones would not.
Imperial learning was a key feature of the imperial system during the interwar
years. Examining the ways in which the British and Italian empires learned from one
another and exchanged knowledge and information breaks down the binary that many
scholars have created between Fascist and British imperial practices. In both the British
and Italian empires, imperial violence was at the heart of their imperial repertoire. During
the interwar years, both empires used aerial bombardment against indigenous
populations, both empires incorporated martial law, both empires implemented
assimilatory policies. They also influenced local elites, penetrated economies, and
exploited natural resources. These commonalities demonstrate that a continuum existed
between liberal and Fascist conceptions of empire, in particular, how it should be
acquired, and how it should be controlled. While the two empires incorporated different
methods in different spaces, they were part of a single logic of empire.549
A focus on cooperation between empires also disrupts the legacy of the long
outdated colonizer-colonized and metropole-periphery models that suggest that the
relationship between empire and imperial space was a strict one-to-one power dynamic.
The literature on empire tends to recognize the colonizing imperial power as emanating
from one particular European state as if imperial rule was hegemonic and undisputed
within the imperial system. In many ways, the cases examined here were shared imperial
spaces. In the Arabian Peninsula, the British and Italians shared the so-called burden of
imperial security. The British held the Mandate for Palestine, but Italian religious and
commercial institutions persisted parallel to the British Empire’s political position.
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Sharing of imperial space was most prominent in Malta where the British and Italians
split influence in political, legal, educational, and religious institutions. The cases of
Abyssinia and Albania provide examples of the limits of imperial sharing and the
permeability of sovereignty. While each country was technically independent, they had
been subject to imperial influences prior to crisis. In the decades before the crisis, the
British, French, and Italians had concluded several agreements over the limits of empire
in Abyssinia. The Italian invasion put an end to imperial sharing in the region. For much
of the interwar years, Albania was a shared space as Italian activities infringed on the
country’s sovereignty since its inception. Cooperation over empire demonstrates the
porousness of empire during the interwar years by highlighting the ways in which
empires shared imperial spaces and coexisted through parallel zones of power.
In shared imperial spaces, support for or opposition to anti-colonial nationalism
frequently emerged as a tool to leverage cooperation. Many scholars have pointed to
internal rebellion and anti-colonial protests as symptoms of fractures within the imperial
system.550 Yet, these movements became intertwined with empire-building itself. Within
shared imperial spaces, the Italians sometimes supported and sometimes opposed anticolonial movements as a means of advancing their own interests. In Arabia and Palestine,
the Italians were advocates of anti-colonial nationalism as weak independence was more
advantageous to Fascist empire-building than continued British rule. But when the two
empires cooperated, the Italians subdued their support for anti-colonial nationalism in
favour of preserving the imperial system and the advantages that they could secure within
it. In Malta, the situation was different. The British and Italians competed in support of
anti-colonial national movements in order to secure the loyalties of the future European
state. These cases show that anti-colonialist movements and empire-building projects
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frequently collaborated to achieve divergent aims which further reveals the contradictions
that characterized the interwar imperial system.
These case studies show the fragility of the interwar imperial system. Policies of
cooperation, imperial sharing, and the instrumentalization of anti-colonial nationalism are
symptoms of the precarity of the imperial system during the 1920s and 1930s. The British
struggled to ensure global imperial defence, regional imperial security, and local imperial
order while the Italians grappled with Fascistization domestically, as well as the
industrialization and militarization necessary to carry forward the imperial project. To a
certain degree, cooperation was necessary. It was not only a tool to navigate competition
between empires. Cooperation also emerged as a tactic to manoeuvre within a precarious,
fragile, and fractured imperial system. For much of the interwar years, it was clear that
empire could not be maintained unilaterally. The two empires cooperated for their mutual
benefit, shared the burden of imperial security, and collaborated to preserve the imperial
system against internal opposition.
Common racial assumptions that underpinned the interwar imperial system
shaped the global hierarchy and facilitated cooperation between imperial powers. Beyond
the status of a particular territory within the League, conceptions of whiteness and ‘other’
characterized both the British and Italian colonial imagination. These racial hierarchies
informed approaches to empire. For example, the British and Italians viewed Corfu,
Malta, and Albania as imperial spaces with the potential to become ‘European’ because
of the perceived degrees of whiteness of their populations. Within the Fascist colonial
imagination, these populations could become a part of Italy proper. Cultural policies and
efforts to ‘Italianize’ the local populations became deeply intertwined with the Fascist
nation-building project itself. As Fascist officials developed cultural propaganda
campaigns, they confronted questions of what it meant to be Italian and how this identity
ought to be defined. For the British, conceptions of whiteness informed attitudes towards
the legitimacy of empire. The Italian occupation of Corfu needed to be rolled back
because Greece was a firm member of the European community. Within the colonial
imagination, the status of Albania’s independence was different than that of Greece.
Albania was a primarily Muslim country on the outskirts of Europe. To a certain degree,
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empire made sense in Albania as it did in the Muslim countries across Africa and the
Middle East. Both empires viewed Malta as an experimentation ground for nationbuilding either through independence or imperial absorption. Perceptions of whiteness
within the colonial imagination shaped the function of a particular space within the
empire-building project and informed the selection of methods to which it was subject.
These case studies parallel the work of Susan Pedersen by looking beyond the
mandatory power-mandate relationship characteristic of the PMC to investigate the
extents and limits of imperial accountability within the imperial system more broadly.551
In the cases examined in the first chapter, imperial accountability was non-existent.
Remaining outside the League of Nations’ imperial system, there was no way to hold the
British empire accountable for aerial bombardment in Yemen and assimilatory practices
in Malta. While Palestine was monitored by the PMC, Geneva was far too distracted with
internal unrest within the Mandate to be concerned with escalating competition between
empires. The cases examined in the second chapter feature internationalized crises
subject to a certain degree of imperial accountability. While the success of imperial
accountability in Corfu and Abyssinia is debatable, in both cases, the League tried to hold
Italy accountable for imperial violence. In theory, Albania was an ideal candidate for the
League’s accountability mechanisms but in practice holding empire accountable was no
longer a major goal as crisis in the centre of Europe became the priority.
It was not only the international status of the violated imperial space that
prompted the League to hold empire accountable. Imperial accountability depended upon
the internationalization of an imperial episode. Pressure from the Europe press, public
opinion, lobby groups, and sympathetic diplomats gave Geneva the political will to enact
the League’s mechanisms of accountability against a transgressing empire. In spaces
where crisis did not precipitate, imperial powers were relatively free to behave as they
pleased. Cooperation between empires further limited the scope of accountability. Even
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in spaces where crisis erupted and when there was the political will to condemn imperial
violence, the British and Italians attempted to reach a compromise outside of the League.
These deep flaws within the system of accountability created space for empires to violate
the League’s imperial standards. The persistence of the nineteenth-century practice of
cooperation undermined the mechanisms of accountability that the League had brought
into being.
These case studies reveal the multi-layered and hybrid nature of global order
during the interwar years. Many historians point to the First World War as a major
turning point in history but close analysis of global order in the 1920s and 1930s does not
support this view. John Ikenberry has demonstrated that in the transitions between global
orders and sets of norms, there is an evolutionary logic at play.552 Rather than a rupture
and rebirth, global orders evolve over time. The postwar peace settlements and the rise of
the League of Nations added new dimensions to the global order, but they did not replace
the norms and standards that already existed. These case studies show that the preexisting global order was surprisingly resilient and durable. Despite the League of
Nations’ efforts to reform empire at the international level, the British and Italians acted
in accordance with nineteenth-century imperial standards through bilateral relations in the
imperial realm. Yet both empires also worked to learn the standards of the new imperial
system and become fluent in the language of the League.
These two sets of standards co-existed, sometimes harmoniously and sometimes
in conflict. The cases examined in Chapter One show that the two empires preserved
these practices with very little push-back as a result of the status of the imperial space
within the international hierarchy. But when new levels of international surveillance
brought to light the persistence of imperial violence as examined in Chapter Two, the
different layers of the global order confronted a contentious convergence of orders and
standards – nineteenth-century imperial conquest clashed with League principles on the
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international stage. Yet in each case, an ideal solution in accordance with either
nineteenth-century standards or League norms was not reached. Imperial crisis caused the
two global orders to collide and forced all parties into an unsettling compromise.
Embedded in the global order of the interwar years was a central contradiction in which
empires were held to new imperial standards that outlawed conquest and protected
member-state sovereignty while continuing the empire-building project in accordance
with nineteenth century practices.
The course of Anglo-Italian cooperation over empire brings these contradictions
within the global order to the fore. But it also problematizes the global order of the 1920s
and 1930s as an interlude between world wars or as period in which international order
stopped working. Instead of interlude when international order broke down, these case
studies reveal the ways in which states and empires navigated the multi-layered and
contradictory global order during the 1920s and 1930s. We can see a commitment to
different layers of this order at different times and we can see the rules and norms that
made the international system work and the ones that challenged it. This focus on empire
highlights the possibilities and limits of the hybrid and Eurocentric global order that
characterized the 1920s and 1930s.
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Appendix A: League of Nations Covenant (select excerpts)
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and
security
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,
by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual
rule of conduct among Governments, and
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in
the dealings of organised peoples with one another,
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.
ARTICLE 1.
The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which
are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the
Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be
effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming
into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the
League.
Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may
become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the
Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to
observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be
prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.
Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do,
withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its
obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.
ARTICLE 8.
The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the
reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and
the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each
State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the
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several Governments. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least
every ten years.
After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of
armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of
munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise
how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being
had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture
the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.
The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the
scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of
such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.
ARTICLE 10.
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of
the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such
aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be
fulfilled.
ARTICLE 11.
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the
League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the
League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on
the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the
attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting
international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good
understanding between nations upon which peace depends.
ARTICLE 12.
The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute
likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial
settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until
three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by
the Council. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial
decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be
made within six months after the submission of the dispute.
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ARTICLE 13.
The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them
which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement
and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole
subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.
Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to
the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any
international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for
any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for
submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.
For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be
the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14,
or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention
existing between them.
The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or
decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of
the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an
award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect
thereto.
ARTICLE 14.
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans
for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be
competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the
parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any
dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.
ARTICLE 15.
If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a
rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with
Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the
Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the
existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary
arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.
For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as
promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and
the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.
The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are
successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding
the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

171

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote
shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the
recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.
Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of
the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.
If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the
Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League
agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the
recommendations of the report.
If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members
thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the
Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall
consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council,
to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation
as to its settlement.
The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The
dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such
request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.
In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article
12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers
of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the
Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a
majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the
Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the
Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or
more of the parties to the dispute.
ARTICLE 16.
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under
Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war
against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject
it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse
between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the
prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of
the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of
the League or not.
It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments
concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall
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severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the
League.
The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in
the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to
minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they
will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their
number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to
afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League
which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be
declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in
by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.
ARTICLE 17.
In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a
Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States
not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in
the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may
deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive
shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.
Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into
the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most
effectual in the circumstances.
If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for
the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the
provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.
If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of
membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such
measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in
the settlement of the dispute.
ARTICLE 18.
Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the
League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be
published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so
registered.
ARTICLE 22.
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be
under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are
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inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions
of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such
peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their
experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who
are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories
on behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the
people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other
similar circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of
development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a
Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these
communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory
must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will
guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public
order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and
the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and
naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the
defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce
of other Members of the League.
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands,
which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness
from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the
Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the
Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned
in the interests of the indigenous population.
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in
reference to the territory committed to its charge.
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory
shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined
in each case by the Council.
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports
of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of
the mandates.
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ARTICLE 23.
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or
hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:
(a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men,
women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their
commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and
maintain the necessary international organisations;
(b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their
control;
(c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements
with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other
dangerous drugs;
(d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and
ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the
common interest;
(e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit
and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this
connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918
shall be borne in mind;
(f) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and
control of disease.
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